hal-03843922
https://hal.science/hal-03843922
https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/document
https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/file/article%201.pdf
arxiv:2211.07708
Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game
Privat, Meziane
[MATH.MATH-PR] Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR]
UNDEFINED
Population Games
Stochastic Evolutionary Models
Infinite-Horizon
Population Games
Population Games
Population Games
To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games.
2022-09-01
2022-11-08
en