Policy regimes, policy-planning networks and corporate elites - CNRS - Centre national de la recherche scientifique Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2022

Policy regimes, policy-planning networks and corporate elites

Marta Varanda
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1267091
Pedro Neves
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1267092

Résumé

How do corporate elites influence policy-making? We explore this question by examining one of the ways in which corporate elites influence policymaking: their involvement in policy think tanks. Building on Michael Useem's (1984) work on the social characteristics and activities of influential corporate board members (i.e. 'inner circles'), we analyse the factors that shape the dynamics of inner circles in two countries: France and Portugal. We compare the inner circle dynamics in these two countries to show how these dynamics are shaped by the different political-institutional contexts or policy regimes in which they operate. We argue that the profiles of corporate leaders involved in think tanks depend on the degree of state openness to external interest groups. France and Portugal differ in terms of state openness. The French state is considered to be closed to external interest groups. It long ago created professional schools, notably Polytechnique and the ENA, to train independent and competent administrative elites. French administrative elites are traditionally jealous of their prerogatives, whereas the Portuguese state is described as lacking a stable administrative elite, making it more permeable to interest groups. In addition, a democratic regime took root in France with the Third Republic in the 1870s, while the Portuguese transition to democracy began with the Carnation Revolution of 1974 after almost 50 years of dictatorship. We argue that the policy regime conditions the composition of the inner circle, which we assess using the profiles of interlockers between corporate boards and think tank boards. When policy makers form a relatively closed, stable and specialised group, the inner circle tends to assimilate members of this elite in order to be audible. Conversely, when policymakers form an open, changing and unspecialised group, the inner circle tends to invest in the policy field to optimise its impact. The analysis is based on datasets of the most important listed companies (100 in France and 48 in Portugal) and the most important think tanks (39 in France and 33 in Portugal). We identify the small groups of interlockers who are simultaneously board members of policy-planning agencies and large corporations (62 in France and 45 in Portugal). We compare first the policy-planning networks and then the profiles of these interlockers. Among them, the pantoufleur emerges as a parangon figure in France, while in Portugal it is the owner who plays this role. A pantoufleur is a former senior civil servant, usually a Polytechnique or ENA graduate, who has joined a private company. This comparison partly confirms our arguments.

Domaines

Sociologie
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-04149120 , version 1 (03-07-2023)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04149120 , version 1

Citer

Catherine Comet, Marta Varanda, Pedro Neves. Policy regimes, policy-planning networks and corporate elites: a comparison between France and Portugal. Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Conference, Jul 2022, Amsterdam (NETHERLANDS), France. ⟨hal-04149120⟩
2 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More