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Mark van Atten

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Chapter 1

Natural constructive proofs of A via $A \rightarrow B$, proof paradoxes, and impredicativity

Mark van Atten, July 23, 2021

for Göran

Abstract Guided by a passage in Kreisel, this is a discussion of the relations between the phenomena in the title, with special attention to the method of analysis and synthesis in Greek geometry, fixed point theorems, and Kreisel's contact with Gödel.

Key words: analysis and synthesis, Brouwer, constructivity, informal proof, fixed points, formal proof, Gödel, Goodman, Greek geometry, Heyting, implication, impredicativity, intuitionistic logic, Kreisel, paradoxes, Troelstra

1.1	Introduction: A passage in Kreisel	2
1.2	Key concepts in that passage	3
1.2.1	Proof and formal proof	3
1.2.2	Naturalness	5
1.2.3	Constructivity	6
1.3	Cases depending on a proof of B	8
1.3.1	Finding the formula B from the formula A	8
1.3.2	A contrast with analytic proofs in a different sense	17
1.3.3	Finding the formula A from the formula B	20
1.4	Cases independent of a proof of B : proof paradoxes	23
1.4.1	'Errors'	23
1.4.2	Lawvere's Fixed Point Theorem	27
1.4.3	Russell's Paradox	30
1.4.4	Proof paradoxes	31
1.4.4.1	Kreisel's Paradox	31
1.4.4.2	Gödel's Paradox (intuitionistic)	36
1.4.4.3	Troelstra's Paradox	44
1.4.4.4	Goodman's Paradox	48
1.4.5	Critical impredicativity	52
1.5	Closing remark	66
	References	67

Mark van Atten
Archives Husserl, Pays Germaniques (CNRS / ENS), 45 rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris, France,
e-mail: mvatten@ens.fr

1.1 Introduction: A passage in Kreisel

In his obituary for Brouwer in the *Memoirs of the Royal Society*, Kreisel explains the meaning of constructive implication thus:

- (1.1) to prove $A \rightarrow B$, one needs two things: a mapping π from proofs to proofs, and a proof, say p_0 , establishing that, if any p proves A then $\pi(p)$ proves B . [Kreisel and Newman, 1969, p. 57]

This is his construal of the corresponding clause in Heyting's Proof Interpretation:

- (1.2) The implication $p \rightarrow q$ can be asserted, if and only if we possess a construction r , which, joined to any construction proving p (supposing that the latter be effected), would automatically effect a construction proving q . [Heyting, 1956, p. 98]

Kreisel, keeping (1.1) in mind, further on writes:

- (1.3a) Perhaps because of all this experience or for intrinsic reasons, nobody seems ever to have been as much as tempted to put down false principles in elementary constructivity. In contrast, if one actually wants to formulate explicit properties of proofs, one has to keep one's wits about one to avoid errors which are, formally, similar to Russell's paradox in set theory.
- (1.3b) This is not surprising, inasmuch as Russell's paradox involves some kind of self application and, as seen from the example of implication, proofs obviously are about themselves, specifically the proof p_0 is involved in some values of the variable p .

and then adds this parenthesis:

- (1.3c) (Incidentally, it is one of the peculiarities of constructive logic that, for some A , a *natural* formal proof of A goes *via* proofs of $A \rightarrow B$ and of $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$: such a proof of A actually contains a proof of $A \rightarrow B$.) [Kreisel and Newman, 1969, p. 58, original emphasis]¹

These passages (1.3a)–(1.3c) raise, in order of reading, several questions, to discuss which is the purpose of the present paper:²

1. What 'errors' are referred to in (1.3a)? (section 1.4.1)
2. In (1.3b) Kreisel notes that the informal construal of implication in (1.1) shares a dependence on 'a kind of self-application' with Russell's Paradox, but he does not go on to suggest that this would be reason to find (1.1) suspect. Whence the difference? (section 1.4.5)

¹ On p. 23 of the 'palimpsest of essays' Odifreddi [2019b], the passage (1.3a)–(1.3c) has retained its original content, but (1.3c) has been turned into a footnote.

² As sources for Kreisel's views that are pertinent to (1.3c), which was published in 1969, publications have been chosen from the encompassing period 1965–1973.

3. What, in (1.3c), is the role of the explicit qualification of formality, what notion of naturalness is being appealed to, and what is meant by ‘constructive logic’? (sections 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3)
4. What are examples of such A and B as (1.3c) refers to? (sections 1.3.1, 1.3.3, 1.4.4)
5. Given that (1.3c) is about formal proofs, but (1.3b) about informal ones, what is the exact bearing of (1.3c) on (1.3b)? (sections 1.4.5, 1.5)
6. As far as I have been able to determine, Kreisel did not elaborate on (1.3a)–(1.3c) elsewhere. If that is correct, could a conjecture be made why he didn’t? (section 1.4.5)

Possible differences between Kreisel’s (1.1) and Heyting’s (1.2) will be discussed as little as possible, as with respect to the remarks (1.3a)–(1.3c) and the questions they make one ask, they seem to be interchangeable.³

1.2 Key concepts in that passage

1.2.1 Proof and formal proof

Kreisel characterises proofs, ‘intuitive proofs’ [Kreisel, 1968b, p. 321], as ‘mental processes by means of which we convince ourselves of the validity of (mathematical) propositions’ [Kreisel, 1973, p. 263], but also as objects that are ‘abstract’ [Kreisel, 1968b, p. 344] or ‘intensional’ [Kreisel, 1971a, p. 242]. The senses of process and object are closely related, and not so much in opposition as revealing of the different ways in which proofs present themselves to us. In the order of both things and explanations, intuitive proof takes priority over formal proof:

Indeed it is easy to forget that formal languages or formal derivations are introduced *because* they express propositions and proofs respectively: an argument which can be formalized by given derivation rules is conclusive *not* because the formalization proceeds according to *some* formal rules, but because the formal rules have been *seen* to preserve validity. Only in conjunction with this act of seeing the validity of

(1.4)

³ The key terms describing differences are ‘second clauses’ and ‘proof conditions versus assertion conditions’. The former refers to Kreisel’s explicit demand for a mathematical proof (object) p_0 ; in Heyting’s formulation this is either implicit or, on the contrary, absent because not required; Sundholm has argued that what is required is rather an act (of understanding a construction process), which is not a mathematical object [1983, pp. 161–167, 169n13]. To my mind, Sundholm is correct here. Be that as it may, it could be argued that (i) coming to possess a mathematical proof and coming to understand a construction process are both cases of coming to *accept*, that (ii) on either (otherwise unadorned) reading of Heyting’s clause, accepting certain proofs of A presupposes accepting a constituent proof of $A \rightarrow B$, and that (iii) this captures enough of the ‘involvement’ that Kreisel speaks of in (1.3b).

the rules is the formal verification that a sequence of formulae is constructed according to given formal rules, a proof. In short, *proofs* as understood here (and in ordinary life and mathematics) are not linguistic objects. [Kreisel, 1970, p. 29, original emphasis]

This was of course a staple in Brouwer, Heyting, and Gödel; among those of Kreisel’s own generation, one finds a clear expression also in Myhill 1960, both – incidentally, born within five weeks of one another – having been strongly influenced by Gödel.⁴

Besides ‘intuitive’ and ‘abstract’, qualifications that are used (by Kreisel or others) to indicate proofs in this primordial sense are ‘absolute’, ‘contentual’, ‘contentful’, ‘informal’, or ‘non-formal’, depending on context and emphasis.⁵

⁴ Of more recent defenses (or sympathetic discussions) of this idea, I here mention e.g. Leitgeb [2009], Tanswell [2015], and Crocco [2019].

⁵ The latter four all serve to translate the German ‘inhaltlich’, which according to the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen* (<https://www.dwds.de/d/woerterbuecher>) goes back to the 17th century.

Further and later information about Kreisel’s take comes from von Plato, who writes:

- (1.5) I translate *inhaltlich* as contentful. Gödel suggested in the 1960s ‘contentual,’ but my translation is at least an English word. Georg Kreisel disliked it: He told me in July 2010 that one should just use the word *meaning*. *Inhaltlich*, then, would be *meaningfully*, or perhaps *in terms of meaning*. I regret not having asked what he thought of Gödel’s invented word. [von Plato, 2017, p. 259]

In an email to me of November 7, 2020, von Plato adds that ‘or perhaps *in terms of meaning*’ is his adaptation for cases where ‘meaningfully’ would not fit, and that Kreisel preferred the translation to be as common a word in English as ‘inhaltlich’ is in German.

To take the claim about Gödel first, compare this remark by Van Heijenoort:

- (1.6) A teaser for translators of German texts on foundations of mathematics is the word ‘inhaltlich’. Mr. Bauer-Mengelberg coined the neologism ‘contentual’ and used it at a number of places. Elsewhere various periphrases were adopted; in particular, Professor Gödel suggested those that are used in the translation of his *1931*. [van Heijenoort, 1967, p. viii]

In that translation of Gödel’s paper, it is always suitable locutions with ‘meaning’ or ‘interpretation’ that are used. As pointed out in Buldt [1997, p. 92], this indicates that Gödel did not like ‘contentual’, which word Van Heijenoort will surely have suggested to him, perhaps when they met in September 1963; the matter does not come up in their letters selected for Gödel [2003b]. In the mentioned email, von Plato takes Buldt’s point.

Although ‘contentual’ may well have seemed a neologism to all mentioned so far, strictly speaking it was not. The *Oxford English Dictionary* lists it with the meaning ‘belonging to, or dealing with, content (opp. act or form)’. That is, admittedly, in its second *Supplement*, published in 1972 (and neither in the original volume for the letter C of 1893, nor in the first *Supplement* to the dictionary, of 1933), but the three citations given there are dated 1909, 1935, and 1962. (Incidentally, with an eye on Gödel’s interests one notes that the citation of 1962, ‘distinguishing the formal from the contentual features of propositions’, comes from *Plato’s Later Epistemology* [Runciman, 1962, p. 132] – where it is claimed that, for methodological reasons, Plato, unlike Aristotle, was not able to make that distinction.)

In their translation of Weyl [1928], Bauer-Mengelberg and Føllesdal use ‘contentual’ for ‘inhaltlich’, but employ ‘meaningful’ for ‘sinnerfüllt’ [van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 482].

Two aspects of formalisation that come to mind as possible further determinants of the full meaning of ‘formal proof’ in (1.3c), individually or together, are explicitation and arithmetisation. While an informal reasoning is the starting point for a formal proof, the latter, when interpreted as intended, supplements it wherever needed by making explicit what was left implicit, such as certain premises or conditions. And through the device of arithmetisation, certain formulas whose intended meaning is arithmetical acquire additional meaning concerning properties of the formalism itself. (Such formulas may themselves be reasoned about informally or formally again.)

Below, I will use notation such as $A \rightarrow B$ both for meaningful propositions and for formal statements, and Gentzen’s Natural Deduction to represent both informal and formal proofs. On each occasion, the context makes clear which is meant. The exact choice of proof system has no bearing on the present discussion, as long as it embodies the idea that if a formal proof is constructed on the basis of given ones, then the former retains the latter as parts; otherwise Kreisel’s remark (1.3c) about ‘literal containment’ cannot apply. For example, Gentzen’s Sequent Calculus (when seen as instructions for constructing Natural Deduction proofs) also complies, but tableau systems do not (Boolos [1984, pp. 377-378]; D’Agostino and Mondadori [1994, p. 287]).

1.2.2 Naturalness

Although the adjective ‘natural’ has a variety of meanings, as witnessed in, for example, the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the one that seems the most suitable for a reading of (1.3c) is ‘naturally arising or resulting from, fully consonant with, the circumstances of the case’, as it is a naturalness that should reflect a ‘peculiarity of constructive logic’. Which among the ‘circumstances’ are the relevant ones, and what ‘consonance’ consists in, will depend on choices guided by values; these choices and values may moreover vary over time.⁶ On the other hand, a formal proof can be completely described in factual or non-evaluative terms. A formal proof can therefore only be argued to be natural if it is seen in relation to something else, such that either that something or

Finally, a reflection on Crocco’s suggestion [2019] of a difference between Kreisel’s ‘informal proof’ and Gödel’s ‘absolute proof’ will have to wait for another occasion.

(I thank Jan von Plato for discussion of an earlier version of this footnote, and for permission to refer to his email.)

⁶ A recent, detailed philosophical and linguistic analysis of naturalness in mathematics, culminating in an emphasis on ‘the dynamic and prescriptive character of naturalness’ that I find congenial, is Mauro and Venturi [2015]. Note that they likewise consult a dictionary, ‘the Oxford Dictionary’ (presumably, given their quotes, the *Oxford Dictionary of English*), but only consider (in a careful way: see pp. 280 and 311) the primary definition they found there: ‘Existing in or derived from nature; not made or caused by humankind’, and not the fourth, ‘in accordance with the nature of, or circumstances surrounding, someone or something’. The latter is closer to the meaning I appeal to.

that relation is subject to evaluation, because an evaluative conclusion of an argument requires at least one evaluative premise. The obvious suggestion now is that if a formal proof derives its status of proof from an intuitive proof, then one way in which a certain formal proof could be considered natural is the derivative one where the intuitive proof it formalises is considered natural in some non-derivative sense. This is why, even though a discussion of natural constructive formal proofs (as in (1.3c)) is central to the present note, its title leaves out the qualification ‘formal’. What naturalness of an intuitive proof consists in is perhaps best considered case-by-case.

1.2.3 Constructivity

To have the idea of (*i*) formally constructive proofs to which (*ii*) constructive meanings are assigned according to certain explanations or interpretations, one must have notions of constructivity of two kinds, theoretical ones for (*ii*) and a pre-theoretical (‘naive’, ‘heuristic’) one for (*i*). The pre-theoretical notion is appealed to when characterising formalisms as constructive, and can be analysed into a variety of theoretical notions in terms of which these formalisms are then given full meanings; the appropriateness of each of the latter is subject to philosophical debate.⁷ Of course, both the pre-theoretical and the theoretical notions have their uses also independently of any formalism.

Pre-theoretically, the following two familiar conditions on constructive non-formal proof are uncontentious: from a proof of an existential proposition one should be able to obtain an instance, and from a proof of a disjunction a proof of one of the disjuncts. Further conditions have led to debate. For example, in the development of intuitionistic logic, Johansson denied that *Ex Falso* holds for it, Freudenthal held that a proof of any proposition $A \rightarrow B$ must begin by proving A , and Griss argued that negation is not a constructive operation.⁸ There is a large overlap with the concerns that led to the development of relevance logic, and it may be argued that Brouwer’s ideas about logic [Brouwer, 1907, 1908] lead to a relevance logic [van Atten, 2009, p. 124]. In the latter case, $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$ would not hold; certain instances may still be demonstrable, but not on the ground on which the schema is considered acceptable by others. (This will be relevant on page 16.) Heyting [1956] accepted the debated principles mentioned. While Kreisel in his publications has little to say about this kind of discussion, his explicit point of reference for informal constructive logic is always Heyting.⁹

The statements of the informal conditions on existential and disjunctive propositions have formal analogues in what have become known as the Dis-

⁷ For an overview, see e.g. Ruitenburg [1991].

⁸ For references and discussion, see van Atten [2017].

⁹ On Freudenthal’s conception, remark (1.3c) could not be made.

junction Property

$$\text{If } S \vdash A \vee B, \text{ then } S \vdash A \text{ or } S \vdash B. \quad (\text{DP})$$

and the Existence Property

$$\text{If } S \vdash \exists xP(x), \text{ then } S \vdash P(t) \text{ for some term } t. \quad (\text{EP})$$

The natural and common system HA has both [Kleene, 1945]. But whereas the mentioned pre-theoretical conditions are constitutive of non-formal constructivism, it is not the case that, analogously, a formal system must have the properties DP and EP to count as formalisation of meaningful constructive thought. Here is Kreisel's proof for the case of EP (also for reference further on p. 15 below).

Theorem 1 [Kreisel, 1970b, p. 125] *There is a predicate P in the language of HA such that $\exists xP(x)$ is true on the intended interpretation, but the formal system $S = HA + \exists xP(x)$ does not have EP.*

Proof We follow the proof in Troelstra [1973b, pp. 178-179]. Define

$$R(x) = \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(x, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner) \vee \forall y \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner), \quad (1.7)$$

where Prf_{HA} is a canonical proof predicate of HA.¹⁰ From the consistency of HA we see that $\forall y \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner)$ is true on the intended interpretation. Hence, with the decidability of Prf_{HA} , $\text{HA} \vdash \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(\bar{n}, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner)$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and

$$\text{HA} \vdash R(\bar{n}) \leftrightarrow \forall y \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner), \text{ for every } n \in \mathbb{N}. \quad (1.8)$$

We also have, by the definition of R ,

$$\text{HA} \vdash \exists xR(x) \leftrightarrow (\exists y \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner) \vee \forall y \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner)). \quad (1.9)$$

Consider the system $S = \text{HA} + \exists xR(x)$. Trivially, $S \vdash \exists xR(x)$, and that formula is true on the intended interpretation, because, as noted, $\forall y \neg \overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}(y, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner)$ is; so S , like HA, formalises meaningful constructive thought. Now suppose, towards a contradiction, that furthermore $S \vdash R(\bar{n})$, for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$. This is equivalent to

$$\text{HA} \vdash \exists xR(x) \rightarrow R(\bar{n}) \quad (1.10)$$

for that n . Applying equivalence (1.9) to the antecedent and equivalence (1.8) to the consequent yields

¹⁰ $\ulcorner \psi \urcorner$ is the natural number that codes ψ in the given Gödel numbering, \bar{n} is the representation of the natural number n in the formalism. $Prf_{\text{HA}}(x, \ulcorner A \urcorner)$ holds if and only if x codes a proof of A in HA; $\overline{Prf}_{\text{HA}}$ is its representation in the formal language of HA.

$$\text{HA} \vdash (\exists y \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp}) \vee \forall y \neg \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp})) \rightarrow \forall y \neg \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp}) \quad (1.11)$$

which simplifies to

$$\text{HA} \vdash \exists y \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp}) \rightarrow \forall y \neg \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp}), \quad (1.12)$$

and then, using $\forall x \neg \varphi(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \exists \varphi(x)$ twice, to

$$\text{HA} \vdash \forall y \neg \overline{\text{Prf}}_{\text{HA}}(y, \overline{\perp}). \quad (1.13)$$

But this contradicts the second incompleteness theorem. \square

Complementarily, Troelstra pointed out that EP and DP are not sufficient conditions for a system to count as a formalisation of the intended constructive interpretation either: he gives the example of two extensions of HA, each of which has EP, but which yield an inconsistent system when combined [Troelstra, 1973b, p. 179]. (The extensions codify incompatible ideas about what constructive existence consists in.)

Given these results of Kreisel and Troelstra, I agree with Kreisel that the formal properties DP and EP ‘are *not* linked to the constructive interpretation of Heyting’s systems’ [Kreisel, 1971c, p. 123].¹¹ Instead, I will take soundness with respect to Heyting’s informal explanation to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the constructivity of a formal system.

1.3 Cases depending on a proof of B

1.3.1 Finding the formula B from the formula A

In the search for an example of (1.3c), we may either start from ideas about such an A and from there attempt to reason towards an appropriate B , or

¹¹ I do not know whether Kreisel had found the results about EP and DP by the time of writing the Brouwer memoir, but the general point is made in Kreisel [1970b], which is the published version of his concluding address at the 1968 conference in Buffalo. In that same volume Prawitz presents a cut elimination theorem for a second-order system, points out the corollaries DP and EP, and comments: ‘These results, which certainly are consonant with intuitionistic principles, may have some bearing on the debated question whether a second-order system of the described kind is intuitionistic acceptable.’ Then a footnote states: ‘The intuitionistic significance of the described system has been advocated by Professor Kreisel especially. I am grateful to him for encouraging me to carry out these investigations’ [Prawitz, 1970, p. 259]. One possibility is that, by the time of the Buffalo conference, Kreisel had not yet developed his argument against EP and DP as criteria of ‘intuitionistic significance’. A further possibility is that Kreisel’s plea was first of all based on his view that quantification over species should be acceptable in ideological intuitionism; see section 1.4.5 below.

the other way around. In the first direction, this suggests the following formal proof skeleton, which is meant to represent not only the deductive relations indicated in (1.3c) but also, in the direction from left to right, the intended order of composition of the two subproofs:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 [A]^1 \\
 \vdots \\
 \frac{B}{A \rightarrow B} \quad 1 \\
 \hline
 \frac{[A]^1 \quad \frac{[A \rightarrow B]^2 \quad \frac{\frac{A}{B \rightarrow A} \quad 3}{A \leftrightarrow B}}{A} \quad \frac{[B]^3 \quad \vdots}{B}}{(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A} \quad 2 \\
 \hline
 A
 \end{array} \quad (1.14)$$

Thus, we here have a formal proof of a given A that proceeds by a cut introduction with cut formula $A \rightarrow B$,¹² with the particularity that our choice for the proposition B depends on our having first derived it from A . This leads to a second cut, with cut formula B .¹³ If we now eliminate the first cut, we obtain

$$\begin{array}{c}
 [A]^1 \\
 \vdots \\
 \frac{B}{A \rightarrow B} \quad 1 \\
 \hline
 \frac{[A]^1 \quad \frac{[B]^3 \quad \vdots}{\frac{A}{B \rightarrow A} \quad 3}}{A \leftrightarrow B} \quad \frac{\vdots}{B} \\
 \hline
 A
 \end{array} \quad (1.15)$$

This skeleton still brings out the simple fact that a sufficient condition for a formal proof of A to contain a subproof of $A \rightarrow B$, which in (1.3c) is the containment that is highlighted, is that A gets proved via proofs of $A \leftrightarrow B$ and B ; this fact would no longer be represented after elimination of the second cut. Although this second skeleton no longer fits (1.3c) literally, of course the essential part of the reasoning towards $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$ in the first skeleton is preserved.

