# Perturbation of Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Makes Power Holders Less Resistant to Tempting Bribes

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## Abstract

Bribery is a common form of corruption that takes place when a briber suborns a power holder to achieve an advantageous outcome at the cost of moral transgression. Although bribery has been extensively investigated in the behavioral sciences, its underlying neurobiological basis remains poorly understood. Here, we employed transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) in combination with a novel paradigm (N = 119 adults) to investigate whether disruption of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) causally changed bribe-taking decisions of power holders. Perturbing rDLPFC via tDCS specifically made participants more willing to take bribes as the relative value of the offer increased. This tDCS-induced effect could not be explained by changes in other measures. Model-based analyses further revealed that such neural modulation alters the concern for generating profits for oneself via taking bribes and reshapes the concern for the distribution inequity between oneself and the briber, thereby influencing the subsequent decisions. These findings reveal a causal role of rDLPFC in modulating corrupt behavior.

## Introduction

As one of the most common forms of corruption, bribery is pervasive in governments, enterprises, and other organizations all over the world (Dreher et al., 2007). In real life, bribes usually occur in interpersonal contexts in which there is an asymmetry in power between the parties involved, such as when a power holder can exert an influence in the briber's interest (Köbis et al., 2016). Hence, bribes often result in mutual benefits via collaboration between the two parties involved but transgress moral principles and legal rules. Although bribery-related issues have been widely investigated in the social sciences (Abbink, 2006; Mauro, 1995; Serra & Wantchekon, 2012), the neurobiological roots of bribery and the underlying computations involved in deciding whether to accept a bribe remain largely elusive. How does a power holder decide whether to take or refuse a bribe? Bribery-related decision-making is supposed to follow the general framework of value-based decision-making (Rangel et al., 2008) and the account of social

preference (Fehr & Krajbich, 2014). In a simplified situation, a power holder makes a choice on the basis of a relative subjective value between accepting and rejecting the bribe, calculated by pitting personal profits against the other-regarding interests. Moreover, accepting a bribe often involves the transgression of a moral principle and results in moral costs, which affects the subjective-value computation (Crockett et al., 2014). A recent study identified the moral cost to the power holder of colluding with a fraud committed by the briber, which depreciates the decision weights on per-sonal gains from the bribe and thus decreases the accep-tance rates (Hu et al., 2021). Notably, the moral cost of taking the bribe is critically distinguished from the psy-chological cost of dishonesty (Fischbacher & Föllmi- Heusi, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2018; Mazar et al., 2008). In these studies, the moral cost occurs if an individual cheats for personal profit, whereas in the bribery sce-nario, the moral cost for a power holder is elicited by collusion with a briber to obtain morally tainted benefits via taking a bribe. It is well established that the right dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (rDLPFC) is critically involved in modulat-ing human social and moral behaviors. Specifically, previous studies using an ultimatum game have consis-tently showed that decreasing the neural excitability of rDLPFC—either by low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation or by cathodal transcranial direct- current stimulation (tDCS)—makes the respondents more likely to accept disadvantageous offers (Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Speitel et al., 2019). In the moral domain, inhibiting rDLPFC and related anterior prefron-tal areas with cathodal tDCS improves deceptive behav-iors by reducing the reaction time to tell lies and increasing skillful lies (Karim et al., 2010). Using a dif-ferent task, a brain-lesion study illustrated that patients with DLPFC lesions selectively increased self-serving cheating behaviors (Zhu et al., 2014). Concerning the anodal tDCS effect over rDLPFC on social and moral behaviors, the current evidence is less clear. There is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that a responder's intolerance of inequity is increased in the ultimatum game after they receive anodal tDCS (Speitel et al., 2019). Regarding moral behaviors, par-ticipants who receive anodal tDCS are more likely to behave honestly (Maréchal et al., 2017). Yet there is also evidence that anodal tDCS over DLPFC speeds up dishonest decisions, suggesting an opposite effect (Mameli et al., 2010). Moreover, a recent functional MRI (fMRI) study indicates that the DLPFC guides anticor-rupt behaviors contextually and selectively modulates bribery-specific computations across individuals (Hu et al., 2021). Together, these results suggest that the rDLPFC should play a pivotal role in bribery-related decision- making, but it remains unclear how disrupting the rDLPFC specifically impacts corrupt acts and the com-putations underlying such decision-making. Here, to examine whether rDLPFC exerts a causal influence in determining whether a power holder would accept a bribe or not, we manipulated the neural excitability of rDLPFC via tDCS and measured corrupt behaviors of power holders using a novel paradigm. Specifically, 120 healthy participants were randomly assigned to three tDCS groups to causally modulate (anodal or cathodal tDCS) or maintain (sham tDCS) the neural excitability of rDLPFC (see Fig. 1; see also Fig. S1 in the Supplemental Material available online). Par-ticipants played the role of a power holder who decided whether another (fictitious) person in a separate game would earn a given amount of money in a fraudulent manner (the bribe condition) or in a morally proper manner (the control condition). Thus, the fictitious per-son, denoted as a proposer, made an offer to influence the power holder's decision. The task for the partici-pants was to decide whether to accept or reject the offer made by the proposer. If the offer was accepted, both the proposer and the participant would profit from the offer, whereas neither would earn any money if the participant rejected the offer (see Fig. 2). Because mak-ing a decision in the bribe condition additionally creates the ethical concern of colluding with a briber (which is not the case in the control condition), this design allowed us to uncover the specific role of the rDLPFC in bribery-related decision-making.

