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# SASA: a SimulAtor of Self-stabilizing Algorithms<sup>\*\*\*</sup>

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**Abstract.** In this paper, we present SASA, an open-source SimulAtor of Self-stabilizing Algorithms. Self-stabilization defines the ability of a distributed algorithm to recover after transient failures. SASA is implemented as a faithful representation of the atomic-state model. This model is the most commonly used in the self-stabilizing area to prove both the correct operation and complexity bounds of self-stabilizing algorithms.

SASA encompasses all features necessary to debug, test, and analyze self-stabilizing algorithms. All these facilities are programmable to enable users to accommodate to their particular needs. For example, asynchrony is modeled by programmable stochastic daemons playing the role of input sequence generators. Algorithm's properties can be checked using formal test oracles.

The design of SASA relies as much as possible on existing tools: OCAML, DOT, and tools developed in the *Synchrone Group* of the VERIMAG laboratory.

**Keywords:** simulation, debugging, reactive programs, synchronous languages, distributed computing, self-stabilization, atomic-state model.

## 1 Introduction

Starting from an arbitrary configuration, a self-stabilizing algorithm [8] makes a distributed system eventually reach a so-called *legitimate* configuration from which every possible execution suffix satisfies the intended specification. Self-stabilization is defined in the reference book of Dolev [9] as a conjunction of two properties: *convergence*, which requires every execution of the algorithm to eventually reach a legitimate configuration; and *correctness*, which requires every execution starting from a legitimate configuration to satisfy the specification. Since an arbitrary configuration may be the result of transient faults,<sup>1</sup> self-stabilization is considered as a general approach for tolerating such faults in a distributed system.

The definition of self-stabilization does not directly refer to the possibility of (transient) faults. Consequently, proving or simulating a self-stabilizing system does not involve any failure pattern. Actually, this is mainly due to the fact that, in contrast with

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<sup>1</sup> A transient fault occurs at an unpredictable time, but does not result in a permanent hardware damage. Moreover, as opposed to intermittent faults, the frequency of transient faults is considered to be low.

most of existing fault tolerance (*a.k.a.*, robust) proposals, self-stabilization is a non-masking approach: it does try to hide effects of faults, but to repair the system after faults. As a result, only the consequences of faults, modeled by the arbitrary initial configuration, are treated. Hence, the actual convergence of the system is guaranteed only if there is a sufficiently large time window without any fault, which is the case when faults are transient.

Self-stabilizing algorithms are mainly compared according to their *stabilization time*, *i.e.*, the maximum time, starting from an arbitrary configuration, before reaching a legitimate configuration. By definition, the stabilization time is impacted by worst case scenarios which are unlikely in practice. So, in many cases, the average-case time complexity may be a more accurate measure of performance assuming a probabilistic model. However, the arbitrary initialization, the asynchronism, the maybe arbitrary network topology, and the algorithm design itself often make the probabilistic analysis intractable. In contrast, another popular approach consists in empirically evaluating the average-case time complexity via simulations. A simulation tool is also of prime interest since it allows testing to find flaws early in the design process.

**Contribution.** We provide to the self-stabilizing community an open-source, versatile, lightweight (in terms of memory footprint), and efficient (in terms of simulation time) simulator, called SASA,<sup>2</sup> to help the design and evaluate average performances of self-stabilizing distributed algorithms written in the *atomic-state model* (ASM). The ASM is a locally shared memory model in which each process can directly read the local states of its neighbors in the network. This computational model is the most commonly used in the self-stabilizing area.<sup>3</sup>

The SASA programming interface is simple, yet rich enough to allow a direct encoding of any distributed algorithm described in the ASM. All important concepts used in this model are available: simulation can be run and evaluated in moves, atomic steps, and rounds; the three main time units used in the ASM. Classical execution schedulers, *a.k.a.* daemons, are available: the central, locally central, distributed, and synchronous daemons. All levels of anonymity can be modeled, such as fully anonymous, rooted, or identified. Finally, distributed algorithms can be either uniform (all nodes execute the same local algorithm), or non-uniform.

SASA can perform batch simulations that use test oracles to check expected properties. For example, one can check that the stabilization time in rounds is upper bounded by a given function. SASA can also be run in an interactive mode, to ease algorithms debugging. During the simulator development, a constant guideline has been to take, as much as possible, advantage of existing tools. In particular, SASA heavily relies on the Synchronic Reactive Toolbox [19] and benefits from its supporting tools, *e.g.*, for testing using formal oracles and debugging. Another guideline has been to make all SASA's facilities easily configurable and programmable so that users can define specific features tailored for their particular needs.