With Curry's insight into the correspondence between implicational logic and the typing of functions, the first skeleton can also be seen as a way to arrive at a judgement that an object a is of type A by finding a function $f: A \rightarrow B$, together with a selection functional $F: (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$, where the latter is, in this case, obtained by finding a function $g: B \rightarrow A$ and an object b of type B . A motivation for transforming a proof with the second skeleton

¹² The term 'cut' comes from the Sequent Calculus, but I will use it also for the corresponding phenomenon in Natural Deduction [van Dalen, 2004, section 6.1].

¹³ Usually, \leftrightarrow is treated as a defined connective, and correspondingly a cut rule for it would be defined in terms of that for \rightarrow . For our present purpose, this is immaterial.

into one with the first would be to make the existence of that functional explicit in the formal proof.¹⁴

The question whether these formal proof skeletons may be natural will, as motivated in section 1.2.2 above, be approached by transposing the question to the informal. The informal counterpart to a cut introduction is a lemma introduction. A motivation for structuring an attempt at informally proving A as a proof of its equivalence to B together with a proof of B as a lemma would be that one expects or knows that, if one assumes that A is true, an equivalent B can be inferred that, if provable at all, should in some sense be easier to prove than A .¹⁵ Two cases may be distinguished. The first is where this greater ease has its ground in the content of B , in case B is more explicit than A ,¹⁶ or is less complex,¹⁷ or shifts to a more convenient domain,¹⁸ for short: is better intelligible, and therefore, one expects, more fruitful to reason about.¹⁹ Intelligibility is a value that depends on the content of the propositions involved in their relations to our capacity of understanding; it is a matter of degree, and furthermore for one and the same proof this degree may, with increased mathematical experience, change. The other case arises when B is among the stock of propositions already proved. There the value involved is efficiency of the simplest kind, independent of propositional content. Since in analysing (1.3c) we are after a ‘peculiarity of constructive logic’ as such, which has to do with (the contribution of the logic to the) propositional content, it is the first case that is of interest.

The heuristic of proving A by looking for such a (more) intelligible B is, not surprisingly, an old one, and goes back to the ‘method of analysis and synthesis’ of the Greek geometers.²⁰ The classical description was given by

¹⁴ For a comparative remark on the role of the selection functional here, see point 5 on p. 28 below. On selection functionals, see e.g. the introduction to Escardó and Oliva [2010].

¹⁵ Dijkstra writes that ‘equivalence is the most underexploited connective in mathematics, in contrast to the implication that is used all over the place [...] the failure to exploit inherent symmetries often lengthens an argument by a factor of 2, 4 or more.’ Dijkstra, 1985, p. 7. His explanation for this is that humans tend to reason in terms of cause and effect, and tend to assimilate implications to that. Note that to constructions in Brouwer’s setting, the familiar distinction between tokens and types applies; so that if $A \rightarrow B$, at the token level there is a sense in which a construction for A causes the truth of B , but this is compatible with $A \leftrightarrow B$ at the type level. See also footnote (53) below.

¹⁶ Through expansion of definitions, or by appeal to the meaning of A .

¹⁷ See the remarks around (1.22) below.

¹⁸ For example, when embedding \mathbb{R} in \mathbb{C} .

¹⁹ Indeed, cut introduction is part of the proof restructuring that is done to make automatic, cut-free formal proofs, which are easier to find for computers, comprehensible to humans (e.g., D’Agostino et al. [2008]). On cut-free proofs, see section 1.3.2 below.

²⁰ Recent detailed linguistic analysis [Longa, 2020] has identified no fewer than 318 proofs in the Greek mathematical corpus (3rd century BC to 7th century CE) that apply the method of analysis and synthesis.

Pappus; well-known modern discussions outside the specialist literature²¹ are Heath's in his edition of Euclid's *Elements* [Euclid, 1908] and Pólya's in *How to Solve It* [2004, first ed. 1945].²²

Pappus writes:

Now, analysis is the path from what one is seeking, as if it were established, by way of its consequences, to something that is established by synthesis. That is to say, in analysis we assume what is sought as if it has been achieved, and look for the thing from which it follows, and again what comes before that, until by regressing in this way we come upon some one of the things that are already known, or that occupy the rank of a first principle. We call this kind of method 'analysis', as if to say *anapalín lysis* (reduction backward). In synthesis, by reversal, we assume what was obtained last in the analysis to have been achieved already, and, setting now in natural order, as precedents, what before were following, and fitting them to each other, we attain the end of the construction of what was sought. This is what we call 'synthesis'. (1.16)

There are two kinds of analysis: one of them seeks after truth, and is called 'theorematic'; while the other tries to find what was demanded, and is called 'problematic'. [Pappus of Alexandria, 1986, p. 82]

In bringing up Pappus, whose concern is with geometry, in the present paper, which is concerned with propositional and predicate logic, I do not mean to take a stand on the question whether the latter are the most appropriate vehicles for the representation of the reasonings of the Greek geometers. Rather, the idea is that the method of analysis and synthesis is of wider

²¹ As examples of that specialist literature in so far as it relates the method to modern constructive mathematics, I mention Knorr [1983], Mäenpää [1993], and Menn [2002]. Brouwer also described this method in his dissertation; see p. 14 below.

²² It is quite likely that Kreisel had seen those discussions. Kreisel reports that 'Since my school days I had had those interests in foundations that force themselves on beginners when they read Euclid's *Elements* (which was then still done at school in England)' [Kreisel 1989; trl. Odifreddi [2019a, p. 148]]. The edition used in his school (Dudley; Isaacson [2020, p. 90]) may well have been a different one than Heath's, but if it was, then the latter would have been the first place to look further if one's interest had been piqued. The one reference to Pólya by Kreisel I have found is: 'The use of axiomatic analysis as a proof strategy does not seem to be well known to people writing on heuristics, like Polya' [Kreisel and Macintyre, 1982, p. 233]. (Axiomatic analysis is a proof strategy because, once one has an axiomatic presentation of a subject, in trying to find a proof one need only take into account the properties mentioned in that presentation [Kreisel and Macintyre, 1982, p. 232].) That observation intimates a wide knowledge of Pólya's writings. Moreover they were colleagues at Stanford, where Kreisel taught from 1958-1959 and 1962-1985, incidentally the year Pólya died. Pólya had been an emeritus from 1953 on, but a very active one. Finally, perhaps that in Lakatos' series 'Proofs and refutations' [Lakatos, 1963-1964] (spread over part 1, pp. 10-11 note 2; part 3, p. 243n1, part 4, p. 305 and its footnote 1). In Kreisel's writings one finds references to the book of the same title that Lakatos published in 1976.

applicability, and that various general remarks or phenomena that occur in the Greek context may also be pertinent or suggestive in domains where these logics are used.

From a modern constructivist point of view the difference between the-oremic and problematic analysis is mostly one of perspective, as to find certain constructions for objects and their relations is what constructively proving the corresponding proposition consists in, and, conversely, proofs may themselves be regarded as mathematical objects one can look for.²³

In its application to propositions, analysis is the process that leads from the assumption that A has been established to a proof of $A \rightarrow B$, where B has independently been recognised as provable, and synthesis the process of combining a proof of B and a proof of $B \rightarrow A$ to prove A . The heuristic turns on the fact that a consequence B of A corresponds to a necessary condition for the truth of A ; if it is also a sufficient one, then, in a reversal of direction, what was construed as a proposition following from A is now construed as a proposition from which A follows. It is with an eye on this subsequent reversal that Pappus glosses ‘analysis’ as a ‘reduction backward’, and I take it that the latter sets things ‘in natural order’ because, by hypothesis, when embarking upon this reasoning B was already known, whereas A was not. The central idea in such a proof of A , then, is its equivalence to B . That B implies A is immediate if B is obtained from A by a chain of equivalences, but other cases will be more involved.²⁴ Be that as it may, the method will have fulfilled its heuristic function if one’s proof of $A \rightarrow B$ at least suggests how to go about proving the converse.

The overall reasoning process will, in general, involve making guesses, but those will at least in part be motivated (directly or transitively) by the meaning of A .²⁵ As Pólya describes it, ‘analysis is devising a plan, synthesis is carrying through the plan’ [2004, p. 146], and this plan is visible in the successful outcome, if there is one. It also illustrates Rood’s observation (made in a discussion of Kant) that ‘if we look at proofs from a procedural point of view, then the boundary between discovery and justification starts to blur. A proof may itself involve various elements of discovery’ [2005, p. 57]. This makes proofs by analysis and synthesis highly intelligible and in that sense natural. When the reasoning steps employed in a successful use of this heuristic method can be mirrored and explicated in formal inferences in a suitable system, the skeleton of a formal proof then is that as those above.

Perhaps one takes an alternative representation of the informal reasoning by analysis and synthesis to be given by the *pair* of proofs

²³ As set out in Kolmogorov [1932], which, as he succinctly put it later, ‘was intended to construct a unified logical apparatus dealing with objects of two types – propositions and problems.’ [2019, p. 452]; see also Bernays’ review of Pólya [Bernays, 1947, 184–185].

²⁴ A discussion of this latter point in the Greek context is Behboud [1994].

²⁵ A recent study of ‘motivated proofs’ is Morris [2020].

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 [A]^1 & & [B]^1 \\
 \vdots & & \vdots \\
 B & & A \\
 \hline
 A \rightarrow B & 1 & \frac{B \rightarrow A}{A} 1 \quad B
 \end{array} \quad (1.17)$$

in which, crucially, the proof of $A \rightarrow B$ does not figure as a subproof in the proof of A . Indeed, in the corpus of ancient Greek geometry one finds proofs where only an analysis is presented, or only a synthesis. The analysis sufficed in case the subsequent synthesis was considered to be obvious,²⁶ the synthesis if the only interest was in a deductive justification of A .²⁷ But it was realised that giving both facilitates understanding, and hence can make proofs more convincing. In addition, there is a rhetorical value to such a double presentation: it ‘[creates] the illusion that the solution is necessary and *emerges naturally* out of the problem’. (See for these two points Netz [2000]; the emphasis here is mine.) Evidently a presentation of neither analysis nor synthesis alone can count as a full rendering of the kind of reasoning process under discussion, and even the pairwise formalisation above remains incomplete, as it distributes the representation of the reasoning towards one conclusion over two proofs. Either stands on its own, and the intended relation between those two, in (1.17) suggested by the juxtaposition and our choice of the same schematic letters, is not itself represented formally. In particular, the central idea of a proof by analysis and synthesis, the equivalence of A to B , is absent. Combining both trees into one, as in skeleton (1.15), makes it appear, and thereby Kreisel’s claimed containment relation. That containment is not an artefact of the representation, but results from an explication of the top-level structure of the informal, intelligible reasoning that it represents.

A whole class of examples of proofs with skeleton (1.15) is generated by a formal theory for which quantifier elimination has been established constructively, and for which the quantifier-free statements obtained are decidable. Then an appropriate B can be found from A without any need for guessing: one has an algorithm that for every sentence A yields a quantifier-free sentence B such that $A \leftrightarrow B$ is provable in the theory and B is decidable. A positive outcome of the corresponding decision procedure for B then leads

²⁶ Or, in the case of *reductio ad absurdum*, superfluous (this is implicit in Pappus’ account, see Mäenpää [1993, 188n83]).

²⁷ See Knorr [1986, p. 9] for the general point, and its p. 377n89 for some examples. Incidentally, Knorr received support from Kreisel:

Knorr read the ancient texts so as to reveal new proof strategies; indeed he dated different bits even of Euclid in terms of a more or less linear development of proof ideas, which of course does not conform to the present order of the *Elements*. Oral history: the proof theorist Georg Kreisel, Knorr’s colleague at Stanford [Knorr joined the faculty in 1979], strongly encouraged this work. I believe he did so because it pointed not only to the history of proof but also to the human discovery of capacities for proving. [Hacking, 2014, p. 140]

(1.18)

to a proof of A .²⁸ It need of course not be the case that the quantifier-free statement is, as a whole, better intelligible to humans than the quantified equivalent, quite the contrary. Be that as it may, since this phenomenon exists for both classical and constructive formal theories,²⁹ it is too broad to count as an interpretation of (1.3c), which asks for a ‘peculiarity of constructive logic’.

To narrow down the scope, consider the characteristic demand of constructive logic that existential statements $\exists xP(x)$ be proved by exhibiting an a such that $P(a)$. A well known heuristic to fulfill that demand can readily be seen as an application of the method of analysis and synthesis.

The heuristic is this. Assume that $\exists xP(x)$ and then attempt to reason, from the definition of the predicate P and other available information (axioms and previously obtained theorems) towards conditions that a witness for it must satisfy, in such a way that combining them leads to conditions that are moreover sufficient. Let a be a hypothetical object satisfying those conditions; thus one has shown that, if the existential statement has a witness at all, then a must be one.³⁰ The second part of the attempt consists in establishing that an a fulfilling these conditions can indeed be constructed. This is how Brouwer described it in his dissertation:

- (1.19) There is a special case [...] which really seems to presuppose the hypothetical judgment from logic. This occurs where a building in a building is defined by some relation, without that relation being immediately seen as a means for constructing it. Here one seems to *assume* to have effected the construction looked for, and to deduce from this hypothesis a chain of hypothetical judgments. But this is no more than apparent; what one is really doing here, consists in the following: one starts by constructing a system that fulfills part of the required relations, and tries to deduce from these relations, by means of tautologies, other relations, in such a way that in the end the deduced relations, combined with those that have not yet been used, yield a system of conditions, suitable as a starting-point for the construction of the system looked for. Only by that construction will it then have been proved that the original conditions can indeed

²⁸ Carrying out decision procedures based on quantifier elimination may quickly become unfeasible for humans and then also for computers; here our concern is with the principle.

²⁹ E.g., (classical and constructive) Presburger Arithmetic, the classical theory of real closed fields. For Presburger Arithmetic, see Presburger [1930] and Kleene [1952, pp. 204,474–475]; for real closed fields, Tarski [1948] and Lombard and Vesley [1998].

³⁰ This is reminiscent of the classically provable ‘dual version of The Drinking Principle’: ‘There is at least one person such that if anybody drinks, then he does’ (Smullyan [1978, p. 210]; Warren et al. [2018]). But here we are reasoning constructively and, in particular, without appeal to *Ex Falso*, and conclude something only about a hypothetical object.

be satisfied. [Brouwer, 1975, p. 72, emphasis Brouwer, translation modified]³¹

Brouwer’s main interest here is in the question whether in a mathematics founded on intuitive givenness, hypothetical constructions can be made sense of at all. His answer is positive: hypothetical statements should be construed not as propositional expressions of possible, as yet unknown truths, but as conditions (on constructions). Conditions that we pose are themselves actual objects, and no bearers of truth or falsehood.

For the present purpose, the interest is elsewhere, namely in the structure of the reasoning that Brouwer describes. In a footnote, he give as examples ‘the uniqueness proofs for transformation groups with given properties by Hilbert and Lie, and also ordinary elementary problems, such as looking for a common harmonic pair, or the problems of Apollonius’; the latter being classical examples of the application of the method of analysis and synthesis.³² (Often, the existence of the ‘building’ in which another ‘building’ is to be constructed is itself given as an hypothesis, and specified in terms of parameters; then what needs to be proved rather takes a form like $R(n) \rightarrow \exists xP(x, n)$. See below, at the discussion of (1.23).) Now, as before: Suppose that the reasoning employed in a successful case can fully be mirrored in formal inferences in a given system. Then the candidate witness a can be obtained from the hypothesis using the inferential resources of the system itself, so that this formal proof of $\exists xP(x)$ begins with a proof of $\exists xP(x) \rightarrow P(a)$. Taking $\exists xP(x)$ for A and $P(a)$ for B , we see that the skeleton of the overall proof is that in (1.15).

Where this works out, the formal system is able to reflect the relation between the propositions $\exists xP(x)$ and $P(a)$ to a greater extent than applications of EP are able to. We refer back to Kreisel’s proof that EP is not a necessary condition for the constructivity of a formal system (p. 7). That proof also shows that closure of a formal system under the rule EP does not guarantee provability in the system of the corresponding implication: On the one hand, EP is a schematic conditional that is constructively correct also when instantiated with the hypothesis $HA \vdash \exists xR(x)$; this is not changed by the fact that we know that, because of the consistency of HA, that hypothesis

³¹ Er is een bijzonder geval [dat . . .] werkelijk het hypothetische oordeel der logica schijnt te vooronderstellen. Dat is, waar een gebouw in een gebouw door eenige relatie wordt gedefinieerd zonder dat men daarin direct het middel ziet het te construeeren. Het schijnt, dat men daar *onderstelt* dat het gezochte geconstrueerd was, en uit die onderstellingen een keten van hypothetische oordeelen afleidt. Maar meer dan schijn is dit niet; wat men hier eigenlijk doet, bestaat in het volgende: men begint met een systeem te construeeren, dat aan een deel der geëischte relaties voldoet, en tracht uit die relaties door tautologieën andere af te leiden zóó, dat tenslotte de afgeleide zich met de nog achteraf gehoudene laten combineeren tot een stelsel voorwaarden, dat als uitgangspunt voor de constructie van het gezochte systeem kan dienen. Met die constructie is dan eerst bewezen, dat werkelijk aan de voorwaarden kan worden voldaan. [Brouwer, 1907, pp. 126–127]

³² Incidentally, Brouwer’s description gives the impression that he had seen the discussion of analysis and synthesis in Hankel [1874, esp. p. 141].

will never be fulfilled. On the other hand, again because of the consistency of HA, we know that for no t the corresponding implication can be proved in it.

And even in cases where we have a system with EP and $\vdash \exists xP(x)$, for some P , a particular proof in that system of $\exists xP(x) \rightarrow P(t)$, for some t , need not proceed by explicating a connection between its antecedent and its consequent. HA has EP and contains the axiom $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$. Suppose that we have a P such that $\vdash \exists xP(x)$. One obtains $\vdash P(t)$ for some t by EP, and then, via an instantiation of the axiom with $A = P(t)$ and $B = \exists xP(x)$, $\vdash \exists xP(x) \rightarrow P(t)$. But the axiom depends on no relation between A and B at all (which for relevantists is the reason to reject it). It may be observed that nevertheless a relevant connection between $\exists xP(x)$ and t has been exploited, namely the one that is made in the proof, at the metalevel, of EP itself. However, the point is that, while the construction method for the formal proof of $\exists xP(x) \rightarrow P(t)$ described here depends on that connection, the formal proof obtained does not represent it.

The relation between constructive existential quantification and the method of analysis and synthesis naturally extends to choice principles. Given the informal constructive meaning of the quantifiers,

$$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D' P(x, y) \quad (1.20)$$

must be proved by providing a method that transforms any proof of $a \in D$ into a b together with proofs of $b \in D'$ and $P(a, b)$.³³ Thus, if such a method is embodied in a constructive function $f: D \rightarrow D'$, a natural way of establishing (1.20) consists in observing that

$$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D' P(x, y) \leftrightarrow \exists f \forall x P(x, f(x)) \quad (1.21)$$

and then proving the right hand side. If this reasoning can be fully formalised, the result is a natural formal proof of (1.20) with skeleton (1.15), taking for A and B the left and right hand sides of (1.21).

This naturalness would explain Kreisel's observation, in correspondence with Mints, that various propositions seem easier to prove when understood constructively than when understood classically [Kosheleva and Kreinovich, 2015]. Kosheleva and Kreinovich have suggested an explanation based on the fact that constructively (and under the Church-Turing Thesis), Π_2^0 -statements about the natural numbers are equivalent to Σ_2^0 -statements

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{N} \exists y \in \mathbb{N} P(x, y) \leftrightarrow \exists e \in \mathbb{N} \forall x \in \mathbb{N} P(x, \{e\}(x)), \quad (1.22)$$

where e is the index of a recursive function and $\{e\}(x)$ denotes the result of its application to x . On this reading, the original statement is therefore in the class of Δ_2^0 -statements, and should be expected to be easier to prove than

³³ Pitfalls in justifying such a choice principle for other domains than the natural numbers are discussed in Troelstra and van Dalen [1988, pp. 189-190].

on its classical understanding.³⁴ This is a special case of that in the preceding paragraph.

