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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2017

Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies

Résumé

Classical voting rules output a winning alternative (or a nonempty set of tied alternatives). Social welfare functions output a ranking over alternatives. There are many practical situations where we have to output a different structure than a winner or a ranking: for instance, a ranked or non-ranked set of $k$ winning alternatives, or an ordered partition of alternatives. We define three classes of such aggregation functions, whose output can have any structure we want; we focus on aggregation functions that output dominating chains, dominating subsets, and dichotomies. We address the computation of our rules, and start studying their normative properties by focusing on a generalisation of Condorcet-consistency.
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Dates et versions

hal-02171294 , version 1 (02-07-2019)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02171294 , version 1

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Jérôme Lang, Jérôme Monnot, Arkadii Slinko, William Zwicker. Beyond Electing and Ranking: Collective Dominating Chains, Dominating Subsets and Dichotomies. 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS '17), May 2017, São Paulo, Brazil. pp.24-32. ⟨hal-02171294⟩
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