On the basis of our recent study on corruption and of previous literature that revealed a role of moral cost on ethical decision-making, we hypothesized that partici-pants would be generally less willing to accept the offers in the bribe condition than in the control condition. More importantly, according to the tDCS literature mentioned above, we expected that participants who received cath-odal tDCS over the rDLPFC would be more likely to accept offers in the bribe condition than would participants who received sham stimulation in the control condition, espe-cially when larger offers were proposed. In contrast, we did not form a specific hypothesis about how anodal tDCS affects corrupt behaviors because of its mixed effect on social and moral behaviors. Moreover, we tested several computational models and identified the one that best characterized actual behaviors for all tDCS groups, which allowed us to delineate how rDLPFC specifically contrib-utes to the computations underlying corrupt acts.

## Method

### Participants

One hundred twenty French-speaking students from University of Lyon I and local residents (54 women; age: M = 22.4 years, SD = 4.4) were recruited via online advertisements. The sample size was adopted on the basis of previous tDCS studies on similar topics (Maréchal et al., 2017; Ruff et al., 2013), which are stan-dard in the field. All participants were psychiatrically and neurologically healthy and were not taking any medications, as confirmed by a standardized clinical screening. The tDCS study was approved by the local ethics committees. All experimental protocols and pro-cedures were conducted in accordance with institutional- review-board guidelines for experimental testing and complied with the latest revision of the Declaration of Helsinki.

### Task and design

Participants were randomly assigned to three tDCS treatment conditions with 40 persons in each: (a) anodal stimulation (18 women; age: M = 22.6 years, SD = 5.5), (b) cathodal stimulation over the rDLPFC (17 women; age: M = 21.9 years, SD = 2.6), or (c) sham stimulation (19 women; age: M = 22.6 years, SD = 4.8). Participants were blind to condition (see the Supple-mental Material for the tDCS protocol). The main experiment included a computerized incentive task and a follow-up paper-and-pencil rating task, which lasted around 30 min in total (see the Sup-plemental Material for procedure details). In the com-puterized task, participants were assigned the role of the power holder who decides to accept or reject finan-cial offers (see Fig. 2a). In a cover story, they were informed that they would be presented with a series of choices from an independent group, whose data were collected previously by the experimenter. Specifically, participants were led to believe that this independent group of online attendants (denoted as proposers here-after) played a game of chance. This independent group did not actually exist, and the choices made by this group were predetermined by the task software. Each proposer was presented with two options that would earn them different payoffs. The larger payoff ranged from €60 to €130 (see details below), and the smaller payoff was fixed at €5. One of the two payoffs was randomly indicated by the computer as the one to be received. According to the rules of the game, the pro-poser should report the payoff indicated by the com-puter, which determined the final payoff (i.e., the control condition). However, the response of the pro-poser was never checked by the experimenters. This allowed the proposer to lie by reporting the alternative payoff that had not been indicated by the computer when this would earn the proposer more profit (i.e., the bribe condition). In other words, the only difference between the two conditions was that in the bribe condi-tion, the proposer cheated for a larger payoff by report-ing the nonchosen larger payoff, whereas in the control condition, the proposer honestly reported

