%0 Unpublished work %T Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game %+ Centre de Physique Théorique [Palaiseau] (CPHT) %A Privat, Meziane %8 2022-09-01 %D 2022 %Z 2211.07708 %K Population Games %K Stochastic Evolutionary Models %K Infinite-Horizon %K Population Games %K Population Games %K Population Games %Z Mathematics [math]/Probability [math.PR]Preprints, Working Papers, ... %X To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games. %G English %2 https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/document %2 https://hal.science/hal-03843922v1/file/article%201.pdf %L hal-03843922 %U https://hal.science/hal-03843922