Informal existence theorems that depend on a hypothesis are typically of the form

$$\forall x \in D(R(x) \rightarrow \exists y \in D'P(x, y)). \quad (1.23)$$

On predicate-logical reconstructions, solved ‘problems’ in ancient Greek geometry are examples; on this point, see Menn [2002, pp. 202–204]. A constructive proof of such a theorem calls for a method that, dependent on proofs of $n \in D$ and $R(n)$, constructs a proof of $\exists y \in D'P(n, y)$. To find such a method, one treats these dependencies as additional information in a parameter n , and may follow the (first part of the) strategy for proving existential statements without an hypothesis sketched above. If this works out, one obtains an a such that

$$\forall x \in D(R(x) \rightarrow (\exists y \in D'P(n, y) \leftrightarrow (a \in D' \wedge P(n, a))))). \quad (1.24)$$

If this method does not actually depend on the way in which $n \in D$ and $R(n)$ have been proved, it furthermore serves to establish

$$\exists f: D \rightarrow D' \forall x \in D(R(x) \rightarrow P(x, f(x))), \quad (1.25)$$

which implies, and is implied by,

$$\forall x \in D \exists y \in D'(R(x) \rightarrow P(x, y)). \quad (1.26)$$

This leads to a natural formal proof of (1.26) using (1.25) and skeleton (1.15).

1.3.2 A contrast with analytic proofs in a different sense

In its application to formal proofs, the term ‘analytic’ nowadays also has a different meaning, a difference that Kreisel remarked upon as soon as it arose. In his review of Smullyan [1965] he wrote:

The author introduces the very happy terminology of ‘analytic’ deduction, i.e., deduction involving the analysis (breaking up) of assertions. This replaces the less elegant ‘deduction rules possessing the subformula property’, or the quite misleading ‘cut free’ (misleading because it refers to a specific formalization). The terminology seems good despite its conflict with the traditional use of ‘analytic’ in contrast to ‘synthetic’ reasoning. [Kreisel, f]

(1.27)

³⁴ Kreisel will also have had in mind examples of a different kind, in the theory of recursive ordinals, and depending on specifically intuitionistic notions: see Kreisel [1965, 2.6141] and Kreisel [1983, pp. 228–229; not in the 1958 version].

Formal proofs that are analytic in this sense have the property that every formula in it is a subformula either of its assumptions or of its conclusion. As a consequence, they do not contain the detour that (1.3c) calls for and that is characteristic for (schematic) Greek analysis and synthesis. For certain formal systems it can be demonstrated that all their proofs can be transformed into ones that are analytic in this new sense; a corollary of such a demonstration is that these systems have the properties DP and EP (p. 7 above).

Recognition of the conflict between these different uses of ‘analytic’ should be enough to keep one from conflating them. But once the distinction is clear, it is interesting to consider in its light a hypothesis evoked by Troelstra concerning the rules by which, in suitable systems, a proof that is not analytic in the modern sense is reduced (normalised) to one that is. The hypothesis is that ‘the reduction rules for systems of natural deduction preserve the intuitive proof-idea associated to the formal proof’ [Troelstra, 1973b, p. 180; see also p. 186]. Accepting it would enable one to say that ‘for the obvious definition of subproof, [...] each derivation of $A \vee B$ contains (modulo some reduction steps) a subderivation of A or a subderivation of B ’, and, similarly, each derivation of $\exists x A(x)$ contains a subderivation of $A(t)$ for some term t . For our purpose, the question is what the relevant data for ‘intuitive proof-ideas’ are.

On this point (also), Kreisel was more outspoken than Troelstra; he had already written:

(1.28) [C]onsider now the rule:

With every formal derivation D in F of an existential (numerical) formula, i.e. a closed formula of the form $\exists x A(x)$, associate *that* x which is supplied by the proof *which you understand to be represented by* D (x will, in general, be a term containing parameters).

[...]

Reflection shows that when one thinks through a formal argument D in Heyting’s system, the *thought* involved is more closely represented by the cut free proof D' associated by means of so-called cut elimination [8] with D : D' has the property that if it proves $(\exists x)A(x)$, it *mentions* a particular $A(t)$ from which it obtains directly $(\exists x)A(x)$. Thus, though D' may still be understood differently by different people, it is a detailed enough representation of the intuitive thought to settle the particular question above (namely, what x is supplied by the proof that we understand to be represented by D ?). All that is needed is this: each of us should convince himself that cut elimination provides a correct (i.e. more faithful) analysis of the proof which D represents for us.³⁵ [Kreisel, 1967a, pp. 244-245, emphasis his]

³⁵ The current view of cut elimination is technical; the view I propose above is probably not shared generally. But it should be noted that though it is more precise and specific (and, perhaps, wrong in detail), it is not inconsistent, for instance, with Brouwer’s view, [1], footnote 8, where he speaks of fully analysed, canonical proofs and stresses that they

and

A minimum requirement is then that *any derivation can be normalized*, that is transformed into a unique normal form by a series of steps, so-called ‘conversions’, each of which preserves the proof described by the derivation. This requirement has a formal and an informal part: (1.29)

- (α) The *formal* problem of establishing that the conversions terminate in a unique normal form (independent of the order in which they are applied).
- (β i) The *informal* recognition (by inspection) that the conversion steps considered preserve identity, and the informal problem of showing that
- (β ii) distinct, that is incongruent normal derivations represent different proofs (in order to have unique, canonical, representations).

For examples of remarkable progress with the formal problem see the work of Martin-Löf and Prawitz in this volume.³⁶ The particular conversion procedures considered evidently satisfy requirement (β i) since each conversion step merely contracts the introduction of a logical symbol immediately followed by its elimination. Such a contraction clearly does not change the proof described by the two formal derivations (before and after contraction).

[...]

As stressed by Prawitz [1971], his normalization procedures obviously preserve identity of proofs.

[Kreisel, 1971c, pp. 112, 114–115, original emphasis]

On the view Kreisel expresses here, two formal proofs that differ in that one is the normalisation of the other still represent the same (understood) abstract proof. (In fact Prawitz’ attitude in the place Kreisel refers to is more like Troelstra’s: he speaks of a ‘conjecture’, ‘a reasonable thesis’ [1971, p. 257].) On the other hand, by Kreisel’s earlier claim quoted in (1.3c) above, there are cases, depending on A , where the non-normalised formal proof can be said to be the natural one. While these two ideas are not necessarily in conflict – there may, for a given notion of naturalness, be both natural and unnatural representations of one and the same object –, they are so on the strongly procedural view on proofs taken above, according to which formal proofs are (primarily) construed as representations of acts of reasoning: Applying normalisation rules to a formal proof that reflects an intuitive proof obtained by acts of analysis and synthesis makes that reflection vanish.³⁷ From this perspective, one would, in interpreting the method of analysis and synthesis,

are infinite structures. [Note MvA: The reference ‘[1]’ is to ‘Über Definitionsbereiche von Funktionen’ [Brouwer, 1927b].]

³⁶ [footnote MvA] Fenstad [1971].

³⁷ In more recent work on the question of the identity of proofs, the presence of lemmas is considered to be a distinguishing feature; see e.g. Straßburger [2019, section 2(a)].

not emphasise the subformula property of certain formal systems, as Hintikka and Remes do [1976],³⁸ and whether a proof of $\exists xA(x)$ proceeds by presenting an instance is too crude a criterion for identifying the thought behind the proof, as Kreisel does in (1.28) above.³⁹

1.3.3 Finding the formula A from the formula B

There are also cases where an A is found starting from considerations about certain B (or, initially, about an open $B(x)$). A formal context that provides examples here, depending on arithmetisation, is the Diagonal Lemma or Fixed Point Lemma (for arithmetic). Consider the following standard formulation and proof:

Theorem 2 (Diagonal Lemma for Formulas) *Let S be a system that contains primitive recursive arithmetic. Then for each formula $\varphi(x)$ with only x free there exists a sentence ψ such that $S \vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$.*

Proof (after van Dalen [2004, p. 251]). Let $s(x, y)$ be a primitive recursive function such that $s(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner, \ulcorner t \urcorner) = \ulcorner \varphi[t/x] \urcorner$, so that s is a substitution function specialised to substitutions for the variable x . Let the predicate $\sigma(x, y, z)$ represent $s(x, y)$ in the formalism. Define $\theta(x) = \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge \sigma(x, x, y))$, $m = \ulcorner \theta(x) \urcorner$, and $\psi = \theta(\overline{m})$. The definitions give the immediate equivalences

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \theta(\overline{m}), \quad (1.30)$$

$$\vdash \theta(\overline{m}) \leftrightarrow \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y)), \quad (1.31)$$

and

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y)). \quad (1.32)$$

As σ represents s ,

$$\vdash \forall y(\sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y) \leftrightarrow y = \overline{s(m, m)}), \quad (1.33)$$

and by the definition of m

$$\vdash \forall y(\sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y) \leftrightarrow y = \overline{\ulcorner \theta(\overline{m}) \urcorner}). \quad (1.34)$$

With this we obtain, from (1.32),

³⁸ On this point also e.g. Behboud [1994, p. 61].

³⁹ Interesting middle ground here may be provided by the so-called analytic cut rule, in which the cut formula has to be a subformula of the assumptions or the conclusion [Smullyan, 1968, D'Agostino and Mondadori, 1994].

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge y = \overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}), \quad (1.35)$$

hence

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi(\overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}), \quad (1.36)$$

and then by the definition of ψ

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi(\overline{\overline{\psi}}). \quad (1.37)$$

□

For the present purpose, I modify this proof slightly, and from (1.34) first obtain, by predicate logic,

$$\vdash \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y)) \leftrightarrow \varphi(\overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}) \wedge \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, \overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}), \quad (1.38)$$

which reduces to

$$\vdash \exists y(\varphi(y) \wedge \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, y)) \leftrightarrow \varphi(\overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}) \quad (1.39)$$

since, by (1.34),

$$\vdash \sigma(\overline{m}, \overline{m}, \overline{\overline{\theta(\overline{m})}}). \quad (1.40)$$

Now with (1.32) we find ourselves at (1.36) again. The point of this detour is that the proof now passes, in (1.38), through a proof of the equivalence of a certain existential statement (namely, ψ) to one of its instances; so that, by our earlier reflection, ψ is an A as in (1.3c), taking the right-hand side of (1.38) for B .

While the proof could be simplified if the language contains a function or term for s instead of representing it by σ , it is the representation that allows for the introduction of the existential quantifier that my point depends on. Representation brings out the existential quantification in the notion of functionality. (For a proof simplified in this sense, see the Diagonal Lemma for Terms and its corollary in section 1.4.2.)

When applying the Diagonal Lemma, one reasons from or toward ψ via $\varphi(\overline{\overline{\psi}})$ in one step, leaving the passage through the instance of ψ on which that step depends implicit (if the theorem is proved in the modified way); and one may have proved it differently. Be that as it may, if the goal of the application is to establish ψ itself, then as long as $\varphi(\overline{\overline{\psi}})$ is proved from yet another equivalent, the overall proof of ψ this yields retains the form of skeleton (1.15). For example, consider a proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for a (consistent) system S via an application of the Diagonal Lemma to $\neg Pr_S(x)$. The fixed point ψ this yields is undecidable in S , but provable in a suitable system U in a proof with skeleton (1.15), where A is ψ and B is, for example, $Con(S)$ or the reflection principle $\overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\overline{\gamma}}) \rightarrow \gamma$, for closed

$\gamma \in \Pi_1^0$. That principle is studied in Kreisel's joint paper with Lévy [1968]. They are convinced that

- (1.41) What makes reflection principles useful is that they have a clear intuitive meaning, and so, if such a principle is provable in U , we have a good chance of finding a proof.

This, in effect, connects reflection principles and the considerations on intelligibility on p. 10 above.⁴⁰

A related application of the Diagonal Lemma is

Theorem 3 (Löb) [Löb, 1955] *Let S be a system that contains recursive arithmetic and a provability predicate Pr_S satisfying certain natural conditions.⁴¹ If $S \vdash \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\varphi}) \rightarrow \varphi$, then $S \vdash \varphi$.*

Where, for given φ , Löb in his proof had appealed to the Diagonal Lemma to obtain a fixed point ψ such that

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow (\overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\psi}) \rightarrow \varphi), \quad (1.42)$$

Kreisel devised a variant proof using a fixed point ψ such that

$$\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\psi \rightarrow \varphi}). \quad (1.43)$$

This equivalence does not mean that a natural formal proof of ψ contains a proof of $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$, because of the indirection introduced by the (formal) provability predicate, which refers to (formal) proofs only through a coding. Similarly, if one first tries to prove $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$ and then appeal to

$$S \vdash \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\gamma}) \text{ exactly if } S \vdash \gamma \quad (1.44)$$

to arrive at a proof of ψ , the relation holding between the formal proofs obtained is not that of containment. This could not be changed by adding an axiom schema $S \vdash \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\gamma}) \leftrightarrow \gamma$ to the system, because that is inconsistent, and would not be changed by adding the admissible rules corresponding to (1.44), because the device of an admissible rule introduces indirection in its own way: it indirectly presents a proof that uses only the rules that are constitutive of the system. However, Kreisel also used his fixed point to prove

Theorem 4 (Formalised Löb) [Kreisel and Takeuti, 1974, pp. 44–45] *Let S be a system as required for Löb's Theorem. Then $S \vdash \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\varphi})} \rightarrow \varphi) \leftrightarrow \overline{Pr}_S(\overline{\neg\varphi})$*

⁴⁰ By a coincidence, the final manuscript of their paper was accepted within days of Brouwer's death (December 8 and December 2, respectively; see Kreisel and Lévy [1968, p. 142]), so that Kreisel had such applications well in mind when setting out to write the obituary from which (1.3c) is taken. A letter from Kreisel to Heyting of February 20, 1967 shows that by then preparation for Kreisel and Newman [1969] had begun; and a postcard in the same direction of April 14, 1969, that by then Kreisel was still working on it [Heyting Papers, Bkre 690220, Bkre 690414].

⁴¹ See, besides Löb [1955] and Kreisel and Takeuti [1974], e.g. Smoryński [1991].

Being an equivalence, this is a strengthening of what Formalised Löb's Theorem would strictly be. If one now attempts to obtain a formal proof of $Pr_S(\ulcorner Pr_S(\overline{\varphi}) \urcorner \rightarrow \varphi)$ it would, since the right hand side is conceptually simpler than the left hand side, be natural to do so via a formal proof of $Pr_S(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$ (and to obtain the latter, if $\varphi \in \Sigma_1^0$, by proving φ and appealing to Σ_1^0 -completeness of S , which is a condition for Kreisel's proof). Thus, $Pr_S(\ulcorner Pr_S(\overline{\varphi}) \urcorner \rightarrow \varphi)$ again is an A exemplifying (1.3c), found from $B = Pr_S(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$.⁴²

1.4 Cases independent of a proof of B : proof paradoxes

1.4.1 'Errors'

As we saw in the introduction, the immediate context in which Kreisel makes his parenthetical remark (1.3c) is one in which he states that implication, when understood as an operation on contentual proofs and not (only) a formal connective, invites 'errors which are, formally, similar to Russell's paradox in set theory'. He does not specify any, but, by the time of writing the Brouwer obituary, he knew, through his own work and personal contacts:

1. his paradox in an untyped λ -calculus enriched with 'notions' (section 1.4.4.1);
2. Gödel's Paradox in Church's system of 1932-1933 (intuitionistic version) (section 1.4.4.2);
3. Troelstra's Paradox in the 'theory of the Creating Subject' (section 1.4.4.3);
4. Goodman's Paradox in the 'theory of constructions' (section 1.4.4.4).

References are given in the dedicated subsections below. The main interest will be in how features they have in common make them illustrate Kreisel's remarks (1.3a)–(1.3c):

1. Each of these paradoxes turns on the existence of a particular proof whose existence is, in effect, concluded to by an application of Lawvere's Fixed Point Theorem.
2. In each the existence of that particular proof entails

$$A \leftrightarrow (A \rightarrow \perp) \tag{1.45}$$

for a certain proposition A .

The (extent of the) formal resemblance to Russell's Paradox is clear if in the formulation of these two features one takes sets instead of proofs for

⁴² It should be noted that the proof of the equivalence depends, in the direction from right to left, on the acceptance of $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$. As recalled on p. 6 above, this is not acceptable on every view of constructive logic.

the objects. The first feature distinguishes these *proof* paradoxes from the *provability* paradoxes, e.g., ‘This proposition is not provable’ or the Myhill-Montague Paradox; I will briefly return to these at the end of this section.⁴³

It can be argued that in the reasonings embodied in these proof paradoxes an error has been made, to the extent that it can be argued that (1.45) leads to \perp . It is a well known general fact that if one has A and B such that

$$A \leftrightarrow (A \rightarrow B), \quad (1.46)$$

then positive implicational logic suffices to prove A and then B from the two component implications

$$A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B) \quad (1.47)$$

and

$$(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A. \quad (1.48)$$

One first derives the contraction of (1.47) by

$$\frac{[A]^1 \quad \frac{A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)}{A \rightarrow B}}{[A]^1} \quad (1.49)$$

$$\frac{B}{A \rightarrow B} \quad 1$$

and then composes

$$\frac{(1.49) \quad (1.48)}{A} \quad (1.50)$$

This proof of A proceeds according to the pattern Kreisel indicates in his remark (1.3c); the presence of the premiss (1.46) can be seen as a way of expressing within the proof itself that only ‘some A ’ are being considered. Also, because of these premisses, the proof of A does not require us first to prove B , unlike those in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3; and unlike those in section 1.3.1, but like those in section 1.3.3, it does require that we have identified the proposition B (or at least the free-variable form $B(x)$) when setting out to make inferences from the hypothesis A .

Finally,

$$\frac{(1.50) \quad (1.49)}{B} \quad (1.51)$$

⁴³ In their discussion of Goodman’s Paradox, Dean and Kurokawa [2016], following a suggestion of Weinstein [1983, p. 264], emphasise the (as they are aware, limited) extent to which it resembles Montague’s; the present approach, the extent to which it is different.

In the paradoxes at hand, $B = \perp$; in Russell's, moreover $A = a \in a$ for a particular a .⁴⁴

In the reconstructions of the proof paradoxes below, the use of logic is limited to positive implicational logic (as above), applied to (informally) decidable propositions. While that use of logic is *correct* also on the Proof Interpretation, it can be treated truth-functionally; from an intuitionistic perspective, one would say that the latter treatment is just another, simpler application of mathematics to the language of mathematics.

There are of course many A and B for which (1.46) holds unproblematically; as Van Benthem [1978, p. 50] reminds us, in his discussion of Löb's Paradox,

$$(A \leftrightarrow (A \rightarrow B)) \leftrightarrow A \wedge B \quad (1.52)$$

is a tautology.⁴⁵ The present discussion, however, concerns A and B for which the existence of a proof prior to that of (1.46) is not assumed, and where (1.46) is all we know about A – which it is therefore natural to prove as above.

There are several ways in which the paradoxes may be avoided by rejecting something in the above derivation. For example, insisting that hypotheses can be used only once, as in linear logic, would make (1.49) impossible; the use of subproofs can be restricted in a way that rules out (1.50) [Fitch, 1952, p. 109]; or one may, more vaguely, suggest that we have 'a wrong idea of [the] logical force' of propositions of the form $A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$ [Geach, 1955, p. 72].⁴⁶ Any such choice leads to narrower conceptions of constructive proof than those of finitary and intuitionistic mathematics, which were the ones Kreisel was interested in, as were the other originators of the paradoxes discussed below. For them the cause of the problem must lie in the prior way A was concocted.

In contrast to proof paradoxes, provability paradoxes turn not on explicitly formulated properties of a certain proof, but on the existence of any proof whatsoever of a certain self-referential sentence or proposition about provability. Thus they would not serve to illustrate Kreisel's remark (1.3a); but, more importantly for the present discussion, they do not illustrate his

⁴⁴ That it is possible to have a derivation of 'Russell's antinomy without negation, with exclusive use of the positive propositional calculus' was observed in those terms (in German) by Gödel in *Arbeitsheft 7*, towards the end of 1940: 'Russell Antinomie ohne Negation mit alleiniger Verwendung d. pos. Aussagenkalküls' [Gödel Papers, 5c/19, item 030025, backward direction, p. 7]. (A note on p. 12 is marked January 1, 1941.) He labels contraction, in his version $(p \supset (p \supset q)) \supset (p \supset q)$, with 'Entscheidende Formel'. He could have gone on to generalise to the paradox found and published by Curry [1942], but apparently did not.

⁴⁵ Note that a proof from right to left involves an inference from B to $A \rightarrow B$ that Heyting would accept, but, arguably, Brouwer would not (in general); see page 6 above.

