%0 Unpublished work
%T Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game
%+ Centre de Physique ThÃ©orique [Palaiseau] (CPHT)
%A Privat, Meziane
%8 2022-09-01
%D 2022
%Z 2211.07708
%K Population Games
%K Stochastic Evolutionary Models
%K Infinite-Horizon
%K Population Games
%K Population Games
%K Population Games
%Z Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR]Preprints, Working Papers, ...
%X To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games.
%G English
%2 https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/document
%2 https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/file/article%201.pdf
%L hal-03843922
%U https://hal.science/hal-03843922