the chosen larger payoff. Importantly, participants were told that each proposer had been informed that whether or not they obtained the payoff of the reported option cru-cially depended on the decisions of a power holder (i.e., the participants themselves). To obtain the profits in the reported option, the proposer could share a por-tion of the money from their potential gain (i.e., the reported larger payoff) to influence the power holder's decision. The task for the power holder was to decide whether to accept or reject the offer on the basis of the information above. If the power holder accepted the offer, both the power holder and the proposer would benefit from the payoff. If the power holder rejected the offer, neither of them earned anything. Participants were informed that they would be paid at the end of the experiment based on one of their decisions in a randomly selected trial. Several aspects of this task merit additional notes. First, participants were informed that each decision was independent, and we matched each decision with dif-ferent proposers to avoid possible learning effects or strategic responses. Second, each participant was actu-ally paid €30 at the end, as required by the ethics approval board. Finally, we designed the task so the proposers always reported the option with a larger pay-off, so their personal profits after sharing with the power holder were always more than the €5 option. This ensured that selfish motivation was the only source that drove the proposer to cheat for a higher payoff and ruled out other motivations perceived by participants that might influence their subsequent behaviors. We implemented a 3 × 2 mixed design by manipulat-ing the tDCS treatment (a between-subject factor) and the task condition (a within-subject factor). Crucially, we operationally defined corrupt behaviors as the acceptance of offers made by the proposer only when the proposer lied (the bribe condition). Compared with accepting offers in the control condition, accepting offers in the bribe condition incurred the moral cost of colluding with the proposer's dishonesty. We also manipulated the offer proportion, which was defined as the proportion of the amount the proposer decided to share with the power holder from the payoff the proposer would have earned in the reported option, which ranged from 10% to 90% (in steps of 10%; nine levels). This allowed us to investigate whether and how the degree of temptation of a bribe modulated corrupt behaviors. To further increase the variance of offers, we set potential gains that could be earned by the proposer (i.e., the larger payoff, which ranged from €60 to €130 in steps of 10; eight levels). This yielded 72 trials, each involving a unique offer, which appeared once in each condition. Each trial began with a screen displaying two payoff options in the game of chance: the computer's choice (indicated by a computer icon) and the proposer's offer. Participants were asked to decide whether to accept or reject the offer by pressing relevant buttons with either the left or right index finger at their own pace. A yellow bar appeared below the corresponding option for 0.5 s once the decision was made. Each trial ended with an intertrial interval of random duration (M = 1 s; see Fig. 2b). The order of these trials was randomized across participants to reduce the confounding effect of the condition order. In addition, the positions of payoffs were randomized within participants, and those of the choice options were counterbalanced across partici-pants. All stimuli were presented using Presentation software (Version 14; Neurobehavioral Systems, 2009). After completing the experiment, participants were asked to perform a follow-up rating task in which they reported their subjective feelings about the task. Then they filled out a series of task-irrelevant control mea-sures (see the Supplemental Material for details). They were debriefed, paid, and thanked at the end of the experiment.

**Data analyses**

One participant in the cathodal group was excluded because technical issues prevented complete data recording, thus leaving a total of 119 participants whose data were further analyzed (overall: 54 women;

age: M = 22.4 years, SD = 4.5; anodal group: 18 women; age: M = 22.6 years, SD = 5.5; cathodal group: 17 women; age: M = 22.0 years, SD = 2.5; sham group: 19 females; age: M = 22.6 years, SD = 4.8). Overall, participants did not report any uncomfortable feelings after the experi-ment and were not able to correctly identify the treat-ment to which they were assigned, $\chi2(1, N = 119) = 1.89$, $p = .169$. Because no difference in age, $F(2, 116) = 0.26$, $p = .775$, or gender, $\chi2(2, N = 119) = 0.13$, $p = .939$, was observed between tDCS groups, we did not include these variables as covariates for later analyses. Behav-ioral analyses were conducted using R (Versions 3.5.3 and 3.6.3; R Core Team, 2019, 2020). Model-based analy-ses were performed using the hierarchical Bayesian approach via the hBayesDM package (Version 1.1.1; Ahn et al., 2017). For method details, see the Supplemental Material.