**Related work.** Only few simulators dedicated to self-stabilization in locally shared memory models, such as the ASM, have been proposed [11,15,21]. Overall, they all have limited capabilities and features, and are not extensible since not programmable.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www-verimag.imag.fr/DIST-TOOLS/SYNCHRONE/sasa>

<sup>3</sup> To the best of our knowledge, this model is exclusively used in the self-stabilizing area.

Using these simulators, only few pre-defined properties, such as convergence, can be checked on the fly.

In more detail, Flatebo and Datta [11] propose a simulator of the ASM to evaluate leader election, mutual exclusion, and  $\ell$ -exclusion algorithms on restricted topologies, mainly rings. This simulator is not available today. It proposes limited facilities including classical daemons and evaluation of stabilization time in moves only.

Müllner *et al.* [21] present a simulator (written in Erlang) of the register model, a computational model which is close to the ASM. This simulator does not allow to evaluate stabilization time. Actually, it focuses on three fault tolerance measures, initially devoted to masking fault-tolerant systems (namely, reliability, instantaneous availability, and limiting availability [24]) to evaluate them on self-stabilizing systems. However, these measures are still uncommon today in analyses of self-stabilizing algorithms. Moreover, this simulator is heavy in terms of memory footprint. As an illustrative example, it simulates the same spanning tree constructions as we do: while they need up to 1 gigabits of memory for simulating a 256-node random network, we only need up to 235 megabits for executing the same algorithms in the same settings.

The simulator (written in Java) proposed by Har-Tal [15] allows to run self-stabilizing algorithms in the register model on small networks (around 10 nodes). It only proposes a small amount of facilities, *i.e.*, the execution scheduling is either synchronous, or controlled step by step by the user. Only the legitimacy of the current configuration can be tested. Finally, it provides neither batch mode, nor debugging tools.

**Roadmap.** Section 2 is a digest of the ASM. SASA is presented in Section 3. We give experimental results in Section 4; an artifact to reproduce these results is available in appendix. We conclude in Section 5 with future work.

## 2 An Example: Asynchronous Unison in the Atomic-State Model

We present the atomic-state model (ASM) using the *asynchronous unison* algorithm of [7] as a running example: a clock synchronization problem which requires the difference between clocks of every two neighbors to be at most one increment at each instant.

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**Algorithm 1** Asynchronous Unison, local algorithm for each node  $p$

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**Constant Input:**  $\mathcal{N}_p$ , the set of  $p$ 's neighbors

**Variable:**  $p.c \in \{0, \dots, K-1\}$ , where  $K > n^2$ , and  $n$  is the number of nodes

**Predicate:**  $behind(a, b) = ((b.c - a.c) \bmod K) \leq n$

**Actions:**

$I(p) :: \forall q \in \mathcal{N}_p, behind(p, q) \quad \leftrightarrow \quad p.c \leftarrow (p.c + 1) \bmod K$

$R(p) :: p.c \neq 0 \wedge (\exists q \in \mathcal{N}_p, \neg behind(p, q) \wedge \neg behind(q, p)) \quad \leftrightarrow \quad p.c \leftarrow 0$

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**Distributed algorithms.** A distributed algorithm consists of a collection of local algorithms, one per node. The local algorithm of each node  $p$  (see Algorithm 1) is made


of a finite set of *variables* and a finite set of *actions* (written as guarded commands) to update them.

Some of the variables, like  $\mathcal{N}_p$  in Algorithm 1, may be constant inputs in which case their values are predefined. Actually, here,  $\mathcal{N}_p$  represents the local view of the network topology at each node  $p$ :  $\mathcal{N}_p$  is the set of  $p$ 's neighbors in the network. Algorithm 1 assumes the network is connected and bidirectional, so  $q \in \mathcal{N}_p$  if and only if  $p \in \mathcal{N}_q$ . Then, each node holds a single writable variable, noted  $p.c$  and called its local *clock*. Each clock  $p.c$  is actually an integer with range 0 to  $K - 1$ , where  $K > n^2$  is a parameter common to all nodes, and  $n$  denotes the number of nodes. Communication exchanges are carried out by read and write operations on variables: a node can read its variables and those of its neighbors, but can write only to its own variables. For example, in Algorithm 1, each node  $p$  can read the value of  $p.c$  and that of  $q.c$ , for every  $q \in \mathcal{N}_p$ , but can only write to  $p.c$ . The *state* of a node is defined by the values of its variables. A *configuration* is a vector consisting of the states of each node.

