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Article Dans Une Revue Review of Philosophy and Psychology Année : 2010

Self-ascriptions of belief and transparency

Pascal Engel

Résumé

Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.

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Philosophie
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halshs-01200548 , version 1 (24-09-2015)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01200548 , version 1

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Pascal Engel. Self-ascriptions of belief and transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2010, 1 (4), pp.593-610. ⟨halshs-01200548⟩
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