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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2021

Escaping social pressure: Fixed-term contracts in multi-establishment firms

Résumé

We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
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Dates et versions

hal-03353701 , version 1 (02-08-2023)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale

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Andrea Bassanini, Eve Caroli, François Fontaine, Antoine Rebérioux. Escaping social pressure: Fixed-term contracts in multi-establishment firms. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2021, 188, pp.697-715. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2021.05.027⟩. ⟨hal-03353701⟩
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