⁴⁶ Kreisel knew Geach well at the time (letter from Kreisel to Derus, September 3, 2004, in Derus [2020, p. 127]), and aptly connected Geach' paradox (a rediscovery of Curry's Paradox) to Löb's paper when writing about the latter for *Mathematical Reviews* [Kreisel, e]; my attention to the latter fact was drawn by van Benthem [1978, p. 55].

remark (1.3c) either.⁴⁷ This will be illustrated by Myhill’s Paradox [Myhill, 1960, pp. 469–470]. Montague’s Paradox was originally formulated for necessity instead of provability, but is otherwise the same.⁴⁸ Assume that we have a formal system containing primitive recursive arithmetic, an informal provability predicate B on sentences, the reflection axiom schema

$$\vdash \overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p})} \rightarrow p, \quad (1.53)$$

and the inference rule

$$\frac{p}{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p})}} \text{R} . \quad (1.54)$$

By the Diagonal Lemma (p. 20 above),⁴⁹ there is a sentence p_0 such that

$$\vdash p_0 \leftrightarrow (\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp), \quad (1.55)$$

Myhill derives a contradiction from (1.53)–(1.55) and classical reasoning, but positive implicational logic suffices. Decompose (1.55) into two implications. With contraction provided by (1.49), we first derive

$$\frac{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow p_0 \quad p_0 \rightarrow (\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp)}{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow (\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp)} \text{transitivity} \quad (1.56)$$

$$\frac{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow (\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp)}{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp} \text{contraction}$$

and use that in

$$\frac{(1.56) \quad (\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow p_0}{\frac{p_0}{\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})}} \text{R}} \text{R} \quad (1.57)$$

and again in

$$\frac{(1.57) \quad (1.56)}{\perp} . \quad (1.58)$$

Although the proof of $\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})}$ in (1.57) proceeds via a (0-step) proof of $\overline{B(\overline{\Gamma p_0})} \rightarrow p_0$, as the latter is a premiss in (1.56), it does not exemplify

⁴⁷ Independently of Kreisel’s remarks, the main question about provability paradoxes is, in a Brouwerian setting at least, whether the sentences or propositions that figure in such paradoxes have any mathematical significance at all (Petrakis; Dean [2014, p. 178]).

⁴⁸ For comparison of the paradoxes of Goodman and Montague, see Weinstein [1983, pp. 264–265], Dean [2014, pp. 164–165, p. 188n17], and Dean and Kurokawa [2016, pp. 40–44].

⁴⁹ The Diagonal Lemma can also be shown using the Fixed Point Theorem (see the next section), so in that sense Myhill’s Paradox can also be seen as an application of the latter.

Kreisel's remark (1.3c), as it contains no subproof of $(\overline{B}(\overline{p_0}) \rightarrow p_0) \rightarrow \overline{B}(\overline{p_0})$. Nor can it be restructured to that effect, as the rule R cannot be used if there is an open assumption.

1.4.2 Lawvere's Fixed Point Theorem

In the reconstructions of the proof paradoxes below, a central role is played by the following result.⁵⁰

Theorem 5 (Fixed Point Theorem) [Lawvere, 1969] *Let A and B be any objects in a category with a terminal object 1 and finite products. Suppose that there exists a morphism $g: A \times A \rightarrow B$ such that for every $f: A \rightarrow B$ there exists an $a: 1 \rightarrow A$ that represents it via g , in the sense that for all $x: 1 \rightarrow A$, $\langle a, x \rangle g = xf$. Then for all $h: B \rightarrow B$ there exists a $b: 1 \rightarrow B$ such that $b = bh$.*

Proof Let a g and h as described be given. The diagonal morphism $\Delta_A: A \rightarrow A \times A$ sends $x: 1 \rightarrow A$ to $\langle x, x \rangle$. Define the morphism $k: A \rightarrow B$ as the composition

$$A \xrightarrow{\Delta_A} A \times A \xrightarrow{g} B \xrightarrow{h} B. \quad (1.59)$$

By hypothesis, k is represented by some a . Now consider $ak: 1 \rightarrow B$. By representation of k , $ak = \langle a, a \rangle g$; by definition of k , $ak = \langle a, a \rangle gh$. Hence ak is a b as sought. \square

The following points will be useful for the purposes of the present paper:

1. If the hypothesis of the theorem is satisfied constructively, the conclusion holds constructively.
2. The construction in the proof also goes through if the definition of the $f: A \rightarrow B$ depends on parameters, so that for example $f_v: A \rightarrow B$ leads to a fixed point b_v . (This plays a role in the reconstruction of Goodman's Paradox in section 1.4.4.4.)
3. If A and B are objects in the category of sets or classes, the existence of a morphism $a: 1 \rightarrow A$ corresponds to truth of the proposition $a \in A$, and the composition af to the application $f(a)$. This is the case everywhere in the present paper.
4. The definition of $f: A \rightarrow B$ is presupposed in that of a representation a of it, whence the latter definition is impredicative, as a lies in the range of arguments of f . A predicative characterisation of provably the

⁵⁰ As the potential for analysis depends on explicitness of the morphisms involved, I have chosen to start from the general Fixed-Point Theorem instead of the Y -combinator, which is readily obtained from it [Frumin and Massas, 2019] and which Dean and Kurokawa use in their reconstruction of Goodman's Paradox [Dean and Kurokawa, 2016, pp. 43–44].

same object may or may not be simultaneously available. If not, then this definition is ‘critically impredicative’. The use of the term ‘critical’ here comes from Bernays [1962]: it is such cases that raise the question whether the definition is constructively acceptable. (See section 1.4.5 for a quotation and further discussion.)

5. The condition on g has the form $\forall f \exists a R(f, a)$. This entails that there be a choice operation F , i.e., $\exists F \forall f R(f, F(f))$, and we can set $a = F(f)$.⁵¹ F is typed as $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$; it is a selection functional. The verification that the element $a = F(f)$ is of type A corresponds to a proof of the proposition A from proofs of the propositions $A \rightarrow B$ and $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$. We saw a similar situation when discussing proof skeleton (1.14). It also presents a contrast: there, an element b of B was used towards constructing a selection functional; here, it is the reverse.
6. The condition on g is, in asking for a representation of every $f: A \rightarrow B$, stronger than required for the proof, which uses only a representation of the morphism k . (This was observed in Yanofsky [2003, p. 378], and is exploited in the proof of the Diagonal Lemma for Terms just below.)
7. The proof of the theorem in effect constructs a choice operation H and puts $b = H(h)$. Thus, $\forall h \exists b (b = bh)$ is proved via $\forall h \exists b (b = bh) \leftrightarrow \exists H \forall h (H(h) = H(h)h)$ and a proof of the right hand side. This yields an overall proof with skeleton (1.15).

To illustrate point 6, here is a proof of the Diagonal Lemma for Formulas that uses the proof of the Fixed Point Theorem while requiring representability only of k ; compared to the version proved in section 1.3.3, this one is for a theory with a richer language. The proof takes the form of a corollary of a Diagonal Lemma for terms.

Theorem 6 (Diagonal Lemma for Terms) [Jeroslow, 1973].⁵² *Let S be a system that contains primitive recursive arithmetic and has symbols for all primitive recursive functions. Then for every formula $\varphi(x)$ there is a closed term t such that $S \vdash t = \overline{\overline{\varphi(t)}}$.*

Proof (adapted so as to use the Fixed Point Theorem). In the category of sets, let A be the set of Gödel numbers of the symbols in S for all primitive recursive functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. Let B be the set of Gödel numbers of closed terms in S . Define

$$\begin{aligned} g: A \times A &\rightarrow B \\ \langle \overline{x}, \overline{y} \rangle &\mapsto \overline{x(\overline{y})} \end{aligned} \tag{1.60}$$

⁵¹ The intuitionistic justification of choice principles depends on their being construed intensionally; results to the effect that choice implies the Principle of the Excluded Middle [Diaconescu, 1975, Goodman and Myhill, 1978] require an extensional construal [Martin-Löf, 2006].

⁵² Jeroslow [1973, p. 360] mentions that it was his referee who had isolated this lemma from one of the proofs in Jeroslow’s manuscript. Santos [2020, pp. 26, 38] shows that the Diagonal Lemma for Formulas does not, in turn, entail that for Terms.

and

$$\begin{aligned} h: B &\rightarrow B \\ \ulcorner t \urcorner &\mapsto \ulcorner \varphi(t) \urcorner \end{aligned} \tag{1.61}$$

Following the proof of the Fixed Point Theorem, $k: A \rightarrow B$ is defined as $\Delta_A g h$, which has the action $\ulcorner x \urcorner \mapsto \ulcorner \varphi(x(\ulcorner x \urcorner)) \urcorner$. This action can also be effected by a certain primitive recursive function a , in the language of S symbolised by \bar{a} , and with $\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner \in A$. The latter therefore serves to represent the morphism k via g . We now have the fixed point $b = \overline{\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner k} = b h = \ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner)) \urcorner$, whence $a(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner) = \ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner)) \urcorner$, and $\vdash \bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner) = \overline{\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner)) \urcorner}$. \square

This simple case illustrates a theme of the proof paradoxes below: for certain domains, a morphism on that domain may be construed as, or as corresponding to, an element of that domain. Note that the sets A can be defined predicatively, so that here the definition of a representation of k while impredicative, is not critically impredicative.

Corollary 1 (Diagonal Lemma for Formulas) *For every formula $\varphi(x)$, there is a formula ψ such that $\vdash \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner)$.*

Proof Apply the Diagonal Lemma for Terms to $\varphi(x)$, and set $\psi = \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner))$; then

$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \psi &\leftrightarrow \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner)) && \text{by def. } \psi \\ \vdash \psi &\leftrightarrow \overline{\ulcorner \varphi(\bar{a}(\ulcorner \bar{a} \urcorner)) \urcorner} && \text{by the Diagonal Lemma for Terms} \\ \vdash \psi &\leftrightarrow \varphi(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner) && \text{by def. } \psi \end{aligned}$$

\square

In contrast, in the contexts in which Russell's Paradox and the proof paradoxes arise, the representability of k is concluded to by instantiation, as there highly general principles have already been accepted that guarantee the fulfilment of the condition on g as stated. For Russell's Paradox, that is the unrestricted comprehension principle. In the other cases these are principles of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{If we have a performable operation for assigning a construction (object)} \\ &\text{to another construction (object), then to this operation corresponds a} \\ &\text{function(al), which is itself a construction (object).}^{53} \end{aligned} \tag{1.62}$$

⁵³ Here I am referring to the threefold distinction thematised in Sundholm [1983, p. 164] between construction as (1) a process as it unfolds in time; (2) an object obtained as the result of such a process; (3) a construction-process as object (the objectification of a process of construction). For each one can furthermore distinguish between types and tokens [van Atten, 2018, pp. 1596-1597].

The recognised operation serves to define the function(al). (The resonance with the introduction to Gödel's *Dialectica* paper, with its emphasis on 'Denkgebilde' [1958, p. 280], is intended.) Thus, in a category where the object A is the class of all constructions, and morphisms are performable operations, the morphisms $A \rightarrow A$ are themselves very much like elements of A , and may even be identified as such. Since the perspective from which I look at comprehension and the other general principles here is determined by their role in the Fixed Point Theorem, I will use the umbrella term 'representation principles'.

1.4.3 Russell's Paradox

This paradox [Russell, 1903] was one of the example reconstructions in Lawvere's paper on his Fixed Point Theorem [1969, p. 137]. It is included here (i) to enable a direct comparison of the proof paradoxes below with this well known one, and (ii) as part of the background to the paradox devised by Kreisel, who actually made that comparison (as seen in (the discussion of) his (1.72)–(1.73b) below.)

For a set-theoretic version, let A be the universe of all sets, and B the set of truth-values $\{\top, \perp\}$. Define

$$g: A \times A \rightarrow B$$

$$\langle y, x \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } x \in y \\ \perp & \text{if } x \in y \rightarrow \perp \end{cases} \quad (1.63)$$

According to the unrestricted comprehension principle, for every formula with one free variable $\varphi(x)$, there exists the set $\{x \in A \mid \varphi(x)\}$. Hence, for arbitrary $f: A \rightarrow B$, there exists the set $\{x \in A \mid f(x) = \top\}$. That set represents f via g .⁵⁴ If f is given to us as the characteristic function of a predicate P , then that set is definitionally equal to $\{x \in A \mid P(x)\}$.

Now apply the Fixed Point Theorem, taking for h the negation function

$$h: B \rightarrow B$$

$$\begin{aligned} \top &\mapsto \perp \\ \perp &\mapsto \top \end{aligned} \quad (1.64)$$

Then k is the characteristic function of the predicate $P(x) = x \in x \rightarrow \perp$, and is represented by the set a of all sets that do not contain themselves. Evidently, the impredicativity in the definition of a is critical. The conclusion

⁵⁴ The circumstance that here the set is seen as a representation of its characteristic function, instead of the more usual converse view, is of course a consequence of the category-theoretical view of an element of a set as a morphism from an initial object.

$b = bh$ here means, in propositional terms, that $a \in a \leftrightarrow (a \in a \rightarrow \perp)$. Now one one derives \perp as in (1.46)–(1.51).

For a property-theoretic version, let A be the universe of all objects, including properties, and replace \in by the exemplification relation ϵ . The unlimited abstraction axiom states that for every unary predicate P the property $\lambda x.P(x)$ exists. With the Fixed Point Theorem, we find the property $a = \lambda x.(x \epsilon x \rightarrow \perp)$ of being not self-exemplifying, for which $a \epsilon a \leftrightarrow (a \epsilon a \rightarrow \perp)$.

Russell [1906, pp. 35–36] offered a generalisation of the set-theoretical version; it is this generalisation that Kreisel appeals to in (1.73a) below. In the present terms: Let A be the universe of all sets, u , x , and y variables ranging over A , and $j: A \rightarrow A$ a morphism such that

$$\forall u(\forall x(x \in u \rightarrow P(x)) \rightarrow \exists y(y = j(u) \wedge P(y) \wedge (y \in u \rightarrow \perp))). \quad (1.65)$$

Russell calls a set u for which the condition holds, as well as the process of applying j to it, ‘self-reproductive’, in that the result of this application is again a set for which the condition holds [Russell, 1906, p. 36]. Define

$$g: A \times A \rightarrow B$$

$$\langle y, x \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } j(x) \in y \\ \perp & \text{if } j(x) \in y \rightarrow \perp \end{cases} \quad (1.66)$$

By unrestricted comprehension, for every $f: A \rightarrow B$, there exists the set $\{z \in A \mid \exists x(z = j(x) \wedge f(x) = \top)\}$. That set represents f via g . Taking for h the negation mapping, we conclude to the existence of a set a such that $j(a) \in a \leftrightarrow (j(a) \in a \rightarrow \perp)$. The earlier version is the special case where j is the identity map and $P(x)$ is $x \in x \rightarrow \perp$. For let u be any set for which $\forall x(x \in u \rightarrow (x \in x \rightarrow \perp))$. Instantiating x with that u and contracting as in (1.49) yields $u \in u \rightarrow \perp$, from which each of the three conjuncts within the scope of the existential quantifier in (1.65) follows immediately.

1.4.4 Proof paradoxes

1.4.4.1 Kreisel’s Paradox

This paradox appears as part of Kreisel’s second presentation of his Theory of Constructions in his ‘Mathematical logic’ [1965], in a volume edited by Saaty. The aim of that theory, he explained in the first presentation, was to give ‘a formal semantic foundation for intuitionistic formal systems in terms of the abstract theory of constructions’ [Kreisel, 1962a, p. 198], beginning with the logic. (The Theory of the Creating Subject, which figures in section 1.4.4.3 below, was meant to be developed into an extension.) The value of the exercise

was seen not to lie in conveying the meaning of the intuitionistic constants, but in technical applications such as independence proofs. As Kreisel related to Heyting in a letter of October 5, 1961, Gödel saw a further interest:

- (1.67) Gödel regards this whole work as specially interesting from the point of view of the paradoxes. For, on the one hand we use constructions without type distinction, on the other, we avoid paradoxes by not allowing propositions as mathematical objects. (The rules of proof used in the antinomies are intuitionistic: the question is why $X \in X$ cannot be expressed. Type distinctions are certainly not always observed, e.g. not in your explanation of the logical constants, in particular of implication. [Heyting Papers, Bkre 611005]

A version of that last sentence is included in the published paper [Kreisel, 1962a, p. 202], but not of the rest of this remark.⁵⁵

Kreisel's Paradox, as I call it here, is distinct from the paradox that has become known as the 'Kreisel-Goodman Paradox', which is only found in Goodman's writings (on his modification of Kreisel's theory),⁵⁶ and will be discussed in section 1.4.4.4. The present paradox arises upon Kreisel's introduction of two of the main ingredients of his Theory of Constructions, unless further precaution is taken, which he of course goes on to do. The one is 'notions, that is, understood, decidable properties of mathematical objects' [Kreisel, 1965, 2.13]. (It is not required that such a decision can be mechanised [Kreisel, 1965, 2.141].) The other is a convention that ensures totality of functions, in the interest of having a theory with decidable equality, and which consists in a modification of the ordinary meaning of application:

- (1.68) 2.151. *Total functions*. [...] [If] for the objects a, b as *given* or *conceived*, no sense is assigned to $a(b)$, then $a(b)$ is put $= a$, say. (Cf. in type theory: if no sense is assigned to $a \in b$, we regard $a \in b$ as false.) Obviously, for any proposed axiomatic scheme one has to verify its validity for this convention. This is illustrated by considering
- 2.152. *The λ -Calculus*. The naive proposal (parallel to the principle: every property defines a collection) is this. For every term $t[x]$, built up by means of the application operation from constants and containing the variable x , there is a function $\lambda z t[z]$ for which we have a proof $a_t : x \cdot (\lambda z t[z])(x) = t[x]$. This is excluded by the *paradoxes*. There is a

⁵⁵ I have not found a reply by Heyting in the Haarlem and Stanford archives (see the Acknowledgements). The Heyting-Kreisel correspondence began in 1952 with a letter from Kreisel, and seems to have ended (with a bang) in 1970; Heyting passed away in 1980. Given that Kreisel attended a lecture by Brouwer as early as 1946 [Kreisel, 1987b, pp. 146], it is regrettable that, for all we know, he did not also begin a correspondence with him (Brouwer died in 1966). Would the reason really just be that Kreisel did not like Brouwer and his style [Kreisel, 1987b, pp. 146-147]? Two ideas of Brouwer's that are not prominent in Heyting's thinking but that Kreisel was very interested in are that of proofs as infinite objects (see footnote 35 above) and creating subject arguments.

⁵⁶ On this last point, see Dean and Kurokawa [2016, p. 40].

notion η , $\eta(x) = 0$ if $x \neq 0$, $\eta(x) = 1$ if $x = 0$; it is a notion since any clearly conceived object either is conceived as 0 or not. Consider the term $\eta(x(x))$; though, by the convention of 2.151, it is well defined for each x , is there a clearly conceived object c (c : for Church) with $c(x) = \eta(x(x))$? No, since $c(c)$ and $\eta(c(c))$ are different. In short, the existential assumptions implicit in unrestricted λ -term formation and conversion are not correct. The ‘rule’ c : for each x , take the value $\eta(x(x))$ overlooks the tacit convention that, for $x = c$, the value is also $c(c)$. [Kreisel, 1965, pp. 124–125, original italics]

Upon reading 2.151, to some it will occur to ask: What if ‘ $a(b)$ ’ takes on a sense only at a certain point in time? Or what if the sense changes? But one just looks at the situation at the moment that the application is attempted. Time is made an explicit parameter in one version of Gödel’s Paradox and in Troelstra’s Paradox, discussed in sections 1.4.4.2 and 1.4.4.3 below.

In his review of Kreisel’s paper for the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vesley wondered ‘whether the system of 2.152 is intended to be a description of calculus of λ -conversion of Church XVII 76 (if so it is a misunderstanding and, in any case, the attribution of the object c to Church is in error)’; the work referred to is Church’s *The Calculi of Lambda Conversion* (1951 edition). This will have been because of the presence of notions, which, to the extent that they must be *understood*, need not be λ -definable. For the paradox as such, this does not matter, as we can view the role of the λ -calculus here as a superstructure; and this agrees better with Church’s earlier system of 1932–1933, with its underlying ‘intuitive logic’ and postulates.

