https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1Privat, MezianeMezianePrivatCPHT - Centre de Physique Théorique [Palaiseau] - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche ScientifiqueInfinite horizon for symetric strategy population gameHAL CCSD2022Population GamesStochastic Evolutionary ModelsInfinite-HorizonPopulation GamesPopulation GamesPopulation Games[MATH.MATH-PR] Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR]Privat, Meziane2022-11-09 14:22:002023-02-08 17:11:262022-11-14 20:39:01enPreprints, Working Papers, ...https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/documenthttps://hal.science/hal-03843922v1application/pdf1To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games.