**tDCS procedure**

The tDCS was administered using a multichannel stimu-lator (neuroConn, Munich, Germany) and pairs of stan-dard electrodes covered with conductive paste. On the basis of previous literature closely relevant to the cur-rent study (Knoch et al., 2006; Strang et al., 2014), we designated our target site as the position centering around the following Talairach coordinates: x = 39, y = 37, z = 22. This location approximately corresponds to the electrode position of AF4 in the 10-10 electroen-cephalography (EEG) system (see Fig. 1, right; marked with a black circle). The vertex, which corresponded to the electrode position of Cz, was chosen as the reference electrode on the basis of the study by Maréchal et al. (2017). To illustrate the strength of the stimulation, we performed current-flow simulations with the realistic volumetric-approach to simulate tran-scranial electric stimulation (ROAST) tool (Version 3.0; Huang et al., 2019; https://github.com/andypotatohy/ roast). For additional methodological details, see the Supplemental Material.

**Results**

**Applying tDCS over rDLPFC increased the probability of accepting bribes with higher offer proportions**

We first tested our main hypothesis regarding choice behavior. Using mixed-effect logistic regression, we observed that participants were less likely to accept an offer in the bribe condition than in the control condition—a main effect of task condition: $\chi2(1, N = 17{,}136) = 126.94$, $p < .001$—and more likely to do so when the offer proportion increased—a main effect of offer proportion: $\chi2(1, N = 17{,}136) = 96.34$, $p < .001$. We also detected a significant two-way interaction between task condition and offer proportion, $\chi2(1, N = 17{,}136) = 33.05$, $p < .001$. Post hoc analyses indicated that participants in the bribe condition were more likely to accept offers when the offer proportion increased than participants in the control condition were ($z = 5.41$, $p < .001$). More importantly, we found a significant three-way interaction between tDCS group, task condition, and offer proportion with respect to whether the offer was accepted, $\chi2(2, N = 17{,}136) = 8.04$, $p = .018$ (see Fig. 3). To follow up the three-way interaction, we performed post hoc analyses on choice for each tDCS group. These analyses incorporated task condition, offer proportion, and their interaction as fixed-effect predictors. We found that participants in the bribe condition who received either type of tDCS stimulation were more likely to accept offers when the offer proportion increased than participants in the control condition were (anodal: $z = 4.67$, $p < .001$; cathodal: $z = 4.34$, $p < .001$), which was not the case in the sham group ($z = 0.67$, $p = .501$; see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material for details). Notably, we did not observe any main effect of tDCS or related interaction on a series of other behavioral measures, including decision time, task-related subjec-tive ratings, and task-irrelevant measures (see Fig. S2 and Tables S2–S4 in the Supplemental Material for details).

**Applying tDCS over rDLPFC modulated the bribery-elicited moral cost on concern for personal gains (β) and fairness (γ)**

Bayesian model comparison showed that Model 1 (shown below) yielded the lowest leave-one-out information criterion (LOOIC) scores and outperformed other competitive models (Models 2–4; see the Supple-mental Material for details):

$$\mathrm{SV}\left(P_{\mathrm{PH}}, P_{\mathrm{P}}\right) = \beta P_{\mathrm{PH}} + \lambda P_{\mathrm{P}} + \gamma \left| P_{\mathrm{P}} - P_{\mathrm{PH}} \right|$$

$$\beta, \lambda, \gamma = \begin{cases} \beta_{\mathrm{control}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{control}}, \gamma_{\mathrm{control}}, \text{ if control condition} \\ \beta_{\mathrm{bribe}}, \lambda_{\mathrm{bribe}}, \gamma_{\mathrm{bribe}}, \text{ if bribe condition} \end{cases}$$

