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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Preprint/Prepublication) Année : 2023

Disorientation faults in CSIDH

Résumé

We investigate a new class of fault-injection attacks against the CSIDH family of cryptographic group actions. Our disorientation attacks effectively flip the direction of some isogeny steps. We achieve this by faulting a specific subroutine, connected to the Legendre symbol or Elligator computations performed during the evaluation of the group action. These subroutines are present in almost all known CSIDH implementations. Post-processing a set of faulty samples allows us to infer constraints on the secret key. The details are implementation specific, but we show that in many cases, it is possible to recover the full secret key with only a modest number of successful fault injections and modest computational resources. We provide full details for attacking the original CSIDH proof-of-concept software as well as the CTIDH constant-time implementation. Finally, we present a set of lightweight countermeasures against the attack and discuss their security.
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licence : Domaine public

Dates et versions

hal-03970597 , version 1 (02-02-2023)
hal-03970597 , version 2 (17-03-2023)

Licence

Domaine public

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03970597 , version 2

Citer

Gustavo Banegas, Juliane Krämer, Tanja Lange, Michael Meyer, Lorenz Panny, et al.. Disorientation faults in CSIDH. 2023. ⟨hal-03970597v2⟩
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