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Article Dans Une Revue European Journal of the History of Economic Thought Année : 2018

Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players

Résumé

Bayesian game theorists claim to represent players as Bayes rational agents, maximising their expected utility given their beliefs about the choices of other players. I argue that this narrative is inconsistent with the formal structure of Bayesian game theory. This is because (i) the assumption of common belief in rationality is equivalent to equilibrium play, as in classical game theory, and (ii) the players' prior beliefs are a mere mathematical artefact and not actual beliefs held by the players. Bayesian game theory is thus a Bayesian representation of the choice of players who are committed to play equilibrium strategy profiles.

Dates et versions

halshs-01941773 , version 1 (02-12-2018)

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Citer

Guilhem Lecouteux. Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2018, 21st Annual Conference of the European-Society-for-the-History-of-Economic-Thought (ESHET) - Rationality in Economics Antwerp, MAY 18-20, 2017, 25 (6), pp.1420-1454. ⟨10.1080/09672567.2018.1523207⟩. ⟨halshs-01941773⟩
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