In this model, SV denotes the subjective value of the choice. PP and PPH represent the offer's payoff for the proposer and power holder respectively, given different choices (i.e., to accept or reject the offer). β and λ measure the decision weights on personal profits and proposer's gain from the offer, respectively; γ measures the sensitivity to the absolute-payoff inequality between the power holder and the proposer. The posterior pre-dictive check revealed that the proportion of accep-tance predicted by this model could capture the proportion of observed acceptance across individuals (both conditions for all groups: rs > .99, ps < .001; see Figs. S3–S7 in the Supplemental Material for the poste-rior predictive check at various levels), which further justified the validity of our model. To examine how bribery-elicited moral cost affected each parameter and how tDCS treatment modulated such effects, we implemented mixed-effects linear regression on each parameter separately, including tDCS group, task condition, and their interactions as the fixed-effect predictors. We also allowed intercepts to vary across participants as the random effects. As a result, we first found a main effect of task condition for all three parameters, namely that participants devalued the personal gains, β: $F(1, 116) = 18.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .092$; the proposer's gains, λ: $F(1, 116) = 172.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .481$; and the absolute-payoff differences, γ: $F(1, 116) = 96.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .320$, in the bribe con-dition relative to the control condition. Furthermore, we observed a main effect of tDCS treatment on γ, $F(2, 116) = 20.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .166$. Post hoc analyses showed that participants in the anodal group decreased their concern for the absolute-payoff differences rela-tive to participants in the sham group, $t(116) = 3.05$, $p = .003$ (false-discovery-rate [FDR] corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.55$, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.19, 0.92], which was even further reduced in the cathodal group (relative to the anodal group), $t(116) = 3.35$, $p = .002$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.61$, 95% CI = [0.24, 0.98] (see the Supplemental Material for details). More intriguingly, we found an interaction effect between tDCS group and task condition on decision weights on personal gains, β: $F(2, 116) = 11.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .116$, and absolute-payoff differences, γ: $F(2, 116) = 16.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta p2 = .320$, but not on proposers' gains, λ: $F(2, 116) = 2.35$, $p = .100$, $\eta p2 = .025$. Post hoc analyses for β showed that compared with participants who received sham tDCS, participants who received cathodal tDCS had decreased weights on personal gains in the control condition, $t(213) = -2.21$, $p = .042$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.59$, 95% CI = [−1.13, −0.06], but they had increased weights in the bribe condition, $t(213) = 2.55$, $p = .035$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.68$, 95% CI = [0.15, 1.22]. Anodal tDCS induced a similar effect of β in the control condition, $t(213) = -3.55$, $p = .001$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.95$, 95% CI = [−1.48, −0.41], but the enhancement effect was not statistically significant in the bribe con-dition, $t(213) = 1.58$, $p = .172$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.42$, 95% CI = [−0.11, 0.95]. Regarding γ, post hoc analyses showed that compared with participants in the sham group, participants in both the anodal group, $t(228) = 5.91$, $p < .001$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 1.42$, 95% CI = [0.93, 1.91], and the cathodal group, $t(228) = 7.46$, $p < .001$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 1.80$, 95% CI = [1.31, 2.29], were less aversive to absolute-payoff differences (i.e., the general inequality) in the control

condition. However, in the bribe condi-tion, participants in the cathodal group were less aver-sive to the absolute-payoff inequality compared with both the sham group, $t(228) = 2.15$, $p = .049$ (FDR corrected), Cohen's $d = 0.52$, 95% CI = [0.04, 1.00], and the anodal group, $t(228) = 3.45$, $p = .002$ (FDR cor-rected), Cohen's $d = 0.83$, 95% CI = [0.35, 1.32]; see Figure 4 for the summary for key parameters; see Fig. S8 in the Supplemental Material for the visualization of the tDCS effect on differential parameters; also see Tables S5–S7 in the Supplemental Material for details of statistical analyses).

