Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory - CNRS - Centre national de la recherche scientifique Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Cognition Année : 2017

Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory

Résumé

Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assumption. We used a two response paradigm in which participants have to give an immediate answer and afterwards are allowed extra time before giving a final response. In four experiments we used a range of procedures (e.g., challenging response deadline, concurrent load) to knock out Type 2 processing and make sure that the initial response was intuitive in nature. Our key finding is that we frequently observe correct, logical responses as the first, immediate response. Response confidence and latency analyses indicate that these initial correct responses are given fast, with high confidence, and in the face of conflicting heuristic responses. Findings suggest that fast and automatic Type 1 processing also cues a correct logical response from the start. We sketch a revised dual process model in which the relative strength of different types of intuitions determines reasoning performance.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-03510054 , version 1 (04-01-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Bence Bago, Wim De Neys. Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 2017, 158, pp.90-109. ⟨10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014⟩. ⟨hal-03510054⟩
13 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More