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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2015

Private Circuits II versus Fault Injection Attacks

Résumé

—Cryptographic implementations are subject to physical attacks. Private circuits II is a proven protection against a strong attacker, able to read and write on a finite number of chosen internal nodes. In practice, side-channel analyses and fault injections are less accurate: typically, classical injection techniques (clock and power glitches, electromagnetic pulses, etc.) can be reproducible, but they do not allow to choose the targeted nodes (the situation is different for software dual-rail with precharge logic, such as [1], [2], where (0, 1) ↔ (1, 0) bitflips are easier to achieve, since the computation is fully sequentialized [3]). So, a priori, private circuits II should be a secure protection against such classical fault injection attacks. In this paper, we provide the first implementation of private circuits II in FPGA, secure against read and/or reset of one internal wire chosen by the attacker. Our implementation is a manually coded netlist which instantiates LUT6 2 (with dual outputs, as required for private circuits II). Our design is a SIMON block cipher programmed in a Spartan 6 Xilinx FPGA. It features a throughput of 142 Mbit/s. We perform a security analysis, and notice that some exploitable ciphertexts can be outputted despite the countermeasure. Our analysis reveals that correlated faults exist because LUT6 2 outputs are produced almost simultaneously. In particular, the critical path actually consists in a dual-rail pair, which is consistently faulted together. If this pair is late with respect to the clock rising edge, then the previous value can be latched instead of the new one. Such fault behaves like a toggle ((01)2 becomes (10)2 or vice-versa) of licit values. They propagate to the ciphertext which becomes by the same token susceptible to a differential fault attack. Nonetheless, we emphasize that such faults require a steady fault injection setup: otherwise, multiple critical paths are violated, resulting in non-exploitable (fully zeroized) ciphertexts. Index Terms—Private circuits II; Fault injection attack; Correlated faults on dual LUT6 2 outputs; Fault effect analysis with ChipScope.
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Dates et versions

hal-01240244 , version 1 (08-12-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01240244 , version 1

Citer

Henitsoa Rakotomalala, Xuan Thuy Ngo, Zakaria Najm, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley. Private Circuits II versus Fault Injection Attacks. Reconfig 2015, Dec 2015, Mayan Riviera, Mexico. ⟨hal-01240244⟩
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