Each action is of the following form:  $\langle \text{label} \rangle :: \langle \text{guard} \rangle \leftrightarrow \langle \text{statement} \rangle$ . *Labels* are only used to identify actions. A *guard* is a Boolean predicate involving the variables of the node and those of its neighbors. The *statement* is a sequence of assignments on the node's variables. An action can be executed only if its guard evaluates to *true*, in which case, the action is said to be *enabled*. By extension, a node is enabled if at least one of its actions is enabled. In Algorithm 1, we have two (locally mutually exclusive) actions per node  $p$ ,  $I(p)$  and  $R(p)$ .

**Steps and executions.** Nodes run their local algorithm by *atomically* executing actions. Asynchronism is modeled by a *nondeterministic* adversary called *daemon*. Precisely, an execution is a sequence of configurations, where the system moves from a configuration to another as follows. Assume the current configuration is  $\gamma$ . If no node is enabled in  $\gamma$ , the execution is done and  $\gamma$  is said to be *terminal*. Otherwise, the daemon *activates* a non-empty subset  $S$  of nodes that are enabled in  $\gamma$ ; then every node in  $S$  *atomically* executes one of its action enabled in  $\gamma$ , leading the system to a new configuration  $\gamma'$ , and so on. The transition from  $\gamma$  to  $\gamma'$  is called a *step*. Usual daemons include: (1) the *synchronous* daemon which activates every enabled node at each step, (2) the *central* daemon which activates exactly one enabled node at each step, (3) the *locally central* daemon which never activates two neighbors at the same step, and (4) the *distributed* daemon which activates at least one, maybe more, node at each step.

**Self-stabilization of Algorithm 1.** Let  $p$  be any node. When the clock of  $p$  is at most  $n$  increments behind the clock values of all its neighbors,  $p$  is enabled to increment its clock modulo  $K$  by Action  $I(p)$ ; see, e.g., node  $p4$  in Configuration 5 of Figure 1. In contrast, if the clock of  $p$  is not equal to 0 and  $p$  has a neighbor  $q$  such that  $p.c$  is more than  $n$  increments behind  $q.c$  and  $q.c$  more than  $n$  increments behind  $p.c$ , then  $p$  should reset its clock to 0 using Action  $R(p)$ ; see, e.g., node  $p1$  in Configuration 1. The legitimate configurations of Algorithm 1 are those where for any two neighbors  $p$  and  $q$ , we have  $p.c \in \{(q.c - 1) \bmod K, q.c, (q.c + 1) \bmod K\}$ . Algorithm 1 is a self-stabilizing algorithm under the distributed daemon in the sense that starting from an arbitrary configuration, every asynchronous execution of Algorithm 1 eventually reaches a legitimate configuration from which every possible execution suffix satisfies the following specifi-



**Fig. 1.** Five steps of Algorithm 1 for  $K = 257$  on a 16-node grid (from SASA). " $p_i : j$ " means that  $p_i.c = j$ . Enabled nodes are in orange and green. Moreover, orange nodes are activated within the next step.

cation: (1) in each configuration, the difference between clocks of every two neighbors is at most one (*Safety*); and (2) each clock is incremented infinitely often (*Liveness*).

**Time complexity units.** Three main units are used for counting time: *steps*, *moves*, and *rounds*. Steps simply refer to atomic steps of the execution. A node *moves* when it executes an action in a step. Hence, several moves may occur in a step. Rounds capture the execution time according to the speed of the slowest node. The first round of an execution  $e$  is the minimal prefix  $e'$  of  $e$  during which every node that is enabled in the first configuration of  $e$  either executes an action or becomes disabled (due to some neighbor actions) at least once. The second round of  $e$  starts from the last configuration of  $e'$ , and so on.

These notions are illustrated by Figure 1. The second step (from Configuration 2 to 3) contains two moves (by  $p_2$  and  $p_4$ ). The first round ends in Configuration 3. Indeed, there are two enabled nodes,  $p_1$  and  $p_4$  in Configuration 1. Node  $p_1$  moves in the first step, however in Configuration 2, the round is not done since  $p_4$  has neither moved nor become disabled. The first round terminates after  $p_4$  has moved in the second step. Consequently, the second round starts in Configuration 3. This latter actually terminates in Configuration 6.

