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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2016

Gossip NoC -- Avoiding Timing Side-Channel Attacks through Traffic Management

Résumé

—The wide use of Multi-processing systems-on-chip (MPSoCs) in embedded systems and the trend to increase the integration between devices have turned these systems vulnerable to attacks. Malicious software executed on compromised IP may become a serious security problem. By snooping the traffic exchanged through the Network-on-chip (NoC), it is possible to infer sensitive information such as secrets keys. NoCs are vulnerable to side channel attacks that exploit traffic interference as timing channels. When multiple IP cores are infected, they can work coordinately to implement a distributed timing attack (DTA). In this work we present for the first time the execution of a DTA and a secure enhanced NoC architecture able to avoid the timing attacks. Results show that our NoC proposal can avoid the DTA with an increase of only 1% in area and 0.8% in power regarding the whole chip design.
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Dates et versions

hal-01382947 , version 1 (19-10-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Cezar Reinbrecht, Altamiro Susin, Lilian Bossuet, Johanna Sepúlveda. Gossip NoC -- Avoiding Timing Side-Channel Attacks through Traffic Management. IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), Jul 2016, Pittsburgh, United States. pp.601 - 606, ⟨10.1109/ISVLSI.2016.25⟩. ⟨hal-01382947⟩
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