Kreisel’s Paradox is, in effect and perhaps also intention, an immediate generalisation of Russell’s Paradox as Church gives it there [1932, p. 347; 1933, pp. 860–861]. There exists a propositional function $\lambda\varphi.\sim\varphi(\varphi)$. Consider the self-application $P = (\lambda\varphi.\sim\varphi(\varphi))(\lambda\varphi.\sim\varphi(\varphi))$. Then P converts to $\sim P$ and vice versa, from which it would seem to follow that P is a proposition that is both true and false. Church’s solution is to accept the existence of the function, but to allow for the possibility that that function does not yield a defined value when applied to itself. In Church’s later terms: P is not meaningful because it has no normal form [Church, 1941, pp. 15, 70–71]. But paradox by the same mechanism can be regained by (re)construing the function as a function on all objects, not only propositions, replacing propositional negation \sim by an everywhere defined function that, to put it anachronistically, likewise has no fixed points.⁵⁷

To see Kreisel’s Paradox as an application of the Fixed Point Theorem, note that the representation principle in this paradox is the proposal at the beginning of 2.152. Kreisel does not introduce an explicit application function, but it seems faithful to his intention as expressed in the text to define

⁵⁷ The presentation of Russell’s Paradox in [Curry, 1934, pp. 588–589] uses N instead of \sim , and a predicate Pr that is true of propositions; thus even more readily suggesting their reinterpretation or replacement by something more general.

$$g: A \times A \rightarrow A$$

$$\langle j, x \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} j(x) & \text{if } 'j(x) \text{' has a sense} \\ j & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1.69)$$

where A is the universe of constructions. The case distinction is decidable (as above: not necessarily by a mechanism, but by anyone who understands the meaning of the terms involved), hence g is everywhere defined: that is, even though there is no construction method for its domain, we see that, whenever we have constructed two constructions j and x , we are able to evaluate g .

For h we take Kreisel's η :

$$h: A \rightarrow A$$

$$x \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \neq 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } x = 0 \end{cases} \quad (1.70)$$

Now the Fixed Point Theorem applied to g and h yields a morphism $k: A \rightarrow A$ whose composition is that of Kreisel's $\eta(x(x))$, i.e., of $h(g(\langle x, x \rangle))$. By the chosen representation principle, this morphism is represented by a construction of which we have a proof that it is an everywhere defined function, and which, by reflection, therefore is one. This function is Kreisel's c . It lies in its own domain, self-application makes sense, and we have $g(c, c) = h(g(c, c))$. But that is impossible; in terms of propositional logic,

$$c(c) = 0 \leftrightarrow (c(c) = 0 \rightarrow \perp). \quad (1.71)$$

Therefore, the function c does not exist, and neither does the proof that it is total: the 'existential assumption' had given *both*.

Note that the definition of c is impredicative, and critically so, as there is no construction method for the elements of the universe of constructions.

In the version of his Theory of Constructions that Kreisel goes on to develop, he keeps the convention 2.151, but introduces in 2.22 a restriction on types in λ -abstraction that avoids the paradox just described. I take it, then, that when Kreisel in his earlier presentation of the Theory of Constructions voiced doubts about the consistency of one of its variants [Kreisel, 1962a, pp. 200, 203], what he saw coming ahead was a paradox like the one he came to formulate in 2.152.

Kreisel gives a detailed diagnosis in a letter to Gödel of April 1, 1968.⁵⁸

(1.72) Vielen Dank für die angenehmen und nützlichen Gespräche. Es ist nur schade, daß ich bei unserer Diskussion der Church'schen Paradoxie eine, m.E. wesentliche, Unterscheidung nicht genügend betont habe, nämlich zwischen *Verfahren* und *Funktion* (oder Konstruktion).

⁵⁸ A date in the middle of the period during which he was working on the Brouwer obituary.

Eine FUNKTION f ist ein Tupel (Verfahren V_f , Menge D_f ; Einsicht E_f daß V_f auf D_f definiert ist). Noch etwas präziser: Verfahren führen immer (sozusagen hereditär) von Verfahren + Definitionsmenge zu Verfahren + Definitionsmenge einerseits, von Einsichten zu Einsichten andererseits. Man vermischt nicht das Objektive und Subjektive.

Es gibt natürlich Verfahren, die sich nur auf Verfahren (ohne Erwähnung der Definitionsmenge des Arguments) beziehen, z.B. Konstante.

CHURCH'SCHE PARADOXIE (siehe 2.151, 2.152 auf S.124–125 des Artikels „Math. Logic“, in Saaty). Natürlich „beschreibt“ $\eta(x(x))$ ein Verfahren, worin die Definitionsmenge D_x selbst eingeht (von einem Verfahren V_x kann man nicht entscheiden, ob V_x für das Argument V_x definiert ist und S.125, Z.3–5, entsprechen keinem Verfahren). Nennen wir dieses Verfahren V_c , wie im Saaty Band.

Ehe man zur Church'schen Paradoxie kommt, muß man noch ein D_c angeben, von dem man weiß, daß V_c auf D_c definiert ist (also eine Einsicht E_c , die von D_c abhängt).

Alles, was die Church'sche Paradoxie zeigt, ist m.E. dies: Obwohl wir ein Verfahren V_c haben, haben wir mehrere Funktionen, abhängig von D_c . Und (V_c, D_c) ist nicht in D_c : V_c ist also auch auf $D_c \cup (V_c, D_c)$ definiert.

Ist das nicht analog zu Saaty, S.100-101 und Fußnote 4 auf S.101?

Beste Grüße, auch an Ihre Frau (der es hoffentlich besser geht)

Ihr sehr ergebener G Kreisel

[Kreisel Papers, 50/1]

‘Church’s Paradox’ is also the name Gödel used for a paradox to be discussed in the next section. Since differences between the paradoxes as presented by Kreisel and Gödel are important here, and, in any case, these two paradoxes were not devised by Church, I will not use the name ‘Church’s Paradox’ for either.

As Kreisel describes it here, a ‘Verfahren’ is an operation that can be carried out on one or more objects supposed to have been given, and is expressed in a rule with corresponding free variables; but, unlike a function, it comes without a domain.

The lines 3–5 on page 125 of his article that Kreisel refers to occur in 2.151 quoted as (1.68) above: ‘[If] for the objects a, b as *given* or *conceived*, no sense is assigned to $a(b)$, then $a(b)$ is put = a , say.’ The comment on it in this letter turns on the dependence of this convention, in its application, on whether a is the kind of object to which a domain is associated to begin with, and, if so, what that domain is. He concludes that η cannot be considered to be a notion independently of a specified domain of its argument, and must be understood not in operational but in functional terms.

At the end of the letter, Kreisel refers to the pages where he had given Russell’s Paradox in a form of the self-reproductivity argument (see (1.65) above):

- (1.73a) [T]here is a genuine problem: what properties define collections, particularly if properties themselves are to be regarded as objects. This may be shown by means of the *paradoxes*. If x is the collection of objects satisfying a property, take $\{x\}$ (whose only element is x) to be the property regarded as an object. Let r (for Russell) be *any* collection satisfying $(\forall x)(x \in r \Rightarrow x \notin x)$, and so $r \notin r$. Thus, $\forall x(x \in r \cup \{r\} \Rightarrow x \notin x)$, $r \cup \{r\} \supset r$ but $r \cup \{r\} \neq r$. In other words, r is not the collection of all objects satisfying $x \notin x$.

The ‘footnote 4’ Kreisel refers to is to this passage and reads:

- (1.73b) One of the set theoretic *definitions* of ordinals takes the empty set \emptyset to be zero: $a \rightarrow a \cup \{a\}$ as the successor function (and unions for limits). The argument above is literally the proof that there is no greatest natural number (greatest ordinal). [Kreisel, 1965, pp. 100–101, original emphasis]

Or, as he put it in his earlier presentation of this analogy,

- (1.74) From this point of view the Russell Paradox does not seem more astonishing than a child’s assumption that there is a greatest integer: we have overlooked the fact that not every property has a definite extension. [Kreisel, 1958, p. 157]⁵⁹

Thus, in the letter Kreisel points out that just as collections that have the property ‘being a collection of elements that do not contain themselves’ or ‘being a collection of ordinals closed under predecessor’ are self-reproductive, so are collections that have the property ‘being a domain on which V_c is defined’. Hence η must be understood not as a single function, but as a family of functions (with different domains but the same rule).

I have not found a letter or note by Gödel in which he explicitly sets out to give an answer to Kreisel’s letter. Perhaps there was one and it got lost. Either way, the matter will surely (also) have been discussed on one of their phone calls, or on one of Kreisel’s visits to Princeton. In fact, Kreisel has said that ‘My main contact with Gödel was in private conversations during the years I spent at the same Institute, not in correspondence’.⁶⁰ A plan for one such visit was mentioned by Kreisel in between that letter and the Buffalo conference, held in August 1968.⁶¹ Be that as it may, we will now see that Gödel had a different view, and that Kreisel came to change his mind.

1.4.4.2 Gödel’s Paradox (intuitionistic)

There is a paradox associated with Gödel that comes in both a classical and an intuitionistic version; the latter is a proof paradox. They are reproduced here

⁵⁹ We will come back to this remark on p. 64.

⁶⁰ Letter of November 2, 2004 to Kai Käkälä, quoted in Derus [2020, p. 128].

⁶¹ In a letter from Kreisel to Gödel, July 11, 1968 [Kreisel Papers, 50/3].

from Gödel's archive in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. These notes were written back to back, and kept in an envelope marked 'Antin(omien) des Intuit(ionismus) und der abs(olute) Beweisbarkeit'.⁶² (Another intuitionistic paradox in that envelope is reproduced in Figure 1.3.) Gödel named the classical version 'Church's Paradox', 'because it is most easily set up in Church's system' [Wang, 1996, p. 279, 8.6.24].⁶³ Wang proposes to call it 'Gödel's Paradox'; for the reason given on p. 35 above, so will I.

I do not know when Gödel first thought of either version, which of the two came first, or how much time there was between them; but I will suggest that at least the particular way in which Gödel presents the intuitionistic version in Figure 1.2 is a direct reaction to Kreisel's Paradox. In the previous section, it was remarked that Kreisel may have arrived at his paradox by generalising Church's version of Russell's. That route was, of course, at any point open to Gödel as well. (For the principal purpose of illustrating the 'errors' referred to in Kreisel's remark (1.3a), obviously neither the considerations in the present paragraph, nor similar ones below, matter. But they are motivated by a perceived intrinsic interest, and by the idea that they may lead to clues as to what, in the sources, should be read in the light of what.)

Gödel never published his paradox. Kreisel included the classical version, in a slightly different presentation, in the proceedings of the Logic Colloquium '69, calling it 'a standard "functional" paradox', without an attribution to Gödel [Kreisel, 1971b, pp. 190-191]. Wang included it in his *Logical Journey*, based on his conversation with Gödel of October 18, 1972 [Wang, 1996, p. 278-279]. No mention is made of Kreisel.⁶⁴ The intuitionistic version is referred to in Wang's book (p. 279), but not included.

The paradox is, Gödel comments, 'a simpler version of the familiar paradox of the concept of not applying to itself' [Wang, 1996, p. 279, 8.6.24]. Wang's rendition of the classical version (in 8.6.25) follows that in Figure 1.1 very closely; Gödel evidently had the latter at hand.⁶⁵ Having shown it, Gödel made some points that also apply to the intuitionistic version:

(1.75)

8.6.26 The derivation above has no need even of the propositional calculus. Definition by cases is available in Church's system.⁶⁶ It

⁶² A pencil note on it states that it was 'Filed with Wang corresp(ondence)'.

⁶³ Gödel reviewed Church [1932] and Church [1933] for the *Zentralblatt*, but without comments [1932, 1934]. The inconsistency referred to at the end of Gödel [1934] will have been the one established by Kleene and Rosser in the Spring of 1934 – Gödel was in Princeton from October 1933 through May 1934 [Kleene 1981, p. 57; Wang 1987, p. 95].

⁶⁴ That may of course be an artefact of Wang's representation. But in view of the date, one can't help recalling the fact that the to all appearances last letter from Kreisel to Gödel was dated October 1, 1972. In that letter, Kreisel had expressed some grievances against Gödel, and reflected that 'Nach meiner Erfahrung mit vielen Menschen (nicht aufgrund ungeprüfter "Theorien") scheinen die menschlichen Beziehungen eine gewisse natürliche Lebensdauer zu haben'. As Parsons comments, 'It is very probable that they never saw each other again' [Parsons, 2020, pp. 79, 83].

⁶⁵ Gödel wrote on the envelope (in shorthand): 'erläutert'.

⁶⁶ [Note MvA] As shown in Kleene [1934].

Bew(eis) (0.):

Df. von E :
 $E(x) = 0$ wenn $x \neq 0$
 $E(0) = 1$ dann $E(x) \neq x$.

$a = b$ bedeutet: a is the object b

Church Antinomie

Df. 0. Überall definierte Funktion.
Th. 1. Es gibt überall definierte Funktionen, zum Beispiel $I(x)$,
 $E(x)$, = (von 2 Variablen).^a
Df. 2. $F . x = F(x)$ wenn F eine überall definierte Funktion ist,
sonst = 0.
Th. 3. $.$ ist eine überall definierte Funktion^b und $F . x =_x F(x)$
für überall definierte Funktion(en) F .
Df. 4. $H(x) = E(x . x)$. H ist (eine) überall definierte Funktion.
Th. { 5. $H(x) = H . x = E(x . x)$
6. $H . H = E(H . H)$
andererseits " \neq "

^a Above these three examples: 'sind überall definiert'.
^b Above the word 'Funktion', there is an arrow leading to 'alle', written above this line. That seems to be the beginning of an unfinished comment.

Fig. 1.1 Gödel's Paradox, classical [Gödel Papers, 12/52, collective item 060772].

is easy to find functions which are everywhere defined. Unlike the classical paradox,⁶⁷ there is no need to assume initially that the crucial concept (or function) of not applying to itself is everywhere defined. The paradox is brief, and brevity makes things more precise. By a slight modification, using provability, it can be made into an intuitionistic paradox. [Wang, 1996, p. 279].

Apparently Gödel did not go on to elaborate that last point, and Wang seems not to have asked.

To see Gödel's Paradox (intuitionistic version) as an application of the Fixed Point Theorem, first note the immediate correspondence between the functions in the former and in the latter:

$$\begin{aligned} . &= g \\ E &= h \end{aligned} \tag{1.76}$$

(where the equality is definitional). A is the constructive universe, and the chosen representation principle is formulated in Gödel's footnote: for every

⁶⁷ [Footnote MvA] This evidently refers to what Gödel called 'the familiar paradox' above; not the classical version of Gödel's Paradox.

Antin(omie) im Intuit(ionismus)

Df überall definierte Funktion^x (unentscheidbar)
+ Beispiele

Df Wenn f ein Paar $\langle B, g \rangle$, B ein Beweis ist dass das Verfahren g überall zum Resultat führt:

$$f \cdot x =_{Df} g(x)$$

$$\text{sonst} =_{Df} 0$$

Th . ist überall definiert.

(0.) Es gibt ein nachweislich überall definiert(es) E so, dass $E(x) \neq x$ (siehe Rückseite).^a

(1.) Es gibt ein H so, dass:

$$H \cdot x = E(x \cdot x). \text{ Dann ist:}$$

$$H \cdot H = E(H \cdot H)$$

andererseits $H \cdot H \neq E(H \cdot H)$

Bew(eis) (1.):
Es gibt ein überall definiertes Verfahren G so, dass $G(x) = E(x \cdot x)$. Also: es gibt einen Beweis B der zeigt, dass G ein überall definiertes Verfahren ist. $H =_{Df} \langle B, G \rangle$. Dann: $H \cdot x = G(x) = E(x \cdot x)$.

^xFunktion = Operation = Verfahren (Regel der Verwertbarkeit = Erstellung einer Reihe von Gedanken).

^a The other side is given in Figure 1.1. The words ‘nachweislich überall definiert(es)’ are written above the line, with an arrow pointing to it from ‘ein’.

Fig. 1.2 Gödel’s Paradox, intuitionistic [Gödel Papers, 12/52, collective item 060772]

totally defined operation (performable series of acts) there is a function (which in the argument is considered as a mathematical object), because these are identified. Note that the case distinction in the definition of the application function is decidable, and that use is made of reflection: if B is a proof that g is everywhere defined, then g is everywhere defined, therefore it can be applied to x . The composition of Gödel’s $G = E(x \cdot x)$ is that of the morphism k , which has a representation as an object in A , namely $a = H = \langle B, G \rangle$. The definition of a is critically impredicative: it is an object in A , the constructive universe, defined via quantification over A , but there is no construction method yielding all elements of A .

Although for Gödel it was important to comment (because for him it shows something about the depth of the paradox – see section 1.4.5 below) that no propositional logic comes in, for our present purpose it should be observed that its conclusion is readily presented in propositional form:

$$H . H = 0 \leftrightarrow (H . H = 0 \rightarrow \perp). \quad (1.77)$$

Gödel expresses the same problem in a different way. On the one hand, to the operations defined in Figure 1.2 the criterion for informal constructivity applies that he had formulated in *Dialectica*: ‘die Ausführbarkeit der Operationen unmittelbar aus der Kette der Definitionen ersichtlich’ [Gödel, 1958, p. 283n5]. On the other hand, as he observes in another note in which he gives the same argument in a slightly different notation:⁶⁸

- (1.78) Also der Versuch der Wertung von $H[H]$ führt auf einen unendlichen *Regress* (*Church*). Also der Beweis b falsch. [Gödel Papers, 12/52, collective item 060772]

The regress arises because an attempt to evaluate $H.H$, demands an evaluation of $E(H.H)$; but the latter demands an evaluation of $H.H$. (Absence of a normal form, see Church [1941, pp. 70–71].) Intuitionistically, the appearance of this regress means that there is a problem with the proof of the totality of H , which must be supposed to have shown that a value can be constructed for each argument. A condition of possibility for this problem to arise is the critical impredicativity of the definition of H .⁶⁹ In fact, the same regress can be found in the other proof paradoxes; for now, the propositional presentation suffices, and I will postpone a further remark on this to p. 59 in the section on critical impredicativity.

I read the following remark of Gödel to Wang as a comment motivated by his intuitionistic paradox and the other proof paradoxes discussed here.⁷⁰

- (1.79) 6.1.13 The concept of concept and the concept of absolute proof [briefly, AP] may be mutually definable.⁷¹ *What is evident about AP leads to contradictions which are not much different from Russell’s paradox. Intuitionism is inconsistent if one adds AP to it. AP may be an idea [in the Kantian sense]: but as soon as one can state and prove things in a systematic way, we no longer have an idea [but have then a concept]. It is not satisfactory to concede [before further*

⁶⁸ Gödel now indicates the use of the special application function with straight brackets, and the proof with a lowercase letter.

⁶⁹ The impossibility of evaluating $H.H$ (notated differently) is remarked on also by Kreisel in his publication of the classical version; classical, but, as he puts it, ‘look[ing] at the steps of the argument by the light of nature’, which means, in particular, that application of a function rule presupposes that a value has been assigned to its argument [1971b, p. 191].

⁷⁰ Note that Wang’s (re)presentation of their conversations does not contain an explicit connection between (1.75) and (1.79).

⁷¹ [Note MvA] When Gödel says that the concept of concept and the concept of absolute proof may be mutually definable, he is suggesting, in one direction, an inferentialist theory of concepts, but also, in the other direction, what may be called a conceptualist theory of inference. In particular, the concept of concept would be that which one understands once one understands the inferences that are correct for any concept. For Brouwer, any such *systematic* understanding would intrinsically be a form of applied mathematics.

investigation] that AP or the general concept of concept is an idea. The paradoxes involving AP are intensional – not semantic – paradoxes. I have discussed AP in my Princeton bicentennial lecture. [Wang, 1996, p. 188, 6.1.13, amendments Wang’s, emphasis mine]

AP is the concept of proof independent of any particular formal language or system. It would therefore seem natural to add the concept AP to intuitionism, as intuitionism has always explained truth in terms of such a concept of proof.⁷² (It is rather Gödel’s proposal in the Princeton lecture to introduce it also in *classical* mathematics that is innovative.) But, Gödel claims, this leads to inconsistency. The similarity between the phrases in (1.79) that I have emphasised and Kreisel’s earlier (1.3a) leaps to the eye.⁷³ Finally, when in (1.79) referring to ‘contradictions which are not so much different from Russell’s Paradox’, Gödel did so while knowing Kreisel’s Paradox and Goodman’s Paradox, and, very likely, also Troelstra’s Paradox, as seen in the respective sections here; all of which are like Russell’s Paradox in the sense explained in section 1.4.1.⁷⁴

The two circumstances that I find suggestive of the idea that, moreover, Gödel’s (intuitionistic) Paradox, at least as presented in Figure 1.2, was occasioned specifically by Kreisel’s Paradox, are:

1. Gödel’s footnote addresses (and denies) exactly the distinction that Kreisel’s letter to Gödel on the paradox in 2.152 turns on.
2. Gödel’s Paradox illustrates the following theme in Kreisel’s paper even more explicitly than Kreisel’s:

⁷² Since it is the role of AP in mathematics that we are here interested in, Gödel’s question whether AP can be treated even independently of any specific system of things [Gödel, 1946, pp. 152-153] is left aside. It is discussed in Crocco [2019].

⁷³ There is independent reason to believe that Gödel had seen the letter before making this remark to Wang in 1972. Kreisel had the habit of sending his work to Gödel, but in this case there was no need to. By the time of Kreisel’s writing (1.3a), Gödel had, like him, become a Foreign Member of the Royal Society (Gödel in 1968, Kreisel in 1966) and on December 17, 1969, Kreisel wrote in a letter: ‘Wahrscheinlich kriegen Sie bald von der Royal Society die 1969 Obituary Memoirs, einschließlich den Nachruf auf Brouwer, den ich gemeinsam mit dem Topologen M. H. A. Newman verfaßt habe.’ [Kreisel Papers, 50/2].