### 3 The SASA Simulator

#### 3.1 SASA Features

This Section surveys the SASA main features. More information is available online as SASA tutorials [16].


**Batch simulations.** They are useful to perform simulation campaigns, *e.g.*, to evaluate the average-case complexity of an algorithm on wide families of networks, including random graphs. They can also be used to study the influence on some parameters.

**Interactive graphical simulations.** It is possible to run a simulation step by step, or round by round, forward or backward, while visualizing the network as well as the enabled and activated nodes; see snapshots in Figure 1. New commands can be also programmed so that users can navigate through the simulation according to their specific needs.

**Predefined and custom daemons.** The daemon, which parameterizes the simulation, can be configured. First, SASA provides several *predefined daemons*, including the synchronous, central, locally central, or distributed daemon; for such daemons, non-determinism is resolved uniformly at random. But, the user can also build its own *custom daemon*: this is useful to experiment new activation heuristics, or explore worst cases. Indeed, the daemon can be interactively controlled using a graphical widget: at each step, the user selects the nodes to be activated among the enabled ones. The daemon can also be programmed; such a program can take advantage of the simulation history to guide the simulation into particular directions.

**Test oracles.** Expected (safety) properties of algorithms can be formalized and used as test oracles. Typically, they involve the number of steps, moves, or rounds that is necessary to reach a (user-defined) legitimate configuration. In order to define such properties, one has access to node state values and activation status [16]. Properties are checked on the fly at every simulation step.

### 3.2 The Core of SASA



**Fig. 2.** The SASA Core Simulator Architecture

The core of SASA is a stand-alone simulator; see Figure 2. The user has to define both a network and a self-stabilizing algorithm following the API given in Section 3.3. The algorithm is written as an OCAML program: the interface has been designed in such a way that the OCAML program implementing the algorithm is as close as possible to guarded commands, the usual way to write algorithms in the ASM. The network topology is specified using the DOT language [12] for which many support exists such as visualization tools and graph editors. The OCAML algorithm is compiled into a dynamic library which is used, together with the DOT network file, by SASA to generate

simulation data. A simulation data file contains an execution trace made of the sequence of configurations. That trace also contains the enabled and activated action history. Such traces can be visualized using chronogram viewers.

### 3.3 The SASA Algorithm Programming Interface

SASA algorithms are defined using a simple programming interface specified in the 37 lines OCAML file, `algo.mli`, which is presented below.

**Local States.** Node states are defined by the polymorphic type `'st` which can represent any data the designer needs, *e.g.*, integers, arrays, or structures. Nodes can access their neighbor states using the abstract type `'st neighbor` (the `"'st"` part means that the type `neighbor` is parameterized by the type `'st`). The access to neighboring states is made by Function `state` which takes a neighbor as input and returns its state; see Listing 1.1.

```
type 'st neighbor
val state: 'st neighbor -> 'st
```

**Listing 1.1.** Access to neighbors' states

**Algorithms.** To define an instance of the local algorithm of each node, SASA requires:

1. a list of action names;
2. an enable function, which encodes the guards of the algorithm;
3. a step function, that triggers an enabled action;
4. a state initialization function, used if no initial configuration is provided in the DOT file. Indeed, even if self-stabilization does not require it, initialization is mandatory to begin the simulation. For example, pseudo-random functions can be used to obtain an arbitrary initial configuration.

```
type action = string
type 'st enable_fun = 'st -> 'st neighbor list -> action list
type 'st step_fun = 'st -> 'st neighbor list -> action -> 'st
type 'st state_init_fun = int -> 'st
```

**Listing 1.2.** The step, enable, and initialization function types

The enable function takes the current state of the node and the list of its neighbors as arguments. It returns a list of enabled actions. The step function takes the same arguments plus the action to activate, and returns an updated state. The initial configuration can be set using an initialization function that takes as argument the node's number of neighbors.

