Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Political Economy Année : 2023

Informed Information Design

Résumé

We study informed persuasion whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim optimal mechanisms is non-empty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single-and multi-agent interactive environments in which ex ante optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.
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Dates et versions

hal-04296464 , version 1 (20-11-2023)

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Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta. Informed Information Design. Journal of Political Economy, 2023, 131 (11), pp.3186-3232. ⟨10.1086/724843⟩. ⟨hal-04296464⟩

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