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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Psychology Année : 2014

Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment

Résumé

In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party, in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject is introduced who either silently observes or observes and gives feedback by choosing one of seven messages consisting of varying degrees of (dis)satisfaction. We found that observation coupled with feedback significantly increases dictators' propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it is linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature that argues that altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-reputation or social approval. This experiment contributes to the growing literature aimed at decreasing the artificiality of DG designs, by increasing their practicability and external validity
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Dates et versions

hal-01069807 , version 1 (29-09-2014)

Identifiants

Citer

Agnès Festré, Pierre Garrouste. Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, 45, pp.141-153. ⟨10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.005⟩. ⟨hal-01069807⟩
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