**Applying tDCS over rDLPFC modulates bribery-elicited moral cost on choice behaviors by mediating key parameters of the computation**

To further establish the link between the tDCS treat-ment, the bribery-elicited moral cost on these param-eters, and choice behaviors, we implemented post hoc mediation analyses with tDCS group as the predictor, the differential parameters as the mediator (i.e., $\Delta\beta = \beta bribe - \beta control$, $\Delta\gamma = \gamma bribe - \gamma control$), and the differential acceptance rate as the dependent variable (i.e., $\Delta accept = acceptbribe - acceptcontrol$). A bootstrapping procedure was applied to the mediation effect (i.e., 5,000 boot-strapped samples). We found that although the tDCS treatment did not directly modify the bribery-specific effect on choice behaviors (i.e., total effect, path c: $ps > .3$ for both tDCS effects), the differential parameters mediated the impact of tDCS treatment on the bribery- specific effect on the behaviors (i.e., direct effect [path c']: $ps < .001$ in both tDCS effects for $\Delta\beta$ and in the anodal tDCS for $\Delta\gamma$, $p = .007$ in the cathodal tDCS for $\Delta\gamma$; indirect effect [path ab] for $\Delta\beta$—anodal: $b = -0.27$, 95% CI = [−0.40, −0.15]; cathodal: $b = -0.26$, 95% CI = [−0.39, −0.12]; indirect effect [path ab] for $\Delta\gamma$—anodal: $b = 0.21$, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.30]; cathodal: $b = 0.18$, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.28]; see Figure 5; also see Table S8 in the Supplemental Material for detailed regression outputs).

## Discussion

In the present study, we combined tDCS with a novel task that captured the essence of real-life bribery to examine whether rDLPFC causally influences the cor-rupt behaviors of a power holder. As predicted, partici-pants were less likely to accept a bribe compared with a standard offer (i.e., the offer in the control condition), even when the bribe became more tempting. These results are consistent with those of other studies on moral decision-making (Crockett et al., 2014; Mazar et al., 2008; Qu et al., 2020) and confirm the role of moral cost for power holders when they decide whether to take a bribe. Model-based analyses further revealed how the computations made during bribery-related decision-making are influenced. Specifically, partici-pants depreciated personal gains ($\beta$) earned by taking the bribes, which replicates the findings of our recent fMRI study on corruption (Hu et al., 2021). In addition, we also observed stronger negative weights for both the proposer's gains ($\lambda$) and absolute differences between their payoffs ($\gamma$) in the bribe condition than in the control condition. This aligns with previous find-ings showing contextual modulation of subjective valu-ation to a partner (Bhanji & Delgado, 2014; Delgado et al., 2005) or to a fairness concern (Gao et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2018). Together, the results of the present study reveal that such bribery-elicited moral cost reshapes not only the valuation of self-profits but also other-regarding interests and thus helps to prevent the power holder from being corrupted. More interestingly, the disruption of rDLPFC (i.e., in both the anodal and cathodal groups) made partici-pants, as power holders, more likely to accept bribes (vs. standard offers) as the size of the prospective pay-off increased, but this finding did not hold for the sham group. Importantly, this tDCS effect over rDLPFC did not influence other measures (e.g., decision time, sub-jective ratings), suggesting that general cognitive or affective processes are less likely to constitute the underlying mechanism. Taking a model-based approach, we further showed that disrupting rDLPFC also alters the computations that contribute to bribery decisions.