**Topological Information.** Algorithms usually depend on parameters relative to the network topology. For example, Algorithm 1 uses the number  $n$  of nodes. SASA provides access to those parameters through various functions that the algorithms can use.



```

val card: unit -> int
val diameter: unit -> int
val min_degree : unit -> int
val max_degree: unit -> int
val is_connected : unit -> bool

```

**Listing 1.3.** Some of the topological parameters provided by the API

**Example.** Listing 1.4 shows the implementation of Algorithm 1 in SASA: notice that we obtain a faithful direct translation of Algorithm 1.

```

open Algo
let n = Algo.card()
let k = n * n + 1
let (init_state: int state_init_fun) = fun _ -> (Random.int k)
let modulo x n = (* for it to return positive values *)
  if x < 0 then n+x mod n else x mod n
let behind pc qc = (modulo (qc-pc) k) <= n
let (enable_f: int enable_fun) = fun c nl ->
  if List.for_all (fun q -> behind c (state q)) nl
  then ["I(p)"] else
  if List.exists (fun q -> not (behind c (state q)) &&
    not (behind (state q) c)) nl
    && c <> 0
  then ["R(p)"] else []
let (step_f: int step_fun) = fun c nl a ->
  match a with
  | "I(p)" -> modulo (c + 1) k
  | "R(p)" -> 0
  | _ -> assert false
let actions = Some ["I(p)"; "R(p)"]

```

**Listing 1.4.** Implementation of Algorithm 1

### 3.4 Connection to the Sychrone Reactive Toolbox

In SASA, a simulation is made of steps executed in a loop. Each step consists of two successive stages. The first stage is made of the atomic and synchronous execution of all activated nodes (1-a), followed by the evaluation of which nodes are enabled in the next step (1-b).<sup>4</sup> At the second stage, a daemon nondeterministically chooses among the enabled nodes which ones should be activated at the next step (2). Overall, this can be viewed as a *reactive* program (Stage (1)) that runs in closed-loop with its environment (Stage (2)), where the outputs (resp. the inputs) of the program are the inputs (resp. the outputs) of its environment.

<sup>4</sup> At the first step, the simulation loop starts in (1-b).

Thus, we could enlarge the functionalities offered by SASA by connecting our simulator to the *Synchrone Reactive Toolbox* [19], which targets the development and validation of reactive programs. The LUTIN language [23], which was designed to model stochastic reactive systems, is used to program daemons that take the feedback-loop into account. The synchronous language LUSTRE [14] is used to formalize the expected properties. Indeed, this language is well-suited for the definition of such properties, as they involve the logical time history of node states. Such Lustre formalizations are used as oracles to automate the test decision [18]. Finally, RDBG [17], a programmable debugger for reactive programs, provides the ability to perform interactive simulations, visualize the network, and implement user tailored features.

## 4 Experimental Results

To validate the tool, we have implemented and tested classical algorithms using various assumptions on the daemon and topology. Below, we give our methodology and some results.

**Algorithms under test.** We have implemented the following self-stabilizing algorithms: a token circulation for rooted unidirectional rings assuming a distributed daemon (DTR [8]); a breadth first search spanning tree construction for rooted networks assuming a distributed daemon (BFS [2]); a depth first search spanning tree construction for rooted networks assuming a distributed daemon (DFS [6]); a coloring algorithm for anonymous networks assuming a locally central daemon (COL [13]); a synchronous unison for anonymous networks assuming a synchronous daemon (SYN [3]); and Algorithm 1 (ASY [7]). All these algorithms can be found in the SASA gitlab repository.<sup>2</sup>

**Methodology.** For each algorithm of the above list, we have written a direct implementation of the original guarded-command algorithm. Such implementations include the running assumptions, *e.g.*, the topology and daemon. Then, we have used the interactive graphical feature of SASA through the debugger RDBG to test and debug them on well-chosen small corner-case topologies. Finally, we have implemented test oracles to check known properties of these algorithms, including correctness from (resp. convergence to) a legitimate configuration, as well as bounds on their stabilization time in moves, steps, and rounds, when available. Testing all those properties is a way to check the implementation of the algorithms. But, as these properties are well-known results, this is, above all, a mean to check whether the implementation of SASA fits the computational model and its semantics.

**Performances.** The results, given in Table 1, have been obtained on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6 138 CPU at 2.00GHz with 50GB of RAM. We are interested in comparing the performances of the simulator on the above algorithms, according to different topologies. Note that every algorithm assumes an arbitrary topology, except **DTR** which requires a ring network. Hence we perform measurements on every algorithm, except **DTR**. We have ran simulations on several kinds of topologies: two square grids, noted `grid.dot` and `biggrid.dot`, of 100 nodes (180 links) and 10 000 nodes (19 800 links), respectively; as well as two random graphs, noted `ER.dot` and `bigER.dot`, built using the Erdős-Rényi model [10] with 256 nodes (9 811 links, average degree