⁷⁴ Of the earlier (voluntarily brief) discussion of (1.79), that in Crocco [2019, p. 571], I note that it does not give an example of a contradiction that AP leads to, except in its

Remark 2. According to Gödel, intuitionism rejects the use of unrestricted universal quantifications (all objects, all proofs, etc.) and therefore extensional and intensional paradoxes do not appear in it. Absolute provability implies reference to all proofs that can be performed by a human agent in any domain. In this sense it is in contradiction with intuitionism. (1.80)

But that contradiction is, in the way in which it arises, not similar to Russell’s Paradox. Furthermore, the first half of the first sentence is problematic, both in the claim ascribed and in the ascription (following Wang) of that claim to Gödel; see the discussion of (1.117) and (1.118) below.

- (1.81) Finally, *isolation of primitive concepts*, in terms of which the other can be defined, and laws (axioms) for these primitives. Current candidates are *construction* (function) and the *application operator* with *proof* as a suppressed parameter.

which comes with the footnote

- (1.82) As *ordinal* and *order* of the cumulative type theory are suppressed in the practice of set theory. The occurrence of such hidden parameters seems essential in work that gives an *analysis* of informal mathematics. [Kreisel 1965, 2.1, p121, italics in the original]

It is certainly essential to intuitionistic mathematics, which by its nature is informal, that functions are applied only to objects that have (actually, or hypothetically) been proved to be in their domain.

In the other direction, even on the (as yet unsupported) supposition that Kreisel knew (the content of) Gödel's Paradox when he set out to write the Saaty paper, it is clear that he would have had little direct motivation to include it: his interest there is in (further) developing an alternative interpretation of formal intuitionistic logic, not in *using* the intuitionists' own understanding. It is only when introducing the convention in 2.151 for use in his theory of constructions that he makes a short detour to show his paradox. Similarly, the topic of Kreisel's 1971 publication in which he presents the classical version of Gödel's Paradox, generalisations of recursion theory, would hardly have motivated including Gödel's intuitionistic Paradox or, for that matter, his own.⁷⁵

As stated at the end of the previous section (p. 36), it is highly likely that Gödel and Kreisel discussed the diagnosis in Kreisel's letter of April 1, 1968, and may have done so on Kreisel's travel to the Buffalo conference, but I have no direct evidence for either supposition. However, in Kreisel's first published remarks on notions and functions after that letter – the published version of his address at Buffalo – he abandons the categorical distinction he had appealed to in the letter, thus coming closer to Gödel's view in the footnote in Figure 1.2. This I take to be indirect evidence of a discussion with Gödel. Kreisel now holds:

- (1.83) Let us scrutinize a bit the basic relation:
 For some given notion α , the construction (more precisely, judgement) c proves αd for variable d .
 [...]

 If we think of the variable d as ranging over the, so to speak, absolutely unattained universe of all constructions, it seems dubious that there should be any construction (something that we grasp

⁷⁵ In fact, there the Saaty paper is referred to only once (p. 166), and on another topic.

completely) which proves αd , even if we have convinced ourselves that, for any clearly given d , α is indeed a well defined notion.

[...]

On the other hand, if we take some particularly simple notion αd , say $\beta d \triangleright \beta d$ (where I use \triangleright for truth functional implication [...]) we simply have a proof. Whatever else may be in doubt, we have a perfectly clear idea or ‘schema’ for verifying $\beta d \triangleright \beta d$. The kind of judgement involved here plays the same role among proofs as, say, the identity operator plays among functions. It is simply a mindless ritual to chant: for each type we have a different identity operator. (Though, trivially, for each domain D the set of pairs $\{ \langle x, x \rangle : x \in D \}$ depends on D .)

The obvious and immediate conclusion is: just as there are some operations which are defined for arbitrary operations (in the non-trivial sense of giving distinct values for ‘lots’ of arguments, e.g. the identity operator, the composition operator etc.) so there are some notions α which can be proved by constructions to hold for unrestricted d . The definition of other operators depends essentially on a given domain (‘essentially’ in the sense that the function is made total by a trick of, say, defining its value to be zero outside the given domain; cf. [21], 2.151, pp. 124-125).⁷⁶ In the case of notions α , the corresponding restriction concerns the variable d .

Applied to Kreisel’s Paradox, this view entails that Kreisel’s own earlier diagnosis in his letter is not correct, provided one considers the notion η to be simple enough.⁷⁷

To return to Gödel’s intuitionistic Paradox, note the variant in Figure 1.3. In the definition of F , the condition has to be understood as that on E in Figure 1.1. The value of the function f applied to x at time t is notated $f(x)_t$, and $\mathfrak{A}_{0t}(f)$ is the sequence of the arguments to which f has been applied between times 0 and t , such as they were given to us at these moments (i.e., intensionally), and possibly with repetitions. I take it that Gödel labels the definitions of the functions F , \cdot , and G as theorems because at the same time the existence of these functions is established, a construal of definitions similar to that in his introduction of ‘reductive proofs’ in the revised *Dialectica* paper [Gödel, 1972, p. 275, note h1]. These theorems are themselves established in time.

Note that the case distinction in the definition of the application function is decidable, with the particularity that which of the two conditions is proved to hold may, for the same arguments f and x , change with time. An example of time-dependency of $f \cdot f$ would be an identity function f , calculated at t_{37} by the projection $f(f) = \pi_0 \langle f, f \rangle$ and at t_{40} as $f(f) = f$ (‘andere Methode’);

⁷⁶ [Note MvA] The remark referred to is contained in quotation (1.68) above.

⁷⁷ This is a view that allows one to accept certain impredicative definitions as constructive; see section 1.4.5 below.




Fig. 1.3 Gödel's Paradox, time-dependent [Gödel Papers, 12/52, collective item 060772].

then for $t > 40$, $(f \cdot f)_t = 0$. We will see something very similar in Troelstra's Paradox.

Gödel offered no solutions to his paradoxes; I will come back to that at the end of section 1.4.5.

1.4.4.3 Troelstra's Paradox

Kreisel intended to enrich his Theory of Constructions with axioms for the intuitionistic 'thinking subject', with an eye on reconstructing Brouwer's so-called 'Creating Subject' arguments [Kreisel, 1967b, p. 180].⁷⁸ Those arguments are another example of (making explicit, or exploiting) a hidden parameter; see quotation (1.81) above. There the hidden parameter in question was proof, here time. (There is no reason these could not be treated together, but there seems to be no experience with that.)

Troelstra added an axiom to Kreisel's two, and in a modern formulation, the axioms and their intended meanings are as follows.

$$\forall n(\Box_n A \vee \neg \Box_n A) \quad (\text{CS1})$$

⁷⁸ Kreisel had received a letter from Kripke in which the latter had proposed a weak version of the Brouwer-Kripke Schema. See van Atten [2018, p. 1588].

That is, for any stage, it is decidable for the Creating Subject whether by that stage it has made A evident.

$$\forall n \forall m (\Box_n A \rightarrow \Box_{n+m} A) \quad (\text{CS2})$$

The Creating Subject never forgets what it has made evident.

$$\exists n \Box_n A \leftrightarrow A \quad (\text{CS3})$$

A proposition A is true if and only if the Creating Subject has made A evident by some stage. From left to right this is a reflection principle: there is a certain proof for A , therefore A .

These axioms show that about provability in Brouwer's sense 'one can state and prove things in a systematic way', as Gödel might have said it (see quotation (1.79)).

But Troelstra had also found a paradox. He discussed it with Kreisel at the Buffalo conference in 1968;⁷⁹ the time span in which Kreisel was preparing his part of the Brouwer obituary included all of that year (see the end of footnote 40 above). It is treated in the notes of the lecture series he gave there, the influential *Principles of Intuitionism* [Troelstra, 1969], of which, incidentally, Gödel owned a copy [Dawson, 1984].⁸⁰ Troelstra published on it again in Troelstra and van Dalen [1988, ch. 16, section 3] and Troelstra [2018].

For the present purpose, the last publication is the clearest and most useful one. It is best read as an argument in which we put ourselves in the shining shoes of the (idealised) Creating Subject, which thus reasons about itself:⁸¹

Let us now use α, β to denote arbitrary, not necessarily predeterminate, and not necessarily infinite sequences of natural numbers, and let us consider statements of the form ' α is a total sequence'. For example, if α is defined as a primitive recursive sequence, this conclusion is immediate as soon as α is defined. If α is initially given to us as a partial recursive function, we may at a later stage conclude that α is a total sequence, namely if we have found a proof of this fact. A lawless sequence is from the moment it is initiated a total sequence. (1.84a)

The original idea for the paradox was as follows. Let α^n be the n -th total sequence the C[reating] M[athematician] encounters when running through the stages of activity; then consider a sequence β defined by

$$\beta(n) = \alpha^n(n) + 1$$

⁷⁹ Email Troelstra to MvA, May 1, 2016. Troelstra spent the academic year November 1966–November 1967 with Kreisel at Stanford. Kreisel rarely refers to Troelstra's Paradox in print; a place where he does is Kreisel [1972, p. 326].

⁸⁰ Also of *Metamathematical Investigation of Intuitionistic Arithmetic and Analysis* [Troelstra, 1973a].

⁸¹ See van Atten [2018] for further discussion and references.

β is total, and at some stage m β should appear as an α^n . But then $\beta(n) = \alpha^n(n) = \alpha^n(n) + 1$, a contradiction. This is just a classical diagonalization argument.

Self-application of functions is not a feature of Troelstra's background theory, but its effect is provided for by letting the natural numbers also play the role of indices (a form of coding) to the encountered sequences $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ (functions). In this argument, one finds the principles CS1–3 instantiated as follows. CS1: Such an encounter consists in the act of proving that the sequence is totally defined, and for the Creating Mathematician it is decidable whether at a given stage it has such an encounter. CS2: A necessary condition for a list of the α^n is that these encounters are not forgotten. CS3 (from left to right): If, at some stage, it is proved that a sequence is totally defined, then that sequence is totally defined. CS3 (from right to left): If it is true that β is totally defined, then this is proved at some stage m .

- (1.84b) Mark van Atten observed that perhaps β is not well-defined, because, having encountered α^n , we are not certain how long we have to wait before the next total sequence appears.

That is, in its original formulation Troelstra's Paradox depends on an appeal to an unacceptable version of Markov's Principle: for discussion, see van Atten [2017a].

- (1.84c) This can be remedied as follows. At stage 0 we take α^0 to be the constant zero function. As long as no new total sequence is declared at stage $n + 1$, we take α^{n+1} to be equal to α^n ; and if at stage $n + 1$ a new total sequence γ is found, we take α^{n+1} to be equal to γ . Then we can diagonalize as before. [Troelstra, 2018, p. 14]

In terms of the Fixed Point Theorem, the representation principle in this Paradox is the instantiation of CS3: every totally defined sequence (function) $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ that the Creating Mathematician encounters can be correlated to an element of \mathbb{N} .

The application function g is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} g: \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} &\rightarrow \mathbb{N} \\ \langle n, x \rangle &\mapsto \alpha^n(x) \end{aligned} \tag{1.85}$$

Since the difference between the two versions that Troelstra described lies only in the way that the list of the α^n is constructed, g is the same for both. Note that the constructivity of g depends, via its dependence on that list, on the decidability of the appearance, at a given stage, of a total sequence.

The role of the morphism h is here played by the successor function. The morphism $k: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ yielded by the Fixed Point Theorem is a recipe for assigning a natural number to each natural number, and thus totally defines a sequence, Troelstra's β . The Creating Mathematician has this insight at

some stage of its activity (otherwise it would, intuitionistically, not be true), which means that $\beta = \alpha^n$ for some n . Thus, n represents β with respect to g .

We now have the contradiction $\beta(n) = g(n, n) = h(g(n, n)) = g(n, n) + 1$. To relate this to our theme in propositional logic, change h to the two-valued

$$h: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$

$$x \mapsto \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \neq 0 \\ 1 & \text{if } x = 0 \end{cases} \quad (1.86)$$

This yields $g(n, n) = 0 \leftrightarrow g(n, n) = 1$, that is,

$$g(n, n) = 0 \leftrightarrow (g(n, n) = 0 \rightarrow \perp). \quad (1.87)$$

The definition of the $n \in \mathbb{N}$ that represents β is impredicative, as it lies in the range of the latter's argument. It is furthermore critically impredicative, because this n , and any n in an argument $\langle n, x \rangle$ of g , is viewed here not as a natural number as such, but as a natural number in the role of an index into the collection of the encountered total sequences, and in that sense as dependent on the latter. But there is no construction method for that collection, as the Creating Subject is free to go about its constructive activity as it pleases. This critical impredicativity exists on both the original and the remedied formulations of Troelstra's Paradox.

The paradox can be seen as a special case of the intuitionistic version of Gödel's Paradox in Figure 1.2, if one accepts the idea that the definition of $f = \langle B, g \rangle$ there may change in the sense that B initially is, say, the object 0, but is identified with the proof that the operation g always yields a result as soon as there is one.⁸² If the relation to time in such a change is made explicit (and we furthermore allow for partial functions), we get a version of Gödel's time-dependent paradox in Figure 1.3, with the application function

$$(f \cdot x)_t = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if by stage } t, f \text{ has not been proved to be total} \\ f(x) & \text{if it has} \end{cases} \quad (1.89)$$

⁸² Troelstra writes:

Originally, I used, instead of 'total sequence' the notion 'a total sequence determined by a recipe'. I used the word 'recipe' instead of 'lawlike', because I did not want to suggest that the sequence was recursive, only that it was fixed by a recipe relative to the activity of the CM in general. But in view of the fact that the CM is completely free in his actions, a 'sequence determined by a recipe' can be as un-predetermined as an arbitrary choice sequence. (1.88)

In fact, in the original publication the term had been 'lawlike' [Troelstra, 1969, p. 105]; it was changed to 'fixed by a recipe' in [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, p. 845]. Be that as it may, the subsequent crystallisation into 'total sequence' in the 2018 version has the effect of bringing it even closer to Gödel's Paradox.

This definition by cases is governed by a decidable disjunction, with the property that it is time-dependent which of the two disjuncts is provable. In both Gödelian renderings of Troelstra's Paradox, the indirect self-reference of Troelstra's β via its index number is made direct in the application of a function to itself. As alluded to at the beginning of this section, it can, at present, not be excluded that Gödel devised his paradox after Troelstra and had seen the latter's, but I have neither positive nor negative evidence for that.

One thematic solution that Troelstra proposed was to stratify:

- (1.90) To each mathematical assertions and construction we suppose a level (of self-reflection) to be assigned. [...] Assertions which may be understood or constructions which can be carried out without reference to $\vdash_n [\Box_n A]$ are said to belong to level zero.
- Assertions which are described using $\vdash_n A$ for A of level p and constructions of level p , are said to belong to level $p + 1$. Likewise, constructions defined relative to $\vdash_n A$ for A of level p are said to be of level $p + 1$.
- [...] [O]ur paradox cannot be derived anymore.

Indeed, the critically impredicative definition of β is ruled out, as its construction can now be carried out only at a higher level than that of any collection of sequences that its definition can legitimately refer to. It is noteworthy that Troelstra proposed it only as an 'approach [that] deserves further investigation' [Troelstra, 1969, p. 107], and when writing about it again in *Constructivism in Mathematics*, he qualified it as 'at least as problematic' as the theory it replaces, unfortunately without expanding [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, p. 846]. In Troelstra [2018], on the other hand, he describes it neutrally.

1.4.4.4 Goodman's Paradox

Goodman's Paradox (which is what is often really meant when the 'Kreisel-Goodman paradox' is referred to) first appears in the introduction to Goodman's dissertation. He introduces (p. 4) an operation π , assumed (with Kreisel) to be decidable, such that

$$\pi(g, y) \leftrightarrow y \text{ is a proof of } \forall x(g(x) = 0), \quad (1.91)$$

and combines this with Kreisel's understanding of intuitionistic implication in (1.1) above to arrive at a contradiction:

- (1.92) To recapitulate briefly, we have said that a pair (p, f) is a proof of the proposition $A \rightarrow B$ just in case p is a proof that, if q is any proof of A , then $f(q)$ is a proof of B . So far we have no way of excluding the possibility that q is itself built up in some way from p . It is largely

this impredicative character of implication that makes the theory of constructions interesting from a technical point of view. Indeed, the most natural formalization of the conception we have outlined so far is inconsistent. It suffices to construct, using π , a function f such that $f(x) = 0$ if and only if $x(x)$ is a proof that no y proves that $f(x) = 0$. Now suppose that y proves that $f(x) = 0$. Then $f(x) = 0$, and so no y proves that $f(x) = 0$. This contradiction, together with the decidability of the proof predicate, shows that no y can prove that $f(x) = 0$. Therefore there must be a function g such that, for any x , $g(x)$ proves that no y proves that $f(x) = 0$. In particular, $g(g)$ proves that no y proves that $f(g) = 0$. That is, $f(g) = 0$. Hence there is a proof that $f(g) = 0$, which is absurd.

In Goodman [1970] a formal derivation of this paradox is given,⁸³ with as background theory an extended type-free λ -calculus, mended afterwards by stratification (see the end of this section).⁸⁴ It is this derivation that is reconstructed below, in different terms. The reader should consult also the rich discussion of Goodman's Paradox by Dean and Kurokawa [2016], and compare their reconstruction and mine. Their perspective is that of a comparison with Montague's Paradox; here, as per footnote 50, the Fixed Point Theorem is used directly and, as per section 1.4.1, the emphasis is rather on the paradox's relation to the propositional reasoning pattern that Kreisel mentions in (1.3c).

Let P be a decidable binary proof predicate, defined on constructions. Goodman, in effect, sets $P(v, u)$ to ' v is a proof that $u(z) \equiv \top$ for all z '. To simplify the presentation somewhat, I will here use ' u is the Gödel-number of a closed proposition and v is a construction that proves that proposition', thus presupposing that sufficiently much arithmetic has been developed first; and I assume that we have an implicational logic for decidable statements from the outset, whereas Goodman constructs it first. For the paradox itself these things are not necessary. Of course Goodman's choice of P is not determined by its ease of use in generating a paradox, but by its suitability for an attempt at a theory of constructions, and this survives after the paradox has been repaired, whether subsequently the theory proves viable or not.⁸⁵

⁸³ There are reading notes by Gödel to that paper (and others in that volume) in Gödel Papers, 10a/40, collective item number 050142.

⁸⁴ For *Mathematical Reviews*, Heyting summarised Goodman's paper with a fair amount of detail, including the impredicativity and Goodman's solution; but, unfortunately, without comments [Heyting, a].

⁸⁵ It did not; see Kreisel [a,b,c]; Weinstein [1983, p. 265]; Dean and Kurokawa [2016, pp. 53–54]; van Atten [2017b, section 4]. Note that Goodman came to hold a view that is critical of his own efforts in a different and farther-going way:

I myself have been attracted by intuitionism. But I have gradually come to see that, in the long term, strong intuitionistic convictions undermine one's actually doing mathematics. By embracing intuitionism the mathematician is giving up the most powerful motivation for his work — the search for publicly

(1.93)

Let A be the universe of constructions, and B the set of truth-values $\{\top, \perp\}$, considered as two arbitrary but distinct constructions. Representation principle: every morphism is also a construction (an element of A).

Let $f(v, u): A \times A \rightarrow B$ be the characteristic function of P , and let the family f_v be given by $f_v(u) = f(v, u)$. Part of the assumed decidability of P is the assumption that P is everywhere defined; if it is, then so are the functions f and f_v .

Define an application function for the f_v by

$$g: A \times A \rightarrow B^A$$

$$\langle j, x \rangle \mapsto \begin{cases} j(x) & \text{if } j = f_w, \text{ for some } w \\ \lambda z. \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1.94)$$

The equality here is intensional. Note that g is everywhere defined because the case distinction is decidable and the f_w are everywhere defined.

Define the family of functions

$$h_v: B^A \rightarrow B^A$$

$$\lambda z. f(v, z) \mapsto \lambda z. f(v(v), \ulcorner P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp \urcorner) \quad \text{if } v(v) \text{ is defined} \quad (1.95)$$

$$\lambda z. t[z] \mapsto \lambda z. \top \quad \text{in all other cases}$$

Constructivity of the image for all arguments presupposes that, for the chosen value of the parameter v , it is decidable whether $v(v)$ is defined, and that, if it is defined, f is constructive (i.e., that P is decidable). Under those presuppositions, h_v is everywhere defined; I will take the presupposition concerning f as a given, and to find a value for v is precisely how the argument will proceed.