Specifically, cathodal tDCS over rDLPFC mitigated the effect of the moral cost on personal gains due to bribe taking (Δβ). This finding is consistent with a previous brain-lesion study in which patients with lesions of DLPFC selectively reduced the moral cost to personal profits (Zhu et al., 2014). Moreover, altering the rDLPFC excitability via cathodal tDCS enhanced the effect of the bribery-elicited moral cost on fairness concerns (Δγ). As noted previously, studies using a standard ulti-matum game consistently showed that inhibiting the rDLPFC by low-frequency repetitive transcranial mag-netic stimulation (Knoch et al., 2006) or cathodal tDCS (Knoch et al., 2008; Speitel et al., 2019) increases the tolerance of unfairness. Although we replicated these findings by showing a less negative γ for the cathodal group than the sham group in the control condition, we found that participants in the cathodal group become more aversive to the inequity between them-selves and the proposer. Collectively, these results in the cathodal group indicate a dual role of rDLPFC dur-ing bribery-related decision-making: It not only over-rides selfish motivation when it conflicts with moral principles (Carlson & Crockett, 2018) but also integrates the moral cost in modulating fairness concerns. This account is further supported by the mediation analyses, which established the link between rDLPFC, computa-tions underlying bribery-related decision-making, and final behaviors. It is worth noting that the excitation of rDLPFC via anodal tDCS had a similar effect as cathodal tDCS in modulating bribe-taking behaviors and the computa-tions underlying bribery-related decision-making. There is no a priori reason to believe that anodal and cathodal tDCS should induce opposite behavioral effects in the moral domain. Indeed, previous evidence is mixed concerning the anodal effect on moral behav-iors, which varies in different paradigms. Although Maréchal et al. (2017) showed that anodal tDCS over rDLPFC increased honesty in a die-rolling task, another tDCS study with an instrumental-deception paradigm indicated the opposite effect (Mameli et al., 2010). In agreement with this, an fMRI study has also shown that DLPFC is recruited more in dishonest individuals when they have a chance to cheat (Greene & Paxton, 2009). Moreover, the classical polarity effect of tDCS (i.e., anodal excitation and cathodal inhibition) has been shown to be much less common in the cognitive domain than in the motor domain ( Jacobson et al., 2012). A systematic review has revealed highly variable effects of tDCS over the DLPFC on cognitive functions such as working memory (Tremblay et al., 2014). Such inconsistent effects also exist in the social domain. For example, although inhibiting rDLPFC with cathodal tDCS consistently enhances the tolerance to unfairness (Knoch et al., 2008; Speitel et al., 2019), no evidence suggests that anodal tDCS increases fairness concerns (Speitel et al., 2019). Lastly, there are large individual variations in tDCS effects on modulating behaviors (López-Alonso et al., 2014; Wiethoff et al., 2014) and in the relationship between DLPFC engagement and moral behaviors (Hu et al., 2021; Yin & Weber, 2019). Together, our findings confirm that the classical polar-ity effect of tDCS, originally observed in the primary motor cortex, should not be expected to be directly applied to other brain areas and to social and moral behaviors such as corruption. Some limitations of the present study should be noted. First, bribery-elicited moral cost merits further consider-ation. In our task, taking bribes was presumed to carry the only moral cost, that of colluding in fraud. In the control condition, no fraud was taking place, and there-fore the offer was not considered to be a bribe. However, it is likely that an extra moral cost might be involved simply because of the action of accepting bribes. Because of the present design, it is impossible to isolate this puta-tive moral cost because it always covaries with the other moral cost. Second, because our sample consisted of healthy adults mainly of college age, researchers should be cautious about generalizing these findings to indi-viduals who actually hold power in companies or gov-ernmental agencies, who are usually older. Future studies are needed to address these issues. Overall, the present study provides empirical evi-dence that perturbing rDLPFC via tDCS causally influ-ences a power holder's decisions of whether to accept a bribe and modifies the computations underlying bribery-related decision-making. These findings shed light on the neurobiological substrates of corrupt acts and open a new window to investigate corruption using a multidisciplinary research approach.

## Transparency

Action Editor: Daniela Schiller Editor: Patricia J. Bauer Author Contributions R. Philippe, V. Guigon, and S. Zhao contributed equally to this study. Y. Hu and J.-C. Dreher conceived of and designed the study. R. Philippe, V. Guigon, and S. Zhao collected the data. Y. Hu analyzed the data. Y. Hu wrote the first draft of the manuscript, and J.-C. Dreher, J. J. Bonaiuto, E. Derrington, and B. Corgnet made critical edits. All authors approved the final manuscript for submission. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article. Funding This research was funded by the IDEXLYON project of the Université de Lyon (Project INDEPTH) under the Pro-gramme Investissements d'Avenir (ANR-16-IDEX-0005), by a grant from the LABEX CORTEX project of the Université de Lyon (Grant No. ANR-11-LABX-0042) under the pro-gram Investissements d'Avenir (Grant No. ANR-11- IDEX-007) by Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) to J.-C. Dreher, and by a grant from the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2019M660007) to Y. Hu. Open Practices All data and analysis code have been made publicly avail-able via OSF and can be accessed at https://osf.io/ve837/. The design and analysis plan for the experiment were not preregistered. This article has received the badges for Open Data and Open Materials. More information about the Open Practices badges can be found at http://www .psychologicalscience.org/publications/badges.