76) and 2 000 nodes (600 253 links, average degree 600), respectively. Every simulation, launched automatically, lasts up to 10 000 steps, except for the two big graphs (`biggrid.dot` and `bigER.dot`). For these latter, we have only performed 10 steps. For fair evaluation, we provide the execution time elapsed per step (Time/Step). Note that the DFS algorithm has been implemented using two different data structures to encode the local states, namely lists and arrays. This leads to different performances; see **DFS-l** for list implementation and **DFS-a** for array implementation.

	grid.dot		ER.dot		biggrid.dot		bigER.dot	
	Time/Step	Memory	Time/Step	Memory	Time/Step	Memory	Time/Step	Memory
<b>BFS</b>	0.6 ms	10 MB	12 ms	22 MB	2 s	59 MB	2 s	922 MB
<b>DFS-l</b>	0.8 ms	11 MB	66 ms	31 MB	3 s	67 MB	14 s	953 MB
<b>DFS-a</b>	0.6 ms	12 MB	70 ms	112 MB	8 s	7464 MB	64 s	30808 MB
<b>COL</b>	0 ms	10 MB	12 ms	21 MB	18 s	59 MB	7 s	941 MB
<b>SYN</b>	0.4 ms	11 MB	12 ms	31 MB	826 s	898 MB	12 s	1019 MB
<b>ASY</b>	0.1 ms	10 MB	5 ms	31 MB	0 s	67 MB	2 s	953 MB

**Table 1.** Performance evaluation of SASA on the benchmark algorithms. Time elapsing is measured in user+system time in seconds or milliseconds, and has been divided by the number of simulation steps. Memory consumption is given in MegaBytes, and has been obtained using the “Maximum resident set size” given by the GNU `time` utility.

The results in Table 1 show that SASA can handle dense networks of huge size. Hence, it allows to measure the evolution of time complexity of algorithms using a wide size variety of networks. Note that every simulation has been performed without data file (`.rif`, see Figure 2) generation. Indeed, for large networks, this would produce huge files and the simulator would use most of its time writing the data file. For example, a 10 000 steps simulation of **DFS-a** on `bigER.dot` generates 2GB of data and takes several days (instead of 15 minutes). Indeed, 100 millions values are generated at each step. For such examples, being able to generate inputs and check oracles on the fly is a real advantage.

## 5 Conclusion and Future Work

This article presents an open-source Simulator of Self-stabilizing Algorithms, called SASA. Its programming interface is simple, yet rich enough to allow a direct encoding of any distributed algorithm written in the atomic-state model, the most commonly used model in the self-stabilizing area.

In order to limit the engineering effort, SASA relies on existing tools such as, the OCAML programming environment to define the algorithms, DOT to define the networks, and the Synchronic Reactive Toolbox [19] to carry out formal testing and interactive simulations.

In the spirit of TLA+ [20], an interesting future work consists in connecting SASA to tools enabling formal verification of self-stabilizing algorithms. By connecting SASA to model-checkers [5,22], the expected properties specified as LUSTRE oracles could be

verified on some particular networks. This would imply to provide a LUSTRE version of the OCAML API to encode algorithms.

Furthermore, SASA could be connected to the PADEC framework [1], which provides libraries to develop mechanically checked proofs of self-stabilizing algorithms using the Coq proof assistant [4]. Since Coq is able to perform automatic OCAML program extraction, we should be able to simulate the certified algorithms using the same source. During the certification process, it could be useful to perform simulations in order to guide the formalization into Coq theorems, or find flaws (*e.g.*, into technical lemmas) early in the proof elaboration.

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## A Artifact

We have set up a zenodo entry that contains the necessary materials to reproduce the results given in this article: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3753012>. This entry contains:

- a zip file containing an artifact based on the (public) TAP 2020 Virtual Machine (<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3751283>). It is the artefact that has been validated by the TAP 2020 evaluation committee.
- a zip file made out of a public git repository containing the same set of scripts; the differences are that it is much smaller, and that the top-level script uses docker to replay the experiments. The entry also contains a link to this git repository.
- a zip file containing the raw data produced by the experiment scripts via a Gitlab CI pipeline of the git repository.

In more details, the artefact contains instructions to install the necessary tools, to replay the interactive session described in Section 2 of the present paper, and to automatically generate the data contained in Table 1 of Section 4. The objective of this artifact is only to let one reproduce the results. If you want to learn more about the toolset, we advice the reader to look at the documentation and tutorials online [16].