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Article Dans Une Revue Theoretical Economics Année : 2023

On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators

Résumé

A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n ≥ p, the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n < p, combining (variants of) the familiar random dictator and voting by veto mechanisms yields a large family of maximal guarantees: it is exhaustive if n = 2 and almost so if p ≤ 2n. Voting rules à la Condorcet or Borda, even in probabilistic form, are ruled out by our worst case viewpoint.
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Dates et versions

hal-04319827 , version 1 (03-12-2023)

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Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Hervé Moulin. On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators. Theoretical Economics, 2023, 18, pp.97 - 127. ⟨10.3982/te4832⟩. ⟨hal-04319827⟩
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