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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2019

Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game

Résumé

We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.

Dates et versions

halshs-01948364 , version 1 (07-12-2018)

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Citer

Giuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Elena Manzoni, Rosemarie Nagel. Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019, 167, pp.341-360. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002⟩. ⟨halshs-01948364⟩
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