With v a parameter, apply the Fixed Point Theorem to g and h_v . Thus we first obtain the morphism $k_v: A \rightarrow B^A$; by the chosen representation principle, it is represented by an element of A , which is k_v itself. Then we get the fixed point $b_v: A \rightarrow B = k_v k_v$, and have $b_v = g(k_v, k_v) = h_v(b_v)$. Hence for all z , the truth values given by $b_v(z)$ and $(h_v(b_v))(z)$ are identical, which, in propositional terms, entails that

validated truth. [...] There is a sense in which intuitionism is inadequate in its own terms, for it overlooks what is introspectively obvious: that I am interested in my constructions not for their own sake but for the new truths they enable me to find. [...] Just as the constructions lie behind the symbols and give them their interest and meaning, so there is something behind the constructions – mathematical truth.

[...]

Mathematical truth, unlike a mathematical construction, is not something I can hope to find by introspection. [Goodman, 1979, p. 545]

Goodman's notion of truth is different from Brouwer's. For a defense of intuitionism against the charge of solipsism, see Placek [1999] and van Atten [2004, ch. 6].

$$P(v, z) \leftrightarrow P(v(v), \ulcorner P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp \urcorner). \quad (1.96)$$

On account of the decidability of P , here and in the remainder (1.97)–(1.102), the implication can be interpreted truth-functionally (which for the reductive purpose of the Theory of Constructions would be required).

As an instance of reflection ('What is proved, is true'),

$$P(v(v), \ulcorner P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp \urcorner) \rightarrow (P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp), \quad (1.97)$$

so with (1.96)

$$P(v, z) \rightarrow (P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp), \quad (1.98)$$

and by contraction as in (1.49)

$$P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp. \quad (1.99)$$

Thus, using the Fixed Point Theorem we have obtained a morphism c that maps any construction v to a proof of $P(v, z) \rightarrow \perp$ for all z , provided that $v(v)$ is defined.

Again by the representation principle, we have $c \in A$, so $c(c)$ is defined, whence c is an admissible value for the parameter v . If furthermore we choose an arbitrary z_0 for z and follow the above reasoning, we obtain the closed statement

$$P(c(c), \ulcorner P(c, z_0) \rightarrow \perp \urcorner), \quad (1.100)$$

so $(h_c(b_c))(z_0) = \top$, and therefore $b_c(z_0) = \top$; propositionally,

$$(P(c, z_0) \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow P(c, z_0). \quad (1.101)$$

Now (1.98) for $z = z_0$ and (1.101) together yield

$$P(c, z_0) \leftrightarrow (P(c, z_0) \rightarrow \perp). \quad (1.102)$$

Part of the subsequent proof of $P(c, z_0)$ from (1.102) according to the reasoning in (1.46)–(1.50) has already been carried out schematically in order to find c , namely the contraction; but for the particular case it must be carried out anew.⁸⁶ Finally, one arrives at \perp as in (1.51).

⁸⁶ On the (constructive) relation between the proof of a general statement and proofs of its instances, there is Weyl's well known conception of the former as an 'Urteilsanweisung' [Weyl, 1921]. I should like to recall here also Freudenthal, who wrote:

der einmal gelieferte allgemeine Beweis dient uns nicht mehr als eine Landkarte,
die uns die Bergbesteigung zwar erleichtert, aber nicht erspart. [Freudenthal,
1936, p. 116] (1.103)

with the footnote

The definition of the representative k_c of the morphism k_c is critically impredicative, because it depends on a quantification over A , for which there is no construction method. Goodman's solution of this paradox was to stratify the universe of constructions 'according to the subject matter of proofs'. That is a much broader criterion than Troelstra's of levels of self-reflection (section 1.4.4.3), and correspondingly more difficult to justify (see the references in footnote 85 above).

1.4.5 Critical impredicativity

A correct but limited answer to the question why these proof paradoxes arise would be to say that their contexts satisfy the hypothesis of the Fixed Point Theorem. To see if a more specific cause can be identified, consider the following common aspects of the applications of that theorem in these paradoxes:⁸⁷

1. *Reflection*. 'There is a proof of p , therefore p .' This is part of the constructive explanation of truth.
2. *Informal decidability*. In each of the proof paradoxes as analysed above, the definitions of the morphism g – in (1.69), (1.76), (1.85), and (1.94) – depends, for its constructivity, on a notion in Kreisel's sense. To repeat: such a notion is a property that is decidable, not necessarily in a mechanical way, but for those who understand the terms [Kreisel, 1965, 2.13, 2.141]. The same dependence exists for h – in (1.70), (1.76), (1.86), and (1.95) –, where in Troelstra's Paradox (1.86) this is just the decidable equality on the natural numbers, the simplest property of the kind that notions were in fact introduced to generalise [Kreisel, 1965, p. 123, 2.13].
3. *A representation principle*. The motivation for accepting the principles figuring here was given together with (1.62) above.
4. *Critical impredicativity*. The general reason for the appearance of an impredicative definition in each was given in point 4 on p. 27; the reason why they are critical, in the discussion of the respective case.

I will argue that it is the last aspect that is responsible for these paradoxes. I will not attempt to show that the other three aspects, doing away with

(1.104) Man könnte meinen, daß dies Immer-wieder-von-neuem-Beweisen nicht nötig ist bei Hilfssätzen, die sich als explizite Formel darstellen, wie $m + n = n + m$. In Wirklichkeit bleibt einem aber weiter nichts übrig, als die Umordnung, von der diese Formel handelt, immer wieder, wenn sie nötig ist, von neuem vorzunehmen. Natürlich wird man in der sprachlichen Darstellung des Beweises das nicht tun, aber das sagt nichts gegen unsere Feststellung und alles gegen die sprachliche Darstellung.

⁸⁷ Compare the analogous section 5 in the discussion of Goodman's Paradox in Dean and Kurokawa [2016].

any of which would also block these paradoxes, are beyond doubt (although to traditional intuitionism, and also to me, in the present cases, they are). Rather, my take will be that rejecting the fourth is in any case necessary, and clearly is sufficient.

The following discussion is constrained (constricted) by the choice to organise it, like the present paper as a whole, around Kreisel's views – here, in particular remark (1.3b) – and their development. On the one hand, this organisation is natural, to the extent that Kreisel was one of the main participants in the discussion of the relations between constructivity and impredicativity, and an influential one at that, as seen in writings of intuitionists after Brouwer and Heyting such as Troelstra and Van Dalen (but hardly in those of the Nijmegen School).⁸⁸ On the other hand, it leaves no natural occasion for reflection on what an analysis of the views of Brouwer, who was neither a participant in that discussion nor among Kreisel's (epistolary) contacts,⁸⁹ might suggest about the matter once these are treated in their own right. (See the questions (i)–(iii) raised, but not taken up, on p. 63 below.) In contrast, ample attention is given to the views of Gödel, which strongly influenced Kreisel's thought in question. But in the end we will rather see the emergence of strong divergences between Kreisel's and Gödel's views.

An early occasion on which Kreisel brings up impredicativity is his 1959 lecture 'La prédictivité' [Kreisel, 1960], but there the emphasis is, as the title suggests, on seeking positive characterisations of predicativity. For the present purpose, more useful is a complementary lecture in 1962 by (his close contact) Bernays,⁹⁰ which refers to Kreisel's but makes, as its title says, 'Remarques sur l'imprédictivité' [Bernays, 1962]:

Une définition d'un objet d'une espèce S (d'un nombre, d'un point) (1.105)
- en bref : « d'un S » est imprédictive s'il intervient une quantification par rapport aux S . C'est l'imprédictivité au sens général.

Le cas critique d'imprédictivité se présente si les conditions suivantes sont remplies :

1. Une définition contenant une quantification par rapport aux S est nécessaire pour démontrer l'existence d'un S ayant une certaine propriété.
2. L'espèce S n'est pas celle des individus, mais, pour ainsi dire une espèce dérivée : espèce de fonctions, de suites, de prédicats, de classes.

⁸⁸ Wim Veldman informs me that there has been essentially no direct contact between members of the Nijmegen School and Kreisel either.

⁸⁹ See footnote 55.

⁹⁰ Their contact started with a letter from Kreisel in 1947, and lasted until Bernays' death in 1977. See for some details Isaacson [2020, p. 109].

The first part of the second condition I take to mean that the members of S are neither given to us from the outset,⁹¹ nor generated by a construction method⁹². The term ‘critical’ may be said to apply here in two of its meanings (in English as well as in the French of the original).⁹³ First, ‘crucial’. In the critical case, quantification over the domain is our only way to form an intention towards the object defined.⁹⁴ Second, ‘of the nature of, or constituting, a crisis’: if the definition of an object is critical in the first sense, then furthermore the existence of that object can be doubted or even rejected to the extent that the correctness of critically impredicative definition itself can.⁹⁵ Poincaré opened the debate by rejecting such definitions. The question, in any given case, is whether the quantification required according to the first condition can be given constructive sense in spite of the fact that the second condition is also fulfilled.⁹⁶

Further on, Bernays comments on the Proof Interpretation:

- (1.106) Mais la question se pose si l’intuitionnisme se restreint à des raisonnements prédicatifs. Je crois que ce n’est pas le cas. En effet, dans les raisonnements intuitionnistes l’espèce des preuves, qui, certes, est une espèce dérivée, est employée de façon qu’on peut, au cours d’une preuve, opérer avec la supposition de l’existence d’une preuve de quelque assertion – ce qui est une méthode imprédicative. [Bernays, 1962, p. 121]

The example of proof being given to show that intuitionism is not wholly predicative, it is clear that Bernays means to flag it as a critical impredicativity. But he does not go on to say that it renders the Proof Interpretation non-constructive. On the contrary, upon finding that alternatives (in meta-mathematics) such as bar induction or computable functionals of finite type likewise introduce impredicativity,⁹⁷ he concludes:

⁹¹ Ramsey’s reference to a man as ‘the tallest in a group’ is an example [Ramsey, 1931, p. 41].

⁹² E.g., the natural numbers.

⁹³ As given in, respectively, the *Oxford English Dictionary* and the *Trésor de la langue française informatisé* (<http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm>).

⁹⁴ A critically impredicative definition need not be unique, but equivalents will likewise depend on such a quantification.

⁹⁵ Such definitions are not eliminable [Behmann, 1931], which had, in effect, been demanded of definitions in Pascal’s ‘De l’esprit géométrique et de l’art de persuader’ of 1658 [1936]. Bernays’ talk was given at the Colloque international de Mathématiques, Clermont-Ferrand, June 4-7, 1962, organised there at the third centenary of Pascal’s death. Beth did rise to the occasion to recall Pascal’s criterion [Beth, 1962, p. 83], but Bernays did not.

⁹⁶ Impredicative definitions that are not critical in the first sense, and hence not in the second, are known as ‘impredicative specifications’ or ‘characterisations’. They define either an object that is accepted as an individual from the outset, or one for which there is an alternative definition that is predicative.

⁹⁷ For historical context: Bernays writes just after the appearance of Heyting [1956], Gödel [1958], Kreisel [1960], and, as he reminiscences to Gödel [Gödel, 2003a, p. 198],

Ainsi nos expériences indiquent que la métamathématique ne peut guère se restreindre dans ses méthodes à des évidences élémentaires ou même seulement prédicatives. (1.107)

Néanmoins nous pouvons maintenir l'idée de la métamathématique et aussi rendre justice à la tendance constructive, cependant nous abstenant dans les méthodes de restrictions innécessaires.

Mais puisqu'il se montre que nous avons à admettre des imprédictivités dans la métamathématique constructive, d'autant moins il y a de raison de rejeter en bloc l'imprédictif dans les mathématiques classiques. Cela naturellement n'empêche pas que nous tendions généralement à éviter des imprédictivités inutiles.

By the same reasoning, the Proof Interpretation would still be considered constructive.

Critical impredicativity of the Proof Interpretation is also what Kreisel has in mind when he points out, in his remark (1.3b), that it, like Russell's Paradox, involves a kind of self-application.⁹⁸ The quantification may be construed in two ways. The first is a quantification over all proofs, as in Kreisel's (1.1). Then $f: A \rightarrow B$ is a proof such that, for all proofs p , if p is a proof of A , then $f(p)$ is a proof of B . The impredicativity is direct, in that f is itself among the p . The second is quantification specifically over proofs of A , as in Heyting's clause (1.2). In that case the impredicativity is indirect: The informal definition of a proof f of $A \rightarrow B$ then does not quantify over a domain of which f itself is an element, but a proof of A in its domain may contain subproofs of $A \rightarrow B$ and $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$. The latter subproof is defined in terms of a quantification over proofs of $A \rightarrow B$, among which is f . On either reading, the appearing impredicativity is critical, for lack of a generation procedure for the respective domain containing f . Incidentally, if there is a proof a of A containing a subproof of $A \rightarrow B$ but not of $(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A$, as in skeleton (1.15), then there also is one that contains both, as in skeleton (1.14), provided that the inference steps from the subproof of $A \rightarrow B$ to A remain correct under an open assumption. (Derivation (1.57) in Myhill's Paradox above is one where this is not the case.) Also note that the definition of such an a is likewise indirectly impredicative.

Dean and Kurokawa [2016, p. 32], quoting Kreisel's (1.3c) but not the preceding (1.3b), have suggested that a role of (1.3c) precisely is to make one think of the impredicativity of 'the pre-theoretical notion of constructive proof which the BHK interpretation seeks to characterize', by transference

had conversations with Spector in Princeton while the latter was working on his [1962]; see also the end of footnote 1 of the latter paper.

⁹⁸ The first to make this observation about implication (without using the term 'impredicativity') in print seems to have been Kuroda [1956] in his review of Heyting [1956]. The first to use that term in print for this seems to have been Kreisel in his review of Wittgenstein [Kreisel, 1958, 147-148]. In van Atten [2017b, section 2], I argue that it is not made in Gödel [1933], but that he did see it as he was working on his functional interpretation.

from the formal to the informal. And, of course, it will; but I think that the primary reason for following up (1.3b) with (1.3c) was a different one. I will come back to that in my closing remark. In this section, I should like to make some further remarks occasioned by (1.3b) itself.

Kreisel has argued that the impredicativity of the definition of a function f that proves $A \rightarrow B$ may make it impossible to generate the domain of f , but that the constructive acceptability of f does not depend on that possibility to begin with. Rather, we accept f as constructive when inspection of the rule in its definition shows that, whatever we will come to recognise as a constructive proof of A , will, by applying f to it, be turned into a constructive proof of B . A characteristic (and general) passage is:

- (1.108) Briefly, to recognize that a given procedure is a welldefined construction, one may already have to have the general notion of construction (similarly in classical mathematics: a formula with quantifiers over sets will in general define a set uniquely only if one already knows the extension of set, except that in the intuitionistic case it is never a matter of the extension). This is an impredicativity, but constructive, provided, of course, one understands the notion involved. [Kreisel, 1962b, p. 318n8]⁹⁹

Naturally, Kreisel applied this view to intuitionistic species: Just as a function gets applied to an object only after that object has been proved to be in its domain, an object becomes an element of a species only by proving that it has the property in question. A species therefore depends as little on a construction method for its elements as a function on a construction method for its domain. The two cases are essentially the same, as to each species corresponds a characteristic function. For the exact definition of species, one would have expected Kreisel to refer to Heyting's *Intuitionism* [1956], which was his reference for the explanations of the logical constants. Heyting's definition runs:

- (1.109) Definition 1. A species is a property which mathematical entities can be supposed to possess (L. E. J. Brouwer 1918, p. 4; 1924, p. 245; 1952, p. 142).
 Definition 2. After a species S has been defined, any mathematical entity which has been or might have been defined before S and which satisfies the condition S , is a member of the species S . [Heyting, 1956, p. 37]¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ This paper was 'Communicated by Prof. A. Heyting at the meeting of January 27, 1962'. The Heyting-Kreisel correspondence of January 1962 indicates that the final part of that paper was revised quite a bit in the weeks before Heyting presented it to the Academy. Kreisel received the proofs on February 24, and sent the corrected proofs to the Academy on March 8, 1962 [Heyting Papers, Bkre 620308]. Gödel's letter to Kreisel quoted in (1.119) below is of the next day.

¹⁰⁰ Below we will have occasion to give, in (1.118), the last of Brouwer's own definitions that Heyting refers to.

But in this case, Kreisel did not follow suit. Without reference to Heyting's definition, in his paper introducing the Theory of Constructions, Kreisel defines

(1.110)

A *species* of n -tuples of constructions a_1, \dots, a_n is determined by a construction s where $s(c, a_1, \dots, a_n) = 0$ if c is a proof that $\langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$ belong to the species, $s(c, a_1, \dots, a_n) = 1$ otherwise. [Kreisel, 1962a, p. 202]¹⁰¹

and in the Saaty paper a species is simply a property (specifically, an undecided one) [Kreisel, 1965, p. 121]. One notices immediately the absence of anything corresponding to Heyting's Definition 2 above of a member of a species, which he had elucidated as follows:

(1.111)

Circular definitions are excluded by the condition that the members of a species S must be definable independently of the definition of S ; this condition is obvious from the constructive point of view. It suggests indeed an ordination of species which resembles the hierarchy of types. [Heyting, 1956, p. 38]

Indeed, Kreisel, in his letter to Heyting of 1962 quoted above in (1.67), had pointed out that 'type distinctions are not always observed, e.g. not in your explanation of the logical constants, in particular implication'. By 1968, he speaks of 'the impredicative theory of species', understanding it as the comprehension principle with intuitionistic logic (Kreisel [1968a, pp. 153]; also Kreisel [1968b, p. 351]). Specifically, he proposes to accept as a principle of second-order arithmetic:

$$\exists X \forall y [y \in X \leftrightarrow Ay], \quad (1.112)$$

where X ranges over species of natural numbers, y ranges over natural numbers, and A may contain quantifiers over species of natural numbers (but not contain the variable X).¹⁰² He elucidates:

(1.113)

For Ay to be intuitionistically meaningful, we must have a notion of: *proof of Ay* ([Kreisel 1965], p. 128, 2.31) and this knowledge determines *per se* a species X such that $\forall y (y \in X \leftrightarrow Ay)$.

What could go wrong? Of course there is the common place objection to impredicative notions allegedly connected with the paradoxes; more precisely we consider here species of arbitrary species instead of sets of arbitrary sets, and take care to derive the paradoxes intuitionistically. Evidently this objection is as weak here as in the case of set

¹⁰¹ The special case for properties of natural numbers had been given in his lecture 'La prédictivité' [Kreisel, 1960, p. 388], held in November 1959, about a year before that of which 'Foundations of intuitionistic logic' [1962a] is the published version.

¹⁰² Likewise, Troelstra accepts the existence of a least upper bound on species of the so-called extended reals [Troelstra, 1982, pp. 284–285].

theory since we are considering species of natural numbers, and not of arbitrary species. Kreisel [1968a, pp. 153–154]¹⁰³

The paradox arising from accepting species of arbitrary species would be a form of Russell’s Paradox for properties (section 1.4.3), but for the species considered here the question of self-membership does not arise. The emphasis on intuitionistic logic in the derivation of the paradox here serves to diagnose that the cause of the paradox lies in the theory of species (see section 1.4.1, and Kreisel’s remark (1.67)). Further on, Kreisel comments:

- (1.114) Of course it is not claimed that the impredicative species above are our constructions in the sense of our having, so to speak, ‘listed’ them all before speaking about them, ‘listed’ in the idealized sense of having given a rule of construction indexed by natural numbers or even ordinals. But note that Heyting’s own interpretation of the logical operations, e.g., of implication, certainly does not refer to any ‘list’ of possible proofs of the antecedent. It simply assumes that we know what a proof is.

[. . .]

The moral is not that Heyting’s interpretation is non-constructive! nor that a more elementary interpretation such as Gödel’s (G) [i.e., the *Dialectica* interpretation of HA] is foundationally uninteresting. The moral is that its foundational interest depends on something subtler than mere constructive validity. [Kreisel, 1968a, pp. 154–155]

Looking back in 1987 on the period in which (1.108), (1.113), and (1.114) were written, he relates this way of seeing the matter to Gödel and the *Dialectica* paper:

- (1.115) Asymmetry between rules and – the ranges of – their arguments. One feature that Gödel emphasized increasingly in conversations during the decade after [Gödel 1958] appeared, was the possibility of exploiting the amorphous character – or, if preferred, our ignorance – of the totality of all effective rules. More fully, a rule is accepted only if it is understood to be well defined for all effective arguments (of appropriate type), even though little is – or can be – known about this possibly growing totality. This situation is only superficially paradoxical, to adapt the wording of footnote 1 on p. 283 of [Gödel 1958] about propositional and other logical operators – for the class of propositions – meant by Brouwer and Heyting.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ See also Kreisel [1970b, pp. 130–131].

¹⁰⁴ In the footnote referred to, Gödel had written about the concept of computable functional of finite type:

- (1.116) Man kann darüber im Zweifel sein, ob wir eine genügend deutliche Vorstellung vom Inhalt dieses Begriffs haben, aber nicht darüber, ob die weiter unten angegebenen Axiome für ihn gelten. Derselbe scheinbar paradoxe Sachverhalt

The critical impredicativity arising in proof paradoxes when reconstructed with the Fixed Point Theorem is, unlike that in the case of functions, direct, and does not define a species, but an individual object. Therefore:

1. On the one hand, accepting a representation principle as constructive obliges us to accept its instances as constructive. On the other hand, accepting the critical impredicative definition that in the present cases results does not put us in a position actually to construct the defined object. This combination presents us (or rather: we present ourselves) with an obligation that is impossible to fulfill. The infinite regress that Gödel observes in (1.78) is a symptom of this, and parallel regresses arise in each of the other proof paradoxes. The reason can be stated in terms of the proof of the Fixed Point Theorem: the contexts in which these paradoxes arise leave us with no other possible attempt at constructing the fixed point b than to construct it as the result of bh , which cannot succeed.