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


**Fig. 1**.

Electric field simulation for (a) anodal and (b) cathodal transcranial direct-current stimu- lation (tDCS). The position centering around the Talairach coordinate of x = 39, y = 37, z = 22 (marked with a black circle in the images on the right) was chosen as the target site. This location approximately corresponds to the electrode position of AF4 in the 10-10 electroencephalography (EEG) system. The vertex was chosen as the reference electrode and corresponds to the electrode position of Cz. The voltage indicates strength of tDCS across the whole brain. L = left; R = right.




**Fig. 2**.

Illustration of the transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) manipulation and behavioral paradigm (a) and an example trial sequence (b). All participants were assigned randomly to three tDCS groups (i.e., anodal, cathodal, or sham). The task involved two roles: a proposer (i.e., a fictitious participant in a previous online study in which a game of chance was played) and a power holder (i.e., the real participant in the current study). In the control condition, the proposer truthfully reported the larger payoff selected by the computer. In the bribe condition, shown here in (a), the proposer lied about the selected larger payoff. In both conditions, the proposer offered a certain amount of money to the power holder, whose task was to decide whether to accept or reject the offer. In the example trial from the bribe condition (b), a proposer ("E.L.") lied by reporting the nonselected larger payoff (as indicated by the misalignment of the blue arrow and the icon of a computer) and attempted to bribe the power holder with

money from their potential gain (i.e., €40 out of €100). The participant decided whether to accept or reject the offer. Once the decision was made (i.e., accepting the bribe here), a yellow bar appeared below the corresponding option for 0.5 s to highlight the choice, which was followed by an intertrial interval (ITI) with a fixation cross (M □ 1 s, range □ 0.6–1.4 s). Trials in the control condition followed the same procedure except that the proposer truthfully reported the selected larger payoff (as indicated by the alignment of the blue arrow and the icon of a computer).




**Fig. 3.**

Mean acceptance rate of the standard offer (control condition) and bribes (bribe condition) as a function of transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) group (anodal, cathodal, or sham) and offer proportion (10% to 90% in steps of 10%). Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.




**Fig. 4.**

Model-based results. Bayesian evidence for each of the four models across the three transcranial direct-current stimula- tion (tDCS) groups (a) was calculated as the difference between the model's own leave-one-out information criterion (LOOIC) score and that of the model with the worst accuracy of out-of-sample prediction (in this case, Model 2 of the anodal group). The posterior mean of individual-level key parameters of the winning model (Model 1) is shown in (b) as a function of condi- tion and tDCS group. The parameters □, □, and □ measure the decision weights on personal profits from the proposed offers, the proposer's gain from the offer, and the sensitivity to the absolute-payoff inequality between oneself and the proposer, respectively. Each large dot represents the group-level mean; each smaller dot represents the data of a single participant. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Asterisks indicate between-group differences (*p □ .05, **p □ .01, ***p □ .001; all ps false-discovery-rate corrected).




**Fig. 5.**

Results of the mediation analysis showing the influence of receiving transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS) on the dif- ferential acceptance rate of the offer (bribe vs. control), as mediated by the differential parameters  (left) and  (right). Unstandardized coefficients are shown; differently colored coefficients on paths a and c show results for each type of tDCS separately. On the path from tDCS to differential acceptance rate, values outside parentheses reflect total effects, and values inside parentheses reflect direct effects after controlling for the mediator. Five thousand bootstrap samples (N  5,000) were used to test the significance of the indirect effect. Asterisks indicate significant paths (**p  .01, ***p  .001).