Note that this kind of impossibility is not the one we are presented with in the case of intuitionistic negation, when we observe that a fitting of one mathematical building into another at some point ‘no longer goes’ [Brouwer 1907, p. 127; trl. Brouwer 1975, p. 73]. Rather, we here observe that an intention directed at a single mathematical object cannot be fulfilled for the reason that, by its nature, this object lies outside the reach of our construction acts. Thus, to put it in the same terms as Brouwer’s analogous rejection of Cantor’s second number class: Here contact with the firm ground of mathematics is lost [Brouwer 1907, p. 146; trl. Brouwer 1975, p. 81]. The proposition that the fixed point exists is therefore not contradictory, but rather non-mathematical (‘theological’, some would say).

2. This separation of cases between direct and indirect impredicativity shows why the existence of proof paradoxes does not, by analogy, cast doubt on the Proof Interpretation of implication (whether construed in Kreisel’s way (1.1), or Heyting’s (1.2)): in both figures ‘some kind of self-application’, but not of the same kind.¹⁰⁵
3. Indeed, in the wake of their paradoxes, neither Kreisel, nor Goodman (both of whom sought a mathematical model of the informal Proof Interpretation) nor Troelstra (who did not, but *used* it), came to express doubts about the Proof Interpretation. Rather, they blocked their respective paradoxes by (in effect) rejecting the critically impredicative

besteht auch für den der intuitionistischen Logik zugrunde liegenden Begriff des inhaltlich richtigen Beweises. [Gödel, 1958, p. 283n1]

¹⁰⁵ Although, by footnote 3 above, I see no reason to discuss Kreisel’s ‘second clause’ extensively, I do, coming from a different perspective, express my agreement here with Dean and Kurosawa’s view [2016, section 4.2] that Weinstein [1983, p. 264] was mistaken to suggest that it is the self-reflexivity in the ‘second clause’ that leads to Goodman’s Paradox.

definition coming in with the application of the Fixed Point Theorem, by introducing forms of typing and stratification.

The approach in item 3 is not the one Gödel envisaged to block his intuitionistic paradox. That much is clear from a comment he makes on intuitionism and paradoxes in general, as reported by Wang:

- (1.117) Brouwer objects to speaking of all proofs or all constructible objects. Hence the extensional and the intensional paradoxes do not appear in intuitionism according to his interpretation. But I think that this exclusion of all, like the appeal to type theory in the theory of concepts, is arbitrary [from the intuitionistic standpoint]. [Wang, 1996, p. 188, 6.1.15, amendment Wang]

The opening sentence here is, in that exact wording, a half-truth. There certainly is an (intensional) sense of ‘all’ such that Brouwer did not object to, and indeed engaged in, asserting that every mathematical construction starts from the ‘basic intuition of mathematics’ [Brouwer, 1907, p. 8–9], or that any proof can be put in canonical form [Brouwer, 1927b, p. 64]. What Brouwer objected to is the formation of a *species* of all proofs, or of all constructible objects (species to play the role of, e.g., domains of functions), because he required species as the (not necessarily decidable) separation of certain objects out of all previously constructed ones (constructed individually, or implied by a given generation method for a collection), and hence to be defined predicatively, as is clear from his definition:

- (1.118) mathematical *species*, i.e. *properties supposable for mathematical entities previously acquired*, and satisfying the condition that, if they hold for a certain mathematical entity, they also hold for all mathematical entities which have been defined to be equal to it, relations of equality having to be symmetric, reflexive and transitive; mathematical entities previously acquired for which the property holds are called the elements of the species. [Brouwer, 1952, p. 142, original emphasis]

The qualification in italics was not present in Brouwer’s published definitions before (the Dutch – which Gödel could read) Brouwer [1947], and it can be investigated whether it is a stronger qualification than that imposed on elements in Heyting’s ‘Definition 2’ in (1.109) above.¹⁰⁶ Either way, the ensuing predicativity was also the essence of Brouwer’s remarks on denumerably unfinished collections and of his reaction to Russell’s Paradox, both formulated in his dissertation [Brouwer, 1907, pp. 148-149, 162-163], which dissertation Gödel had read [van Atten, 2015, p. 191]. Once one forbids species with members whose definition is critically impredicative, the proof paradoxes as well as the Russell paradox are all blocked. Surely that was what Gödel had in mind in the first sentence of (1.117), and one begins to wonder whether ‘speaking’ might be Wang’s mishearing or misremembering of Gödel saying

¹⁰⁶ See on this point van Atten [2017b, section 3].

‘species’.¹⁰⁷ This would also give a precise sense to Gödel’s qualification of arbitrariness, the idea being that if intuitionism accepts impredicativity in the Proof Interpretation (as observed, for example, in Bernays’ remark (1.106) above) then why not also in the definition of species? Indeed, Brouwer’s theory of well-ordered species has generally been considered to be impredicative (see also footnote 117 below).

Gödel insists on the intensional conception of quantification in intuitionism in a letter to Kreisel of March 9, 1962, in a discussion of his Russell paper:

Was das vicious circle betrifft, so habe ich ja selbst auf p134 gesagt, dass es sogar für die konstruktive Mathematik nicht in vollen Umfang gilt (vgl. die Formulierung auf p133). Dabei ist ja unter ‘Konstruktivismus’ in meiner ganzen Arbeit der Russell-Poincaré-Weylsche ‘Halbintuitionismus’¹⁰⁸ zu verstehen, der in einer Hinsicht weiter, in einer andern (insbes(ondere) hinsichtlich des Imprädikativen) enger ist als der Intuitionismus. In dem letzteren kommt ja der Begriff der Totalität überhaupt nicht vor u(nd) auch die Quantoren sind intensional zu interpretieren (vgl. p136 oben). Es besteht daher kein Grund, weshalb das vic(ious) circ(le) princ(iple) (intensional formuliert) im Intuit(ionismus) gelten sollte. [Kreisel Papers, 50/1, underlining Gödel]¹⁰⁹

(1.119)

In the Russell paper, Gödel had stated the vicious circle principle as ‘no totality can contain members definable only in terms of this totality, or members involving or presupposing this totality’, and remarked that, for each choice among ‘definable only in terms of’, ‘involving’, and ‘presupposing’, one in fact obtains a different principle [Gödel, 1944, pp. 133, 135]. The intensional formulation is that in terms of definability. In it, intuitionism would replace the extensional ‘totality’ by the intensional species, but then Gödel sees no objection to a species having members that are definable only in terms of that species. Kreisel’s acceptance of impredicative definitions as in (1.108)–(1.115) above is based on this idea.

¹⁰⁷ Wang made notes during and after the conversations, but no tape recordings [Wang, 1996, p. 135]. ‘Since I do not have a verbatim record of Gödel’s own words, there are bound to be misrepresentations’ [Wang, 1996, p. 129]. The possibility evoked here is reminiscent of Wang’s ‘Rotterdam’ when mentioning Gödel’s 1939 lectures at Notre Dame [Wang, 1981, p. 655]. (See also Parsons’ comment on this in Gödel [2003b, p. 392].)

¹⁰⁸ Die finite Mathematik scheint mir in einem gewissen Sinn der Durchschnitt von Intuition(ismus) u(nd) Halbintuit(ionismus) zu sein.

¹⁰⁹ In the letter of January 31, 1962 to which Gödel is replying, Kreisel (letter of January 31, 1962 [Kreisel Papers, 50/2]) had said that he had read the Russell paper again, and found the argument there that the vicious circle principle should apply to constructive mathematics [Gödel, 1944, pp. 136–137] not convincing, on the ground of the considerations in the *Dialectica* paper. But that is, as we see, not the kind of constructivism Gödel had meant.

Not long after that letter, Gödel made the point in print, in a note he added to the 1964 reprint of that paper:¹¹⁰

- (1.120) The author wishes to note [...] that the term ‘constructivistic’ in this paper is used for a strictly anti-realistic kind of constructivism. Its meaning, therefore, is not identical with that used in current discussions on the foundations of mathematics. If applied to the actual development of logic and mathematics it is equivalent with a certain kind of ‘predicativity’ and hence different both from ‘intuitionistically admissible’ and from ‘constructive’ in the sense of the Hilbert School. [Benacerraf and Putnam, 1964, p. 211]

Gödel here sees, by implication, an element (not a ‘vestige’!) of realism in the intuitionistic position;¹¹¹ and we see that (1.119) and (1.120) confirm the correctness of Wang’s amendment to (1.117).

The paradoxes that drew attention to the problematic character of the impredicative species of all proofs or all constructions, the proof paradoxes of section 1.4.4, all appeared in print, and were discussed among the protagonists, over a period of a few years after (1.120). In 1969, Gödel stated where he wanted to look for a solution to paradoxes, in a letter to Kreisel (July 25):

- (1.122) Die Scott-schen Bedenken gegen impräd(ikativen) Spezies u(nd) den allgemeinen Beweisbarkeitsbegriff¹¹² scheinen mir *beim heutigen Stand der Wissenschaft* durchaus berechtigt.¹¹³ Wie die Antinomien zeigen,¹¹⁴ *verstehen* wir diese sehr allgemeinen Begriffe heute noch *nicht*. Erst nach einer genauen phänomenolog(ischen) Analyse, welche die Antinomien auf eine vollkommen einleuchtende Weise auflöst, werden sie vertrauenerweckend sein. [Kreisel Papers, 50/2, emphasis Gödel]

¹¹⁰ He expanded and revised that note in 1972, and only that version is included in Gödel [1990]. But see the next footnote for a related note that is included there.

¹¹¹ In a note kept with an offprint of the Russell paper, Gödel specified an ‘antireal(istic) kind of constr(uctivism)’ as one for which

- (1.121) the starting point and the means of constr(uction) are to be exclusively sensual & material (e.g. symbols, their perc(eptual) prop(erties) & rel(ations) and the actual or imagined handling of them), not the element(ary) operations and int(uitions) of a new & irreducible entity called mind. [Gödel, 1990, p. 320]

In Sundholm and van Atten [2008, p. 71], intuitionism and platonism were likened to one another in that both are forms of ‘ontological descriptivism’ (there, as opposed to meaning-theoretical approaches).

¹¹² This refers to Scott’s thinking, which he discussed with Gödel and Kreisel, that led to „Constructive validity“ [1970]; see its p. 239 and p. 241 (where, however, no explicit argument against quantification over species is given). See also footnote 119 below.

¹¹³ [Note MvA] Kreisel comments: ‘Scott, in [Scott 1970], p. 239, 1.-10 to 1.-9, expresses very clearly similar misgivings about the role of proofs in constructive foundations. Pushed beyond reason [...] Scott’s view blocks any chance, at least at present, of a non-circular explanation of implication.’ [Kreisel, 1971c, p. 124n8]

¹¹⁴ [Note MvA] Here Gödel may also have had paradoxes such as Myhill-Montague in mind (see the end of section 1.4.1).

These lines were written at the time of Gödel's undergirding his *Dialectica Interpretation* by Husserl's phenomenology, first, more specifically, as a contribution to intuitionism, then in the form of a theory of 'reductive proof' [van Atten, 2015, pp. 210–222]. This is no coincidence, of course: philosophical questions around impredicativity and proof are raised just as much by the concept of computable functional; see, e.g., Gödel's (1.116) in footnote 104 above. One thinks of Husserl: 'Für die apriorischen Disziplinen, die innerhalb der Phänomenologie zur Begründung kommen (z.B. als mathematische Wissenschaften) [kann es] keine ‚Paradoxien‘, keine ‚Grundlagenkrisen‘ geben' [Husserl, 1962, p. 297].¹¹⁵

Gödel's expectation in (1.122) is that an analysis such as he envisages will have the effect of validating impredicative species and a general notion of proof.¹¹⁶ Brouwer, on the other hand, at least in his explicit statements, and presumably on the basis of *his* further analysis, accepts a general concept of proof, but not impredicatively defined species, e.g. (1.118) above. It has been a matter of debate (*i*) whether in Brouwerian intuitionism, as practised, critical impredicativities nevertheless do occur;¹¹⁷ (*ii*) whether, given Brouwer's views on mathematical existence and truth, they should be avoided; and (*iii*) whether, if they should, intuitionism would still be able to develop satisfactory

¹¹⁵ On his 'reductive proof', which Gödel introduced around the time of (1.122), he observed in a note dated February 11, 1974:

Meine Dial(ectica) Arbeit mit dem Begriff des reduktiven Beweis(es) gibt keine die Parad(oxien) ausschließende Interpretation (daher die Fundierung nicht wesentlich besser als Heyting und zwar deswegen, weil zum Beispiel der allgemeine Begriff der berechenbaren zahlentheoretischen Funktion vorkommt und dieser von irgendeiner Def(initions)-Kette spricht (also die Def(inition) $x \in a \equiv \sim x \in x$ kann vorkommen)). [Gödel Papers, 10a/40, item 050136] (1.123)

See on this note also van Atten [2015, p. 222–224].

¹¹⁶ A view that I cannot go into here, but that is highly interesting for comparison and contrast with Gödel's, is that of those who wished to accept both impredicative species and the Curry-Howard isomorphism. This combination was proved inconsistent by Girard [1972]; see also Coquand [1986]. Generally, the conclusion was that impredicative species had to go [Martin-Löf, 2008, p. 250], and this opened the way to Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory as we know it today. Gödel, on the contrary, had accepted, from early on, as the object correlate to a general notion of proof, one universe of all proofs. He (and Kreisel) criticised Howard's manuscript for not analysing what a construction is [Wadler, 2014, p. 11]. (Incidentally, Bill Howard told me that Gödel and he never discussed impredicativity in the Proof Interpretation explicitly [van Atten, 2015, p. 193n10].)

¹¹⁷ In his notebook Max Phil IV of May 1941–April 1942, Gödel lists as impredicativities in Brouwer the sum species of an arbitrary species (of species) and the definition of ordinal numbers [Gödel Papers, 6b/67, item 030090, p. 154]. See, e.g., Brouwer's definition of the 'Vereinigungsspecies' (and note the use of \mathfrak{S} , as for 'Summe') in Brouwer [1925, p. 247], and the definition of well-ordered species, which is fundamental to Brouwer's theory of ordinal numbers, in Brouwer [1927a, pp. 451, 456]. In the former definition, the implicit quantification over species is not universal but existential. Note that Gödel does not mention implication; perhaps because in Brouwer the Proof Interpretation is operative, but implicit [van Atten, 2017, section 3.1].

understandings of, in particular, implication and of well-orderings. A treatment of those questions lies outside the scope of the present paper; for references, a discussion, and an attempt at a contribution, see van Atten [2017b].

As for Kreisel, already at the time of receiving Gödel's letter with (1.122) in it, his thinking was developing in quite the opposite (deflationary) direction, in every respect:

1. Having given his analysis of impredicative species quoted in (1.83) above, he recommended leaving it at that:

(1.124) The analysis above, like the interpretation of the logical operations intended by Brouwer and formulated by Heyting, uses notions which are more abstract than those of familiar constructive mathematics [...] The analysis has enough coherence and substance to suggest that there is something definite to understand here [...] But do we want to know about it, not only subjectively, but for getting on with the business of constructive mathematics? Not the possibility of understanding intuitionistic concepts, but their usefulness is the true issue. Dramatic exaggerations would only lead to the kind of letdown which Russell felt after he (or rather, according to his autobiography, after Whitehead) finished *Principia*. [Kreisel, 1970b, p. 131]¹¹⁸

In fact, Gödel had written (1.122) *after* having seen this recommendation.¹¹⁹

2. Kreisel's initial calls for phenomenological analysis in papers at the time [1969, p. 97; 1970a, p. 489; 1971b, p. 151] no doubt inspired by his conversations with Gödel, quickly vanished. As Kreisel explained later, he did not read Husserl because he was, in fact, 'interested in other things' [1998, pp. 100, 105].
3. As we saw in (1.74), a comment of 1958 and among Kreisel's first on the paradoxes, he looked at Russell's and concluded that it arises from an oversight: not every property has a definite extension. He there also

¹¹⁸ The qualification 'dramatic exaggeration' predicts Kreisel's reaction to the elaboration of the *Dialectica* paper that Gödel was working on at that very moment. Kreisel always considered the 1958 version a 'gem' [Kreisel, 1987b, p. 108], but, reviewing volume 2 of the *Collected Works*, considers the added notes in the 1972 version 'particularly ethereal', and opines that, while it is not difficult to see the philosophical gain achieved 'when the "gain" is measured by the canons of academic epistemology', '[t]his leaves open what gain, if any, there is for a more realistic view (of knowledge)' [Kreisel, 1990, p. 615].

¹¹⁹ The details, as recounted in a letter from Kreisel to Gödel of March 10, 1969 [Gödel Papers, 2a/92, item 011262], are these. On February 20, 1969, Scott had sent Gödel a letter in which he stated objections to impredicative species, and a copy to Kreisel. Kreisel then asked Myhill, one of the editors of the Buffalo volume, to send Gödel the typescript of Kreisel [1970b], and commented to Gödel that at least some of Scott's objections seem to be incorrect, for the reasons Kreisel gives in section 5 of his paper (which does not discuss Scott's views directly). 'Übrigens sind Ihnen die Überlegungen von §5 höchstwahrscheinlich sowieso nicht fremd.'

DRAFT NOTE: I hope to obtain a copy of Scott's letter soon.

stated that this take, while ‘illuminating’, ‘does not seem to lend itself to generalisation’. Initially, it seems he nevertheless hoped that such a generalisation existed and would be found; thus in 1967 he writes that

in Zermelo’s work [...] the intuitive analysis of the crude mixture of notions, namely the description of the type structure, led to the good axioms [...] And a similar conceptual analysis will be needed for solving the problem of the paradoxes. [Kreisel, 1967b, p. 145] (1.125)

But by 1971, at the beginning of a long ‘*Autobiographical remark* on the (functional) paradoxes’, a turn sets in:

Speaking for myself, I simply do not find the paradoxes dramatic: halfway through the argument, that is well before any hint of a paradox appears, my attention begins to wander as in free association. [Kreisel, 1971b, p. 188] (1.126)

And in 1973 he holds:

For contrary to popular opinion I have the impression that paradoxes occur when we have not even *begun* to think, when we are playing with words, and their resolution is generally *not* fruitful: after all, how much more does the child really know about the concept of number when he realizes that there is no greatest? [Kreisel, 1973, p. 265] (1.127)

Not fruitful, unlike, one is, in view of the above, inclined to add, Zermelo’s analysis of set.¹²⁰ Finally, in his retrospective Salzburg essay, he draws the contrast with Gödel:

Evidently, if such simple and familiar points are overlooked in the manufacture of paradoxes, there is good reason to doubt Gödel’s high expectations from a solution of the paradoxes. [Kreisel, 1987a, pp. 95-96] (1.129)

¹²⁰ Kreisel [1967b, p. 144n1] still expressed his opposition to the view, there ascribed to Rasiowa and Sikorski [1963], of the paradoxes as a ‘dead (fruitless) issue’. Also note how close the spirit of Kreisel’s (1.127) to that of this passage in Brouwer:

It can be shown, however, that these paradoxes result from the same error as that of Epimenides, namely, that they arise where regularities in the language that accompanies mathematics are extended over a language of mathematical words that does not accompany mathematics; that, further, logistics too is concerned with the mathematical language instead of with mathematics itself, thus does not clarify mathematics itself; that, finally, all paradoxes disappear, when one restricts oneself to speaking only of systems that explicitly can be built out of the Ur-intuition. [Brouwer 1908, p. 155; trl. van Atten and Sundholm 2017, p. 17] (1.128)

Items 1 and 3 in this list make up an educated guess why Kreisel seems never to have taken up the matter of (1.3b) again.

1.5 Closing remark

A question I need to return to is that of the relation between remarks (1.3b) and (1.3c). As mentioned at the beginning of section 1.4.5, I agree with Dean and Kurokawa that (1.3c) will draw attention to the idea of impredicativity of implication, which is a way in which proofs are about themselves, as stated in (1.3b). However, Kreisel could have done that in a more direct way, without also invoking the contrast between the formal and the non-formal, or that between the natural and the non-natural. The point of inserting the parenthetical remark (1.3c), such as I understand it, will also serve as conclusion to the present paper as a whole. It is to make clear that for certain A , a formal proof that depends on a proof of $A \rightarrow B$ is not a merely theoretical, and in that sense unnatural possibility, to be taken into account only to test the generality of some theoretical interpretation or explanation of the pre-theoretical notion ‘constructive proof of A ’, but one that, when formalising natural informal proofs, is to be expected.

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